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Chapter 1
Approaches to South Tyrol
Anyone interested in the history of twentieth-century Europe can learn a 
good deal about the wider complexities of that century by focusing on a 
relatively small geographical area situated in the centre of Europe: South 
Tyrol. This small region situated between the main alpine ridge at the 
Brenner Pass and Lake Garda, provides the historian with a microcosm 
of the political, economic and social issues that dominated the history 
of twentieth-century Europe. The history of South Tyrol contains all the 
central issues that characterized twentieth-century European history: war, 
expulsion, suppression, colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, fascism, 
resistance, division, terrorism, dictatorship, the ef fects of the bipolar rela-
tionship between the USSR and the USA, technical progress, the Cold 
War, Europeanization and globalization, environmental protection and 
neo-liberalism. Crucially, South Tyrol also of fers a vivid case study of the 
cultural implications of the interaction of these complex issues throughout 
the twentieth century.
In 1920, as part of the First World War settlement, the small area of 
South Tyrol was annexed (with the consent of the Western allies) by the 
Italian state. In the decades that followed, this small German-speaking area 
was subjected to an of ficial programme of Italianization, which involved the 
attempted cultural deconstruction of the Austro-German identity of the 
region. Despite this prolonged process of denationalization the Germanic 
culture of the area was never successfully undermined and the people of 
the region never lost their appetite for self-determination, which brought 
the area to the brink of civil war in the early 1960s. The South Tyrol ques-
tion posed serious challenges to the stability of Western Europe against the 
backdrop of the Iron Curtain and the division of Europe. The fact that the 
explosive potential inherent in the South Tyrolean situation was defused 
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and ultimately channelled into a process of regionalization has led many 
commentators to hail it as the success story in minority protection of the 
European Union. Since its birth in the late 1940s, the European project 
has been instrumental in preventing warfare and providing diplomatic 
solutions within Western Europe. South Tyrol posed the ultimate and, in 
many respects, symbolic challenge to that spirit of diplomatic endeavour.
The advent of a regionalist approach in European politics in the 1950s 
and the institutionalization of regional legislative developments through the 
Madrid Convention in 1980 defused a number of explosive regional situa-
tions in Europe. The small region of South Tyrol is today one of the major 
European regional players and has managed to co-found the ‘Europaregion 
Tirol-Südtirol/Alto Adige-Trentino’, thus creating a potentially powerful 
economic and political institution straddling the sovereignty of two well-
established states, Austria and Italy, and establishing itself in the midst 
of them. This development was gradual, and it emerged from the South 
Tyrolean nationalist drive for self-determination. This book analyses in 
detail how the shift in paradigms from historical nationalism to modern 
regionalism occurred against the backdrop of European, global and local 
historical developments.
South Tyrol is a small geographical area, barely 120km from north to 
south and little more from east to west. Most holiday makers who travel 
through it on their way from Northern Europe to the sunny South will 
notice that it takes at least an hour and a half in the car after passing the 
border between Austria and Italy on the Brenner Pass, before the road signs 
become fully Italian and the German language disappears completely. Near 
Salurn/Salorno1 the architecture of the villages glimpsed from the motor-
way changes and becomes ‘very Italian’. At that stage one has left South 
Tyrol and entered the Provincia di Trento. Anyone with a knowledge of 
German and Italian will also have noticed that in South Tyrol the bilingual 
road signs along the A22, the Brenner/Brennero Motorway, bear names 
1 All place names in South Tyrol appear in their German and Italian forms, including 
Trient/Trento, while place names in the Italian heartland appear in their English 
form.
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that often appear unrelated. There may be little dif ference between Bozen 
and Bolzano, the name of South Tyrol’s capital, but Gossensass and Colle 
Isarco or Neumarkt and Egna hardly seem like two versions of the same 
town. Even the Italian name for the entire region, Alto Adige, is not a literal 
translation of South Tyrol, which would in fact be Tirolo del Sud.
In many respects the word pair Alto Adige/South Tyrol hints at the 
entire complexity of this part of the world. Where there is a South Tyrol, 
there should be a North Tyrol, otherwise there would be no need to add 
the prefix South to distinguish one part of the landscape from another. 
North Tyrol is part of another independent state, Austria, which is located 
beyond the Brenner border. South Tyrol therefore highlights a connection 
to an area outside the Italian state. Those who use South Tyrol to describe 
the area in question, and this is the vast majority of the 320,000 German-
speaking South Tyroleans, keep alive the memory of the division of Tyrol 
in 1918 and a loyalty to a past political unity with Austria.
Alternatively, the fact that the 160,000 Italians in South Tyrol refer 
to the region as Alto Adige, the high Etsch/Adige region, implies that 
there must be a lower Etsch/Adige region. As the Etsch/Adige river f lows 
from the Swiss-Austro-Italian border down through the Vinschgau/Val 
Venosta, unites with the river Eisack/Isarco and then f lows to central Italy, 
this lower Etsch/Adige region is in Italy where the river f lows into the 
Adriatic Sea. The Italian name for the region, therefore, emphasizes the 
region’s geographical connection to the entire Italian landscape: it is liter-
ally drawing the region into the Italian homeland. Thus the two names for 
the region are not merely German and Italian versions of each other, they 
are, in fact, linguistic attempts to appropriate the area based on competing 
political and cultural understandings of the region. An exploration of the 
historical underpinnings of this linguistically expressed tension will form 
the basis of this study.
The border between Austria and Italy was established in the aftermath 
of World War I and thus follows the ‘natural boundary theory’ as propa-
gated by Italian nationalists. This theory was based on the idea that the ‘true 
border’ of a nation state should be decided by nature rather than ethnicity. 
However, this natural boundary theory also conveniently answered some 
pressing military, strategic, political and economic needs of the Italian state. 
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From a military strategic point of view, the drawing of the border along 
the Brenner Pass/Passo di Brennero and the Reschen Pass/Passo di Resia, 
which are two of the lower passes along the main alpine ridge, answered 
late nineteenth-century Italian needs to secure the Southern Alps and the 
Po Valley from northern attacks. A defense line 120km further south, at a 
much more distinct geographical point such as the gorge of Salurn/Salorno 
would have been much cheaper, more ef ficient and easier to instal, but 
the desire to own ‘our half ’ of the main alpine ridge was dominant in the 
kingdom of Italy towards the end of the nineteenth century.
The Brenner Pass has for centuries marked the point of busiest trade 
in the Alps between Northern and Southern Europe. Other passes in the 
central Alps, such as the Reschen Pass/Passo di Resia, the Staller Sattel/
Passo di Stalle and the Timmelsjoch/Passo Rombo, never had comparable 
importance in international trade. To control the Brenner Pass/Passo di 
Brennero politically has thus always meant more than simply to participate 
in the f low of goods: it meant a certain degree of control over imports and 
exports and an enormous amount of political power. Massive fortresses 
dotting the landscape from Innsbruck down as far as Sterzing/Vipiteno 
testify to the attempt to control the f low of goods, travelling armies and 
intellectual exchange. The Italians, when espousing the natural border 
theory, were also driven by a pressing need to control this essential gateway 
of European trade.
South Tyrol boasts another feature which became significant in the 
late nineteenth century: water. In a period that was above all else inf luenced 
by the growing impact of the industrial revolution, water represented a 
powerful natural resource. The country’s biggest rivers, Etsch/Adige and 
Eisack/Isarco, lend themselves to various uses, for example, the production 
of electricity. As the main alpine ridge divides south from north-f lowing 
rivers, its possession was another asset for Italy. Christoph Guf ler has argued 
that the prospect of developing hydroelectricity was one of the main rea-
sons for the forced amalgamation with Italy in 1920.2 At the end of the 
2 Christoph Guf ler, ‘Stauseen und Kraftwerke im Ultental’, Südtirol in Wort und Bild, 
Vol. 50, No. 3 (2006), 24–26.
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nineteenth century, Italy was in the process of modernization and indus-
trialization, South Tyrol’s abundance of water along with its mountainous 
relief structure of fered huge potential for further development. In fact, 
as soon as Italy owned South Tyrol it began to build hydroelectric power 
plants alongside an intensification of its ef forts in the fascist campaign to 
industrialize Bozen/Bolzano and upper Italy.
Hydroelectric power was only one factor among others and can only 
be understood in the context of nationalist philosophies and the defense of 
natural resources. In the contemporary nationalist context it was important 
to own the sources of the rivers if one wanted to use their lower parts to 
produce electricity in order to gain and defend a certain level of economic 
autarky. It was felt that no northerly neighbour could pressurize Italy if it 
owned the entire river, from source to mouth. The era of nationalism was 
a period highly charged with such emotional claims. Within the course 
of annexing South Tyrol it became an issue of the utmost significance to 
use the electricity not only in South Tyrol itself, but to transport it further 
South to the industrial centres in Turin and Milan. It is highly unlikely 
that Northern Italy would have become as significant an industrial area in 
the twentieth century without the inexhaustible resources of electricity 
produced in South Tyrol. Furthermore, the fascist policy of industrializing 
South Tyrol in the 1920s and 1930s was motivated purely by the desire to 
bind the largely agrarian South Tyrol more closely to Italy. This policy of 
industrialization dovetailed with another major plank of the fascist policy 
in South Tyrol: the desire to relocate large numbers of Italian workers to 
the newly created industrial zone near Bozen/Bolzano, hence outnumber-
ing the native German-speaking population.
The early period of Italian rule over German-speaking South Tyrol sets 
the tone for much of the twentieth century: there were various attempts to 
Italianize the population through force and/or industrial plantations and 
the ensuing move of Italian workers. The German-speaking South Tyroleans 
were victims of Italian policies and remained victims for a long time, which 
explains why much of the literature on the South Tyrol issue during the 
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twentieth century pays tribute to the ‘victim discourse’ of South Tyrol,3 
and which, despite the fundamentally changed role of South Tyrol in the 
early twenty-first century, still tends to characterize the analyses in recent 
publications.4 Hence, there is a need to include more recent developments 
in minority protection and autonomy issues into a history of South Tyrol 
in the twentieth century: this monograph presents a new approach to the 
local history of South Tyrol and its interactions with European and world 
history. It also focuses strongly on the more recent past in South Tyrol (since 
the 1980s), a time when South Tyrol has left its victim status behind and 
has emerged as an economic and political force of regional significance in 
the Alps region and in the European concert of regions.
3 See for example: Dennison I. Rusinow, Italy’s Austrian Heritage, 1919–1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1969), and Antony E. Alcock, The History of the South Tyrol Question 
(London: Michael Joseph, 1970).
4 See Rolf Steininger, South Tyrol: A Minority Conf lict of the Twentieth Century (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003).
Chapter 2
Tyrolean Nationalisms before 1918
The roots of many conf licts in Europe in the twentieth century can be traced 
back to the period preceding World War I. The origins of the South Tyrol 
Question, which dominated politics and society in the southern Alpine 
region for much of the twentieth century, are no exception dating back to 
the rampant nationalism of the pre-1914 period. This chapter establishes 
the links between European nationalist ideas and their ef fects on the pre-
World War I political landscape in today’s South Tyrol and Trentino.
The era of expansive nationalism in Italy
Italy united in 1861, however, nation building was not quite finished at that 
stage. Venice and Rome only became Italian in 1866 and 1870 as a result 
of negotiations with Prussia. Bismarck needed alliances with Italy to focus 
on his war with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and with France and prom-
ised Venice and Rome to Italy as a reward for such an alliance. This was a 
precedent for the acquisition of South Tyrol after World War I. In secret 
talks with the Western Allies in 1915 Italy was of fered this area in return 
for the abandonment of the existing Three Emperor’s Agreement between 
Italy, Austria and Germany, a move that would significantly weaken the 
strategic position of the axis powers Germany and Austria.
Italy’s claim on South Tyrol as articulated in the secret negotiations 
in London in 1915 was in stark contrast to the principles of Risorgimento 
nationalism which had determined the Italian unification process in the 
1860s. The underlying idea was that every nation should possess its own 
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house, that is, the state it was living in. According to this central European 
understanding nations were distinguished from each other by the use of 
dif ferent languages. Thus nationalists in Italy in the 1860s accepted that 
Italy’s northern border lay in Salurn/Salorno, the linguistic divide between 
the German and Italian-speaking worlds.1 This view changed, however, in 
the immediate pre-World War I period when a more imperialistic philoso-
phy gained ground in Italian political circles, which suggested that even 
non-Italian-speaking areas could and should become part of the Italian 
state. As late as 1914, the Italian foreign minister Sidney Sonnino restricted 
Italian interests in the north to the Trentino. In fact, in 1915 prime minister 
Antonio Salandra still declared South Tyrol to be a relatively undesirable 
object as the integration of some 200,000 Germans in order to liberate a 
few hundred Italians would lead to enormous problems if it ever came to 
defending the state’s northern border.2
It is likely that Sonnino’s view was inf luenced by the fear of pan-Slavism 
against which Austria might still constitute some kind of protection, while 
in 1914 the then prime minister Giovanni Giolitti expressed the view that 
the existence of the ailing dual monarchy protected Italy against the German 
Reich’s possible expansionist ideas further south.3 At the same time the once 
powerful Austria still tried to hold on to the idea of a multinational Empire, 
but this ideal became more and more unrealistic with the growth of rampant 
nationalism especially in the Balkans and along Austria’s fringes. The prin-
ciple of nationhood had become the driving force behind the organization 
of collective identities in the new twentieth century, but Austria’s Emperor 
Franz Joseph was too slow to recognize this new reality.
Finally, on 1 April 1915 Austria ref lected the changing realities of the 
war situation and of fered Italy the option of withdrawing from Trentino. 
Trentino was to be given to Italy after the end of the war if Italy continued 
to support the axis powers. At this stage the Italian prime minister Salandra 
1 Hanns Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, in Anton Pelinka andAndreas Maislinger, ed., Handbuch 
zur neueren Geschichte Tirols (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1993), 95–130, 97.
2 Claus Gatterer, Im Kampf gegen Rom: Bürger, Minderheiten und Autonomien in 
Italien (Vienna, Frankfurt a. M. and Zürich: Europa-Verlag, 1968), 236.
3 Gatterer, Kampf gegen Rom, 239.
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and foreign minister Sonnino were well aware that the Entente of fered 
much more than the crumbling dual monarchy.4 The Italian ambassador 
had been involved in secret talks with the Western Allies and began to real-
ize that it might be both feasible and desirable to expand the Italian nation 
state beyond the purely Italian-speaking areas, might well be the desirable 
ones. When in November 1917 the new Soviet government released details 
of all the secret agreements the previous Tsarist government had signed 
up to – among them the secret London Treaty of 1915 – the world learned 
that South Tyrol was one of the top war goals of the Italian government 
and that the new Italian imperialism demanded the Brenner Pass/Passo 
Brennero as its Northern border.5
Moderate voices such as the historian Gaetano Salvemini’s, who 
warned against a German minority problem, were swept aside by a public 
campaign citing democracy, the sovereignty of the Italian people and the 
solidarity of Italy with its brothers and sisters in the Trentino and beyond. 
This imperialist claim employed the rhetoric and logic of Risorgimento 
nationalism as it claimed that all the way up to the Brenner Pass/Passo 
Brennero the inhabitants of the land were Italian. Giuseppe Mazzini, the 
father of emancipatory nationalism, had paved the way for this kind of 
imperialist view in 1866 by claiming that only some 20 per cent of the 
Tyrolean people who lived south of the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero were 
of German origin and that they were thus easy to italianize.6
Moreover, in his Unita Italiana on 25 August 1866, he had declared 
that the Trentino, which belonged to Italy, stretched as far as Bruneck/
Brunico and the main alpine ridge including all the rivers that f lowed into 
the Etsch/Adige, Adda, Po and the Gulf of Venice.7 Thus Mazzini had, 
in ef fect, developed the blueprint for the imperialist policies of the later 
4 Umberto Corsini and Rudolf Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946 (Bozen: Autonome Provinz 
Bozen, 1988), 40.
5 Gatterer, Kampf gegen Rom, 236.
6 Rudolf Lill, Südtirol in der Zeit des Nationalismus (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag 
Konstanz, 2002), 26.
7 Oswald Gschliesser, ‘Der italienische Nationalismus’, in Franz Huter, ed., Südtirol: 
Eine Frage des europäischen Gewissens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1965), 167.
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prime minister Francesco Crispi (1887–1891, 1893–1896) by providing the 
ideological rationale for extending the geographical boundaries of the 
Italian nation state.8 Crispi had not supported the Irredenta in Northern 
Italy as his imperialist ambitions in Africa required German and Austrian 
approval, but he nevertheless contributed hugely to a change in climate in 
Italian politics in relation to its northern border, a change that benefited 
the right wing political parties in Rome in particular.
In an era which claimed that the nation was the highest political ideal 
and nationalism became an accepted motivating force in European societies, 
political strategy and moderation gradually disappeared. In the nationalis-
tically zealous period of the immediate pre-World War I era nationalism, 
imperialism and irredentism in northern Italy and southern Austria blended 
into a kind of mélange which was to have huge repercussions for Europe 
and South Tyrol, because the drawing of borders in 1919 mirrored both 
Mazzini’s claims of 1866 and Crispi’s dreams of Italy as a great power.
Nationalisms in Trentino before 1918
Neither the Trentino nor South Tyrol was apolitical in this nationalist era. 
The political landscape in the Trentino was very complicated as German 
and Italian loyalties were inextricably linked. It took the events of the war 
to polarize the population. At the beginning of the war there was a pro-Aus-
trian mood, even in the city of Trient/Trento. This loyalty was combined 
with anti-Serbian and anti-Russian sentiments. Even Vittorio Garibaldi, 
one of the nationalist representatives of Trentino, reportedly said that Italy 
was a whore if it did not fight on the side of Austria and Germany. The 
paper Il Trentino refuted reports from pro-Italian papers claiming that the 
Welschtiroler, the Trentino people, were in favour of neutrality.9
8 Corsini / Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 31.
9 Martha Stocker, ‘Austriacanti und Irredentisten’, Author’s Lecture Notes, 5.
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Nevertheless, this impression needs to be qualified: the intelligentsia 
in urban Trentino had for a long time leaned towards Italy and accentu-
ated its dif ferences to the German neighbours in the North.10 In 1896, 
for example, a monument to the poet Dante Alighieri was erected in 
Trient/Trento, which was intended to act as a symbol of cultural defiance 
in response to the monument to the poet Walther von der Vogelweide, 
which had been erected in Bozen/Bolzano in 1889. This monument was 
erected not so much in order to honour the poet, who probably never 
visited Trient/Trento, but it was the creation of an Italian symbol in a 
city with mixed national loyalties. The inscription on the monument 
highlighted the hopes and aspirations of irredentist Trient as the poet 
stretches his hand out towards the North in a defiant gesture: ‘A Dante, al 
padre, il Trentino col plauso e l’aiuto della nazione’ [dedicated to Dante, 
the father, the Trentino with the help and to the applause of the nation]. 
Following World War I, the monument became the symbol of the Italian-
ness of the Trentino.11
The more rural parts of Trentino leaned towards Austria, the country 
people admired the father-figure of the Emperor,12 but also the economic 
ties with other parts of the dual monarchy may explain the loyalty towards 
Vienna. People did not expect any economic advantages from a fusion 
with Italy as many farmers in Trentino associated Italians above all with 
the poor migrant workers they employed from time to time, ‘who prepared 
their polenta among rocks in the fields and who slept in tents. My poor 
father and my uncle said to us: children, look at the Italians over there. 
They were a pitiful sight.’13
This positive sense of af filiation with Austria in rural Trentino dis-
appeared during the course of the war. It was particularly the Austrian 
introduction of war legislation in 1915 that alienated the local people 
because the new military administrations dissolved local councils and 
10 Stocker, ‘Austriacanti und Irredentisten’, 4.
11 Gschliesser, ‘Der italienische Nationalismus’, 176.
12 Stocker, ‘Austriacanti und Irredentisten’, 3.
13 Cited in Stocker, ‘Austriacanti und Irredentisten’, 3. Note: All translations are the 
author’s translations, unless otherwise indicated.
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social organizations and began to arrest politically unreliable people, 
which meant that many innocent and well-recognized individuals found 
themselves behind bars. The Austrian military began to distrust the entire 
population of the Trentino and stipulated that all people were politically 
unreliable whose political loyalties were not proven and who refused 
to publicly display patriotism.14 This suspicious approach to the local 
population was felt even more intensely in the Austrian army where there 
were numerous Trientinians. They were accused of disloyalty to Austria-
Hungary and suspected of plotting treason. In 1916 the Austrian army 
headquarters released an order stating that Welschtiroler should be with-
drawn from the first line of defence as they were politically unreliable. It is 
hardly surprising that an increasing number of Trientinians deserted the 
Austrian army, which in turn, hardened the Austrian view of them. As a 
result of these tensions the Austrian army had in ef fect turned more and 
more into an army of occupation. Austrian newspapers did their best to 
support the anti-Trientinian theories,15 which resulted in the transforma-
tion of a politically ambiguous situation at the beginning of the war into 
an intensely polarized atmosphere of deep-seated mistrust and perceived 
suppression.
Another contributory factor to this polarization was the emergence 
of a missionary German nationalism in Trentino. The main agent of this 
nationalism was the Tiroler Volksbund, which agitated aggressively in 
favour of the Germanization of the Trentino. They sought, for example, 
to build on existing German language pockets with a view to increasing 
the number of German speakers and, crucially, the cultural significance 
of German in the area. In its agitation the Volksbund made use of the fact 
that most of the Trentino used German as the ‘Brotsprache’, the lingua 
franca. A testament to the popularity of German is the fact that German 
language courses in purely Italian-speaking areas were common, and occa-
sionally Italians ticked the box ‘German-speaking’ in the census.16 By 1917 
14 Cited in Stocker, ‘Austriacanti und Irredentisten’, 7.
15 Stocker, ‘Austriacanti und Irredentisten’, 10.
16 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 100.
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any chance of peaceful cultural co-existence of the German- and Italian-
speaking inhabitants of the Trentino region had been destroyed by a com-
bination of German missionary nationalism and a hardening irredentist 
opposition in Northern Italy.
Nationalisms in German South Tyrol before 1918
The German missionary tendencies apparent in German-speaking South 
Tyrol exacerbated existing tensions in Trentino. This cultural chauvinism, 
which had its origins in the patriotic concerns of the 1870s and 1880s for the 
survival of the German language and culture, was fundamentally radicalized 
by the pre-World War I nationalism.17 Unlike the Trentino, South Tyrol 
was much more homogeneous in its ethnic/linguistic divide: in 1910 South 
Tyrol comprised 221,142 Germans, 9,350 Ladins and some 7,000 Italians.18 
Of the working population, sixty-two per cent were involved in farming 
and forestry, while thirteen per cent were engaged in industry and mining 
and eighteen per cent were in the tertiary sector. The ethno-linguistic 
homogeneity in South Tyrol manifested in a clear Austro-Tyrolean form 
of settlement, which ref lected Germano-alpine architecture. It was also 
manifest in the complete dominance of the German language, loyalty to the 
Emperor, pro-Habsburg sentiments and a cultural focus that looked north 
in a socio-political sense. Hence the often abused contention, abused that 
is in the political arena, that South Tyrol before World War I was clearly 
a German land, is convincing.19
17 Hass, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 99.
18 Lill, Südtirol, 23; Corsini / Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 24.
19 See Hans Kinzl, ‘Die Forderung Italiens nach der Brennergrenze’, in Franz Huter, 
ed., Südtirol: Eine Frage des europäischen Gewissens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1965), 
236–253.
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When the war broke out in 1914 fanatical nationalism was also preva-
lent in Tyrol. In South Tyrol this fanaticism was clearly pro-German. The 
German war goals extended and then included the southern slopes of the 
Alps as far as the Po Valley, including the Germanization of these areas 
and the resettlement of all Italian Trientinians. For example in 1915, the 
Tiroler Volksbund republished a 1905 propaganda postcard which labelled 
all bilingual and monolingual Italian areas as far as Verona and Lake Garda 
with German names, while the Italian irredenta was quite literally kicked 
out of the picture by a Tyrolean leather boot. No doubt the aggressive 
display of the Tiroler Volksbund reinforced the resistance of the irredenta 
in Trentino and facilitated the implosion of Tyrol during the war.20 There 
is equally no doubt that nationalism on both sides destroyed the ancient 
Tyrol during this period.21 It was obvious that such aggressively displayed 
German nationalism would lead to a hardening of the Italian position in 
the country’s negotiations both with Austria over areas along the border 
to Northern Italy and with the Allies in the London secret negotiations 
leading up to the 1915 Treaty.
When, after the London Treaty, Italy did withdraw its support for 
German and Austrian sides and joined the Allied camp, rumours about an 
Italian annexation of South Tyrol circulated and led to hysterical reactions 
among the people in ‘Deutschtirol’. The Tiroler Volksbund held a so-called 
‘Volkstag’ in Sterzing/Vipiteno on 9 May 1918, during which representa-
tives reiterated their demands that the Trentino should be Germanized 
and that any attempt to create Trientine autonomy should be resisted. 
However, the noisy ‘Volkstag’ of Sterzing/Vipiteno did not represent the 
majority of Tyroleans and its inf luence on the negotiations over the post-
war future of South Tyrol remained negligible.22
20 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 100.
21 Gatterer, Kampf gegen Rom, 124.
22 Lill, Südtirol, 33.
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Ettore Tolomei and the italianità of South Tyrol
Another political strand emerging in the pre-World War I era, the irredenta, 
claimed that the boundaries of Italy should stretch as a far as the Brenner Pass. 
Even though this claim would violate the ideas of the classical Risorgimento 
nationalism it gained popularity with a steadily radicalizing interpretation 
of nationalism in Italy. These radical notions were based on the ‘natural 
boundary theory’ whereby the borders of states were to be marked by natural 
boundaries, such as the main alpine ridge rather than ethnic.
Like many other European nations the Italians leaned more and more 
towards a comprehensive and more aggressive version of nationalism, which 
focused on the superiority of the home culture over others, and linked this 
to a desire to spread Italian values across the world. Italian writers such as 
Gabriele d’Annunzio praised Italy as the ‘chosen nation’ which had to spread 
its ideals through struggle and warfare. For example, war in Giovanni Papini’s 
writings became the ‘catharsis of the decadent human species’.23 In this way, 
the scientific theories of Charles Darwin regarding the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
and ideologies of nationalism amalgamated into a revolutionary romanticism 
which defined war as both competition and catharsis. Nationalism, impe-
rialism and irredentism were gradually seen as one thing in Italy. Political 
leaders cited the Risorgimento to claim areas which were not inhabited 
by Italians and began to focus on the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero as the 
northern border of Italy, using geography as it was convenient.24
One of the individuals that inf luenced the development of Italian 
chauvinism significantly was the zealous nationalist Ettore Tolomei (1865–
1952). He was one of its major figureheads and has become a symbol of the 
Italianization of South Tyrol. Tolomei grew up in an era when national-
ism in both Italy and Austria was at its most virulent and he symbolized 
the abandonment of political liberalism and the old unifying Catholic 
23 Giovanni Papini, ‘The War as a Source of National Renewal’, in Roger Grif fin, ed., 
Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 24.
24 Lill, Südtirol, 29.
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conservative ideal represented by the ailing Austro-Hungarian dual mon-
archy.25 Anti-Semitism and expansive nationalism were fashionable ideolo-
gies for Ettore Tolomei’s generation. Born the son of a timber merchant 
in Rovereto, he did his military service in Vienna. Thus, he was an expert 
on the border area of the German-speaking world and the Italian cultural 
cosmos and became an ethnocentric warrior who believed he could salvage 
the honour of his own nation by raping its neighbour.26
It was part of his nationalist repertoire to deny the native population 
its right to remain in its homeland. Instead, he considered South Tyrol/Alto 
Adige to be a genuinely Latin territory which had only been Germanized 
very late on, superficially and through force. The irredenta attempted to give 
it back to its rightful owner. A layer of invented topographical terms was 
supposed to cement this claim retrospectively.27 So, from the 1890s Tolomei 
had worked on his expansionist nationalist programmewhich called the 
main alpine ridge with the Brenner/Brennero and the Reschen Pass/Passo 
Resia a natural, allegedly historically legitimate and strategically essential, 
northern border of Italy.28 This orographic border also happened to define 
the alpine watershed, as all rivers south of the ridge f lowed to the South. The 
geographer Giovanni Marinelli had come up with this theory in Tolomei’s 
magazine Nazione Italiana in 1890,29 and Tolomei adopted the idea and 
blended it with his nationalist theory in order to provide a pseudo-scientific 
legitimacy for the expansion of Italy. He propagated the notion zealously 
and continuously until people began to think that he had developed the 
‘watershed theory’ himself.30 This geographical legitimacy for the Italian 
claim on the Brenner/Brennero was disputed by contemporary scholars 
and considered unscientific. Tolomei’s argument was so successful with 
25 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 97.
26 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 98.
27 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 98.
28 Lill, Südtirol, 30.
29 Karl Heinz Ritschel, Diplomatie um Südtirol (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1966), 57.
30 Viktoria Stadlmayer, ‘Die italienischen Argumente für die Brennergrenze’, in Franz 
Huter, ed., Südtirol: Eine Frage des europäischen Gewissens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
1965), 254–267, 258.
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contemporary Italian nationalists, however, precisely because this blend of 
geographical and political logic for the annexation of South Tyrol provided 
nationalists with the ideological framework to claim it for Italy.
The establishment of the border of Italy at the Brenner Pass/Passo 
Brennero was one of the two main goals in Tolomei’s life, the other one 
was the Italianization of all the people that lived in the area between this 
natural boundary and the then kingdom of Italy. This idea related mainly 
to the German-speaking population of South Tyrol and, to a lesser degree, 
to the Trentino. Tolomei went to great lengths to establish, contrary to 
scientific evidence,31 that South Tyrol was essentially Italian. For example, 
in 1905 he founded a new pseudo-scientific magazine Archivio per l’Alto 
Adige primarily as a vehicle to promote this idea. Hence Archivio per l’Alto 
Adige deliberately entertained no attempts to understand the mentality 
of the majority of inhabitants of South Tyrol and deliberately ignored the 
historic connections between and the very close economic ties between 
North and South Tyrol.32
Tolomei was largely successful in his endeavour to provide legiti-
macy for the notion of Italy’s border stretching to the Brenner Pass/Passo 
Brennero because even the educated circles in Italy had only a rudimentary 
knowledge of the geographical and ethnographic situation in South Tyrol.33 
Benito Mussolini, journalist and contributor to the socialist paper Avanti, 
reported from Trient/Trento in 1909 that a great number of Italians in the 
kingdom – even those who signed up to the irredenta – had no more than 
a very vague idea of the location of these areas that they wished to liber-
ate. He explained that many, even educated Italians, displayed a significant 
degree of political, linguistic and geographical ignorance when they talked 
about the Trentino. The dif ference between the Trentino and Triest was 
largely unknown. It was believed that German was spoken in Trient, and 
it happened that Trient was located by the coast like Triest. This was not 
surprising since everything learned about geography at school was soon 
31 Lill, Südtirol, 30.
32 Gschliesser, ‘Der italienische Nationalismus’, 184.
33 Gschliesser, ‘Der italienische Nationalismus’, 184.
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forgotten, and adults travelled very little in Italy, Mussolini concluded.34 
This was the audience that Tolomei had in mind when, in Volume 11 of the 
Archivio in 1916, he presented to the Italian public his home-made catalogue 
of Italian names, the Prontuario dei nomi locale dell’Alto Adige containing 
new Italian names for every mountain, forest, village, river and meadow in 
South Tyrol, which was to prove the Italian-ness of the land. These names 
were often inaccurate translations of the German names many of which 
matched the original meaning only approximately, and some not at all. 
However, accuracy was not important to Tolomei as he was not attempt-
ing to contribute to science, but sought to annex the land linguistically 
as he considered South Tyrol to be a part of Italy. His motivation is best 
revealed by his renaming of a particular mountain, the Glockenkarkopf 
near the alpine ridge, as Vetta d’Italia: ‘the Top of Italy’.
The fact that Tolomei had excellent connections with some Italian 
politicians, for example the liberal right politicians Sonnino and Orlando, 
helped him to propagate the Italianization of South Tyrol even to those 
politicians who belonged to the Italian peace delegation of 1918/19. These 
politicians attended the negotiations for a post World War I European peace 
settlement, which resulted, amongst other agreements, in the Versailles 
Treaty and the Treaty of St Germain, which was to become crucial for 
South Tyrol. Tolomei had thus managed to provide Italian delegates, and 
consequently even the US delegation, headed by Woodrow Wilson, with his 
cartographical material and with his views on South Tyrol. In the absence 
of Austrian and German delegates at the peace negotiations he thus dealt a 
serious blow to the notion that South Tyrol might remain with Austria.
By 1920, Tolomei had achieved one of his two aims in life, the estab-
lishment of the Brenner/Brennero border to Austria. However, his second 
major aim, the Italianization of South Tyrol would have to wait until the 
political environment was more conducive to the implementation of such 
an aggressive manifestation of nationalism. This more amenable climate 
arose in October 1922 with the takeover of power by Benito Mussolini 
and his blackshirts.
34 Cited in Ritschel, Diplomatie um Südtirol, 51f.
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The Annexation of South Tyrol, 1919–1922
By the end of the First World War in November 1918 the chauvinistic 
nationalism that had caused the conf lict and seen the proselytization of 
individual cultures across Europe was discredited and replaced instead by 
a palpable desire to create a new stable political order to anchor post-war 
Europe. Its guarantor, the United States under President Woodrow Wilson, 
had been drawn into the European war in 1917 and was determined to play 
a decisive role in the creation of a peace settlement and the introduction 
of a stable political order to post-war Europe. Whilst the allied coalition 
assessed the various rewards and conquests presented by their victory, 
those who were facing defeat, namely Germany and Austria, looked with 
hope to Wilson and his fourteen point programme. The foundations of 
these fourteen points, written in January 1918, lay in the concept of a future 
that would see conf lict resolved only by peaceful means. ‘On the 4th of 
October 1918 Austria-Hungary and the German Empire of fered peace to 
the American president. In doing so they recognized Wilson’s fourteen 
point programme, according to which the Italian borders were to be posi-
tioned “along clearly recognisable lines of nationality” (Point 9) and the 
national self determination of the population of the Danubean monarchy 
was assumed.’1
While Austria and Germany’s agreement to a cessation of war is barely 
explicable without the existence of Wilson’s progressive ideas, Italy feared 
that a realization of the fourteen points would render the results of the 
London Treaty of 1915 meaningless. It was during the period of post-war 
1 Egon Pinzer, ‘Tirol von innen am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges’, in Anton Pelinka 
and Andreas Maislinger, eds, Handbuch zur neueren Geschichte Tirols, Vol. 2: 
Zeitgeschichte, Part 1: Politische Geschichte (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1993), 40.
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negotiations that Italy needed to have its claim on South Tyrol validated 
by the post-war peace treaties. Furthermore, Italy intended to exploit the 
region’s weakened position to impose its rule.
It is essential to understand the expectations Woodrow Wilson’s four-
teen point programme raised in among many European states: Wilson’s 
agenda for a post-war Europe comprised the founding of a peace covenant, 
which was to feed into the League of Nations (Point 1). Wilson’s pro-
gramme included: ‘impartial adjustments of all Colonial claims’ consider-
ing ‘the interests of the population concerned’ (Point 5), the ‘evacuation 
of all Russian territory’ (Point 6) by German troops, and, more significant 
for the Alpine region, the ‘readjustment of the frontiers of Italy […] along 
clearly recognizable lines of nationality’ (Point 9) as well as the creation of 
a convenant that would guarantee ‘political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small nations alike’ (Point 14).
In Austria, Points 9 and 14 of fered hope that South Tyrol would not, 
as was feared, face annexation by Italy. Since the secret London Treaty of 
April 1915 between Italy and the western Allies, South Tyrol was no longer 
to be a battle ground for Italian and German nationalism. Instead it became 
a bargaining tool on the international plane. The Entente countries had 
of fered Italy very comprehensive territories as a reward for Italy’s entry into 
the alliance. By 1915 Austria-Hungary had accepted the national principle 
and had of fered the ‘main part of Trentino to Italy, with the exception of 
the Fassa and the San Pellegrino Valleys, and the right bank of the Isonzo 
river,’2 coupled with the condition that the delivery of these territories 
would be postponed until the end of the war. The Allies, on the other hand, 
of fered Italy the Trentino and all the lands up to the Brenner/Brennero for 
Italy’s support. An Italian refusal of this generous of fer, which included 
the gift of South Tyrol, was not likely, especially as imperialist nationalist 
coteries in Italy became increasingly inf luential: dreams of colonial occu-
pation in Asia Minor and Africa were within reach, and moderate voices 
were completely silenced. In the North, the acquisition of the Brenner 
Pass/Passo Brennero had become a nationalist dogma despite the area’s 
2 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 99.
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decidedly non-Italian population, dominated by the German language 
and Austrian culture.3
Italy’s imperialist claims had already been recognized in the treaty 
between Italy, Great Britain, France and Russia. Article 4 of the London 
Treaty, dated 16 April 1915, stated that as soon as a peace had been negotiated 
Italy would receive: the Trentino area, all of South Tyrol up to its natural 
boundary which was specified as the Brenner.4 The Italian prime minister 
Orlando referred to this wording of 1915 when, at the peace negotiations 
in Paris in 1919, he declared that Italy was a geographical unit, bounded 
on three sides by the sea and by mountains in the North.
This definition violated the basic idea of Risorgimento, as propagated 
by Italy itself, yet the real arguments for a claim to the Brenner/Brennero 
lay elsewhere. Economics was the driving force behind the Italian claim: 
if Italy got access to the main alpine ridge it gained the important rivers 
Etsch/Adige and Eisack/Isarco. Furthermore, there were compelling mili-
tary and strategic reasons as the Brenner/Brennero was easier to defend 
against a possible future attack from the North.5
Woodrow Wilson’s role in the peace negotiations
The idealistic vision behind Wilson’s fourteen points did not match the 
political reality of post-war Europe: the right to self-determination for 
South Tyrol was not implemented, and Italy was no longer defined by 
national, but by seemingly natural and geographical borders. Apart from 
the creation of a league of nations none of Wilson’s idealistic proposals 
would be realized, a surprising fact considering that he was the president 
3 Corsini/Lill, Südtirol 1918–1945, 45.
4 Rolf Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert: Dokumente (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 
1999), 16.
5 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 106.
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of one of the most powerful states in the world and that the US had been 
instrumental in bringing the war to an end.6 At the beginning of the post-
war negotiations Wilson naturally occupied a diplomatic position of power 
which would easily have allowed him to implement his peace concept.
Wilson’s fourteen points were embedded in a framework of ideas 
and intentions designed to revolutionize diplomacy and world politics 
in a fundamental way. His fourteen points rested on four fundamental 
considerations:
1. Every part of the agreement has to be embedded in the legal system 
of the country it is designed for.
2. Peoples and provinces must not be treated like chess pieces and be 
pushed around on the chess board.
3. Every territorial agreement has to be in the interest and always in 
favour of the population af fected by it, and it must not be seen as 
a compensation deal for the demands of rivalling states.
4. Every recognizable national movement should find recognition as 
far as possible without creating new or cementing old sources of 
dispute and animosity.7
In his Mount Vernon Speech on 4 July 1918 Wilson specified his ideas: he 
explained that any agreement of controversial issues needed to be settled 
with the consent of the af fected population and not on the basis of spe-
cific interests and advantages of other nations.8 Besides insisting on the 
involvement of everybody, victors and losers, in the creation of a new world 
order Wilson categorically rejected the notion of secret agreements as those 
undermined the sincerity and the security of peace deals. ‘This encompass-
ing world peace programme is created in a very ingenious way: not just 
6 Antony Evelyn Alcock, Short History of Europe (Basingstoke and New York: 
Macmillan, 1998), 221.
7 Christiane Wagemann, Das Scheitern des grossen Friedens: Fallstudie zum prak-
tischen Scheitern des Weltfriedenskonzeptes Wilsons. Die Südtirol Frage (Neuwied: 
Hieronymus, 1985), 119.
8 Wagemann, Scheitern, 120.
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with regard to individual claims, but also in relation to the claim that this 
programme should, without exceptions, relate to rich and poor, powerful 
and weak nations and peoples, and to friendly and hostile states’,9 which 
was a most progressive view and would have introduced a new world order 
had it been realized. Despite its progressive and pacifist agenda, Wilson’s 
programme was not implemented after World War I, instead the treaties 
of Versailles and St Germain evolved. It is ironic that President Wilson 
was mainly responsible for the negotiations leading to these two treaties 
which facilitated the denial of South Tyrol’s national self-determination.10 
Through the abandonment of their neutrality and their military involve-
ment in the war the United States had played a significant role in ensuring 
that the Allies remained victorious: naturally the US was to have a decisive 
role in drafting the ensuing peace treaties. All the more so as Wilson had 
argued that the US could only participate in the world war because it was 
on a mission to show humankind the way to freedom. According to Wilson 
it was only this crusade for the liberation of humankind that justified the 
use of violence, a stance which reveals Wilson’s liberal missionary trait and 
his semi-religious zeal.11
Wilson had ample opportunities to bring the world in line with his 
principles, as all participating countries, regardless of whether they were 
winners or losers in the war, suf fered badly and were financially and eco-
nomically very vulnerable. Wilson could easily have married economic 
assistance with his humanitarian crusade, but his idealism prevented him 
from mixing economic aid with power politics. He categorically renounced 
the ‘dollar diplomacy’ of his predecessors which linked diplomatic success 
in world issues with economic help for the parties involved. The decision 
not ‘to use the US’ economic strength to enforce its predominant political 
role on the domestic politics of the weak European nations,’12 therefore 
resulted in the Wilson’s failure to realize his ambitious peace plan. This 
9 Wagemann, Scheitern, 120–121.
10 Wagemann, Scheitern, 368.
11 Wagemann, Scheitern, 369.
12 Wagemann, Scheitern, 371.
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was all the more regrettable as the European people in general, but also the 
peace movements which mushroomed all over Europe, hailed Wilson as an 
angel of peace, and were expecting him to use the United States’ strength 
to change political mentalities in Europe.
As regards South Tyrol, Wilson’s initiative failed as well. Post-war polit-
ical realities prevailed over Wilson’s idealism because during the Paris peace 
negotiations Italy managed to convince the other powers of its interpreta-
tion of history, namely that it had been threatened by Austro-Hungarian 
imperialist aspirations in 1914, because the empire had built military forts 
overlooking the Italian heartland. Therefore, Italy argued successfully, the 
realization of the secret treaty of 1915 appeared to be the best way forward 
to secure peace in the alpine region. This result for South Tyrol meant 
that Wilson contradicted his own ideas in two respects, once because he 
accepted the validity of a secret agreement and secondly because the right 
to self-determination of the South Tyrolean people was completely ignored. 
The South Tyrol issue, like no other, highlights the complicated problem of 
Wilson’s aloof idealism versus European hardnosed power politics. Despite 
Wilson, the world in 1918 would be divided into winners and losers.
The historian Christiane Wagemann, who undertook a detailed 
psychoanalysis of the President’s character and his mindset, argues that 
Wilson’s missionary christian values explain the apparent contradiction 
between his objectives as laid out in the fourteen point plan and his sub-
sequent decisions in relation to areas like South Tyrol. She notes that he 
was not a pragmatist or a ‘Realpolitiker’ but a missionary, who, when things 
got tough, often pushed aside the political realities and approached things 
not as the politician he was, but as the prophet he aspired to be.13 Both 
his frail health and the conf lict between liberal politician and committed 
Christian impaired his ability and his willingness to find viable compro-
mises and led to his eventual failure. Umberto Corsini called Wilson ‘gen-
erous, but naïve,’14 when it came to reorganizing post-war Europe. Some of 
the decisions, which were supposed to create stability in Europe, appear 
13 Wagemann, Scheitern, 376.
14 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 48.
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rather arbitrary, for example, ‘in order not to of fend Yugoslavia and sup-
port the pan-Slavistic unification under Soviet guidance, he decided to 
cede the port of Fiume to Yugoslavia instead of Italy, instead he granted 
Italy the Brenner Pass and all of South Tyrol, thus turning 250,000 power-
less Tyroleans into a football in the game of power politics, which violated 
Wilson’s basic convictions.’15
When assessing Wilson’s responsibility for the emergence of the South 
Tyrol issue, the historian Hanns Haas points to the divergence between 
ethnic boundaries and the natural boundary theory in the US American 
peace delegation: ‘According to Wilson few countries had boundaries as 
distinct as Italy’s. In special cases, however, strategic considerations had to 
be taken into account. Occasionally the principle of political self-deter-
mination could not be maintained.’16 A violation of the principle of self-
determination was particularly easy to pursue against the aggressors of 1914, 
and thus the Germans and the Slav people had to endure most of these, as 
this promised the best the chance of peace in the Alps.
‘The deviations from the ethnic principle and the negation of self-
determination were generally compensated by measures to protect minori-
ties, which were issued in St Germain’,17 however, there were no guarantees 
attached and Italy was never forced to implement them. With hindsight 
this was certainly an oversight, but at the time the view prevailed that Italy 
was a great power and a home to many dif ferent nationalities, thus, the 
United States simply assumed that Italy would deal with the realities of 
the cultural melting pot as positively as the US had done.18 Wilson himself 
had to concede later in life that Italy never recognized his fourteen points.19 
It was obvious in this period that the right to self-determination and the 
London Treaty were not compatible.
Viewed in this light, Wilson’s fourteen points became little more than 
a guide to political ‘best-practice’ which was theoretically convincing yet 
15 Wagemann, Scheitern, 376.
16 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 110.
17 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 110.
18 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 114.
19 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 115.
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impractical. Wilson, himself, failed to sell his programme as a leader of the 
peace negotiations, a role he was supposed to assume naturally and expected 
to take by all conference participants.20 Instead, during the course of the 
negotiations he turned into a mere conference mediator and left the politi-
cal field to European politicians who used every opportunity to promote 
and push their own agenda. It was easy to outmanoeuvre this president 
who had few tactical skills and who gravely underestimated the potential 
for conf lict between the numerous ethnic movements in Europe. Italy’s 
argument that the Austro-Hungarian empire had been expansionist in its 
irredentism was hardly refuted by Wilson’s weak stance, all the less so as 
Britain supported the Italian view and pointed to the dif ficult situation of 
1915. Lloyd George also repeatedly emphasized British loyalty to Italy.
Early in 1919 Wilson took the decision that the Trentino, obviously 
including South Tyrol, should be ceded to Italy.21 As Italy was not forced 
to guarantee a degree of autonomy to South Tyrol – even though it was 
willing to do so at the time – the Germans in South Tyrol were denied a 
say in any decision regarding their nationality, or any chance of domestic 
self-determination.22 At this late stage South Tyrolean politicians desper-
ately attempted to make the President reconsider his decision. In a pas-
sionate letter to Wilson, the South Tyrolean mayors pleaded with him to 
reconsider his view. They emphasized the relevance of ethnic boundaries 
between peoples by arguing that the Tyrolean homeland had never been 
demarcated by states or peoples, but by language. The linguistic bounda-
ries in Tyrol, the mayors claimed, were clearer and more pronounced than 
anywhere else in Europe. In their desperation they pleaded with Wilson to 
recognize that their ‘Heimat’ had belonged to the German cultural area for 
more than a thousand years, and they urged Wilson personally to become 
the saviour of their people and their homeland. The letter was signed by all 
20 Wagemann, Scheitern, 378.
21 Rolf Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert: Vom Leben und Überleben einer 
Minderheit (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 1997), 36.
22 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 116.
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the communes of German-South Tyrol and the twelve Ladin communes 
in Gröden, Enneberg, Buchenstein and Fassa.23
The Government of Tyrol in Innsbruck supported this petition by send-
ing another memorandum to President Wilson, in which they reminded 
him in English of his own fourteen point programme explaining that ‘the 
separation of even only one part of German or Ladinic territory would 
undoubtedly cause the ruin of the whole country and people as a political 
entity.’ They cited the parliamentary debate of 29 January 1919, in which 
the Tyrolean government had declared that ‘the question of the undivided 
preservation of the entire German and Ladinic territories of Tyrol fills the 
hearts of all the people with grave anxiety. We Tyrolese declare that we will, 
under no condition whatsoever, consent to a separation of South Tyrol, and 
we would rather make any sacrifice required of us than give up our union 
with our brothers in South Tyrol.’ Those sacrifices relate to the of fer of the 
Viennese government to rescue the territorial integrity and unity of Tyrol 
and to ward of f Italy. The government had of fered to accept the neutrality 
of Tyrol as a whole and even to accept a fusion with neutral Switzerland.24 
Wilson remained unmoved, and his decision to divide Tyrol and cede 
its Southern part to Italy unchanged. The National Assembly in Vienna 
agreed to this decision in an emtionally charged debate in September 1919, 
during which the representatives of South Tyrol referred to this division 
as a tearing apart of Tyrol and voiced their pain and grief over the divison 
angrily and noisily. The division of Tyrol after Wolrd War I proved that 
pre-war categories and an aggressive and expansionist nationalism had 
maintained the upper hand over liberal aspirations. South Tyrol became 
a part of the Italian state.
23 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 264.
24 Haas, ‘Südtirol 1919’, 126.
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The occupation of Tyrol
After the signing of the ceasefire between Austria-Hungary and Italy in the 
Villa Giusti near Padua on the 3 November 1918, Italian troops advanced 
to Trient/Trento on the same day. On 7 November they reached Bozen/
Bolzano. By 10 November they had occupied the whole of South Tyrol 
as far as the Brenner Pass. In so doing Italy created a position of strength 
which it intended to utilize at the final negotiations. The Italian troops 
then marched on to North Tyrol and occupied places such as Stregen/
Arlberg, Silz, Hall and Mils. They reached Innsbruck, the capital of Tyrol 
on 23 November. In North Tyrol there were very few problems between the 
local people and the occupiers, even though Italy advanced much further 
into Austrian lands than previously agreed. However,
the occupying Italian of ficials did not get involved in the internal politics of North 
Tyrol. In this way neither the numerous demonstrations against the likely loss of 
South Tyrol, during which radical tones against the Italians could be heard, nor the 
public demands for unity with Germany managed to disturb this relationship. The 
Italian military administration strove to send as many German-speaking of ficers as 
possible to Innsbruck. It was, however, seen as a painful loss that the former state 
archive in Innsbruck had to hand over the inventories relating to Trentino and South 
Tyrol. In spite of the peace treaty of St Germain being signed on 10 September 1919, 
the Italian occupation of Innsbruck did not end until 11 December 1920. It was prob-
ably a question of prestige which motivated the Italians to station their troops for 
such a long time in North Tyrol.25
South Tyrol was no dif ferent to the rest of Europe in its yearning for the 
end of the war. As Pinzer observes,
the enormous loss of life, the ever increasing dearth of basic consumer goods, and 
the hopeless state of food supplies aggrieved the desperate populace. In 1918 hunger 
demonstrations became commonplace. Throughout the country pilfering was ram-
25 Pinzer, ‘Tirol von innen’, 91/2.
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pant so that armed guards were deployed to communities. Particularly common was 
the theft of livestock.26
In agreement with the peace treaty of St Germain the South Tyroleans 
were assigned to Italy, and they reacted with concern and disbelief to these 
new political realities. However, the population was both too hungry and 
too poor to engage in civil protest or unrest, South Tyrol was, like most of 
Western Europe, paralysed by the Spanish Flu of 1918–19, which had easy 
pickings among a war-weary, weak and fatigued population. Children and 
mothers were its principle victims and in one week alone from 27 October 
to 2 November 157 people died.27 The situation was exacerbated by the pau-
city of medical personnel the majority of whom were stationed in military 
hospitals tending the soldiers. When, for example, the reserve hospital in 
Gossensass/Colle Isarco was closed in November 1917 as the medical staf f 
were brought to the war fronts, the Wipptal area from Steinach to Sterzing/
Vipiteno was without any medical support. South Tyrol was literally shut 
down with the closure of schools, cinemas and transport networks for the 
fear of infection.28
It was thus hardly surprising that Italian soldiers could occupy South 
Tyrol without much interference after the Austrian troops had abandoned 
their positions. There was no resistance from the weakened and war rav-
aged populace. According to the diary of the priest of the small Dolomite 
village of Kastelruth/Castelrotto, who represented many similar voices, 
the people of Tyrol were ‘tired, tired, and totally indif ferent.’29 They had 
only one thought: ‘Thank God the war is over.’30 The people respected 
the appeal of the Italian military when it requested peace and discipline. 
The occupation forces themselves remained disciplined, however, the rela-
tionship between the South Tyrolean farmers and the Italian soldiers was 
26 See Pinzer, ‘Tirol von innen’, 42.
27 Pinzer, ‘Tirol von innen’, 42/3.
28 Pinzer, ‘Tirol von innen’, 42/3.
29 Josef Nössing, Völs am Schlern 888–1988: Ein Gemeindebuch (Bozen: Athesia, 1988), 
553.
30 Nössing, Völs, 553.
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characterized by distrust, as the reaction of the predominantly agrarian 
population showed:
The farmers hid women and livestock from approaching soldiers, the townspeople 
hid their jewellery and money. There were no reports of fraternization between 
the population and the occupation forces. Too wide was the social gap between 
both groups: the South Tyroleans had only known Italians as impoverished foreign 
workers who came from Friule or Venice to Bozen, prepared to take on the lowest 
type of work.31
Italy addressed the poor living conditions of the South Tyroleans imme-
diately. Representing many such reports, the chronicler of the village 
Völs am Schlern/Fiè allo Sciliar in the lower Eisack/Isarco Valley noted: 
‘Approximately eight days after the surrender the Italian troops arrived. 
They behaved respectably and organized public kitchens for children and 
poor people. In Kastelruth some people refused to be fed by the Italians, 
however, in Völs and Völser Aicha the pasta asciutta and the rice, which 
was largely unknown, was accepted gratefully.’32 Survival was the order of 
the day. The new administration employed their military infrastructure in 
the new Italian province to create a positive impression:
It was one of the first undertakings of the military government to attend to supplies 
and to set fixed or free price tags on groceries, so that South Tyrol could be spared 
the tragedy of hunger. Italy was in a position to do this, as it commanded deliver-
ies of supplies from the European and American allies. It was a clever political and 
psychological strategy towards a population that had been annexed.33
Even though there were no clashes between the new occupiers and the 
native population of South Tyrol, this did not mean that life continued 
unchanged. 1919 was a caesura in the collective psychology of what was now 
a German-speaking minority located outside its native country Austria. 
Almost overnight a code of behaviour and a system of values was destroyed 
which had been characterized by the trinity of ‘Gott-Kaiser-Vaterland’ and 
31 Pinzer, ‘Tirol von innen’, 90.
32 Nössing, Völs, 553.
33 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 56.
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which had been regarded as eternal.34 The end of the war for the German-
speaking Tyroleans went hand in hand with the collapse of their traditional 
values. This was more than a temporary disorientation; it meant serious 
damage to the social and political prestige of their collective identity. All 
of a sudden they were demoted from being members of a majority native 
culture to the position of a minority which required help. Before World 
War I South Tyrol had considered itself integral to Austria as a ‘bastion 
of German-ness and a bulwark against Italy’,35 now the German South 
Tyroleans found themselves on the wrong side of the border. They remained 
a border region, but now looking back into the old homeland of Austria 
instead of out of it. South Tyrol thus became ‘auslandsdeutsch’ [foreign 
German]. South Tyrolean historian Leopold Steurer diagnosed a kind of 
‘protective paralysis among the South Tyrolean community, a condition of 
national depression and collective frustration, focused solely on the ques-
tion of nationality, which needed to be resolved.’36 This ‘protective paraly-
sis’ resulted in a denial of the new political realities and the embracing of 
anything associated with the lost homeland. The mayor of Bozen/Bolzano, 
Julius Perathoner’s refusal to remove the picture of the Austrian emperor 
from his of ficial rooms or to greet the Italian King in Italian on his visit in 
October 1921 was indicative of this collective shock and denial.
The new political situation in South Tyrol also represented a profound 
cultural shock which resulted in a feeling of impotence. It was obvious 
that the Italian administration had created, by their occupation of South 
Tyrol, a new social reality. The South Tyroleans understood very quickly 
that they were occupied and subordinated to a military regime, as the land 
was hermetically sealed of f from Austria. Fiscal exchange, human commu-
nication and trade were suppressed and censorship of the postal service 
was introduced. The military high command under General Guglielmo 
Pecori-Giraldi stayed in of fice until the end of July 1919 and managed 
34 Leopold Steurer, Südtirol zwischen Rom und Berlin 1919–1939 (Zürich, Vienna and 
Munich: Europaverlag, 1980), 29.
35 Steurer, Zwischen Rom und Berlin, 33.
36 Steurer, Zwischen Rom und Berlin, 31.
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within this period to replace the Austrian administration with an Italian 
commission. The peace treaty of St Germain af firmed under international 
law what Italy had virtually already achieved: an Italian-dominated South 
Tyrol. In October 1920 the formal annexation of South Tyrol was passed 
by the Italian parliament. South Tyrol’s new status was of ficial and any 
chance of self-determination for the German speaking population of that 
area eliminated.
The beginning of the Italian regime in South Tyrol from the end 
of the World War in 1918 to Mussolini’s accession to power in October 
1922 was accompanied by relatively weak, liberal governments in Rome. 
It became apparent that the prime ministers at the time, Orlando, Nitti, 
Giolitti, Bonomi and Facta, had to invest considerable time and energy 
in the retention of their own power, whereby ‘the rule of South Tyrol 
and Trentino remained very tentative in the four years before Mussolini’s 
accession to power.’37 Politics in South Tyrol were shaped by the procon-
suls, the governors and the governing commission: in particular, Pecori-
Giraldi (November 1918 to July 1919) and Luigi Credaro (August 1919 to 
October 1922). Pecori-Giraldi sought to strengthen the sovereignty of 
Italy in Venezia Tridentina, the new name for the amalgamated provinces 
of Trentino and South Tyrol, whilst paying attention to the feelings and 
traditions of the inhabitants as far as was compatible with this project. 
Credaro’s wish to create a sense of equilibrium between the Italian people 
and the minority was sincere, but he had little support from Rome and 
stood mostly between the two fronts.38
The new administration presented itself to the native population with 
a mixture of liberal attitudes and political pressure, which the following 
excerpt from a poster-size invitation issued throughout the land to a cel-
ebration of the union on 10 October 1920, documents: ‘Fellow Italians’, 
the invitation to the German speaking South Tyroleans spelt out, ‘On this 
noteworthy day no inhabitant who regards themselves as a grateful citizen 
will be absent from the festivities celebrating the expansion of the bor-
37 Lill, Südtirol, 52.
38 Lill, Südtirol, 65.
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ders from Ala to Brenner to become one with the new homeland.’ While 
amicable and cordial on the surface, the Italian administration expected 
the South Tyroleans to behave like all other citizens of Italy and participate 
in its state commemorations. At the same time the Italian administration 
closed the German school in Laag near Bozen/Bolzano in October 1919 
and opened a new Italian school, and this added to the feeling of Italian 
domination. Even though the German school was reopened in 1920 in 
response to public protest, the South Tyroleans were exposed to a regime 
which simply did not understand local traditions and customs. When, in 
June 1920, the South Tyroleans celebrated the religious feast of St John’s 
Night in their traditional way, including bonfires and the firing of salutes, 
thirty-nine Tyroleans were arrested, brought to Trient/Trento in chains 
and convicted of open acts of violence – just one striking example of how 
the Italian authorities mishandled the situation in South Tyrol.
In contrast to the following fascist period, the push for Italianization 
during the years 1919–1922 was, however, restrained. Nonetheless, a cer-
tain national-cultural expansionism during this phase can be identified 
in Italy’s handling of the South Tyrol issue which suppressed the right of 
self-determination of the inhabitants of South Tyrol. Historian Rudolf 
Lill concludes that it was the spirit of this nationalist epoch that both cre-
ated the problem of minorities and then prevented its solution through 
democratic means.39 An existential threat to the cultural identity of the 
German-speaking South Tyroleans, however, occurred simultaneously with 
the growing power of Mussolini in Italy.
39 Lill, Südtirol, 65.
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Italianization under Mussolini, 1923–1932
The political stage in Europe was irrevocably altered by the accession of 
Benito Mussolini to power in October 1922. His regime presented Europe 
with the most ef fective model of an authoritarian national and socialist 
one-party state thus far.1 Under Mussolini nationalism in Italy became 
an ‘integrative ideology’2 which meant that South Tyrol was subject to a 
suppressive political system which sought the Italianization of all parts of 
Italy. While Mussolini adopted the principle of Risorgimento nationalism, 
which was well established in Italy, he redefined it in an aggressive fascist 
way. His appropriation of Risorgimento ideals made him more acceptable 
to those elites in Italian society which feared Communism. Mussolini 
considered Risorgimento nationalism to be a unifying force for Italy, but 
he was also convinced that the World War had been equally significant in 
this process.3 While fascist rule was established generally in Italy between 
1925 and 1926, the process had begun as early as 1923 in South Tyrol, with 
drastic sanctions against the Tyroleans (which were similar to those taken 
against the people from Aosta, the Croats, the Slovenes and the Ladins, to 
name other ethnic minorities living in Italy). For all these minorities in Italy, 
Fascism was experienced as an era of suppression.4 Mussolini’s attitude to 
minorities was apparent before he came to power. The events surrounding 
the so-called ‘Blutsonntag’ [Bloody Sunday] in Bozen/Bolzano in April 1921 
were an augury of what South Tyroleans could expect from Fascism.
1 Lill, Südtirol, 69.
2 Montserrat Guibernau, Nationalisms (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1996), 47.
3 Lill, Südtirol, 71.
4 Lill, Südtirol, 72.
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Ironically, Mussolini’s party enjoyed strong support in South Tyrol 
from the growing number of Italian immigrant workers, especially among 
the railway workers. Under the leadership of the chairman of the party in 
Trento, Achille Starace, a ‘Fasci di Combattimento’ cell was founded in 
Bozen/Bolzano. From then on the fascists advocated publicly and often 
in an unruly fashion the Italianization of South Tyrol. In Salurn/Salorno 
they removed all Tyrolean double-headed eagles, and in Bozen/Bolzano 
they erased the German language inscriptions of several public of fices. In 
April 1921 they descended upon a procession of German-speaking South 
Tyroleans who were dressed in traditional costume to commemorate the 
opening of the annual Bozen/Bolzano spring fair. The security forces that 
had been informed about the fascist gathering did nothing to hold back 
the 280 fascists arriving from Italy, who were joined by some 120 political 
hooligans from Bozen/Bolzano. The participants in the procession were 
set upon with wooden clubs, shot with pistols and attacked with hand gre-
nades. Remarkably only one person was killed, Franz Innerhofer, a teacher 
from Marling, who became a martyr of South Tyrolean suppression by 
Italian fascists. A further fifty people were injured, and consequently the 
event has been remembered as ‘Blutsonntag’.
The complicity of the Italian security forces in the events of Blutsonntag 
1921 went so far that after the bloodshed they accompanied the rampaging 
fascists to the train station to assure them a safe passage home. The course 
of events on Blutsonntag indicated that the fascists were increasingly gain-
ing power in Italy and that the middle classes had largely given in to the 
fascist supremacy in public life. The demonstrations in April 1921 revealed 
that ethnic minorities in Italy were left unprotected by a state which was 
quickly losing power to Mussolini.
Mussolini made ample use of this newly discovered political advantage. 
In April 1922, well ahead of the takeover of power in Rome, the fascists 
once again focused on South Tyrol. On 6 April 1922 the fascists passed a 
programme of action in Trento to accelerate the implementation of  Italian 
legislation. Crucially, these measures included the abolition of the special 
status South Tyrol had had since 1920, and he redefined South Tyrol as 
part of the province of Venezia Tridentina, now comprising South Tyrol 
and the Trentino. An equally significant aspect of this programme was the 
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targeted elimination of the German language in everyday life through the 
introduction of Italian in all of ficial correspondence and as a compulsory 
subject in schools and the only language of instruction. This language policy 
was coupled with the threat of military service for all South Tyroleans who 
would then be sent into the heartland of Italy. The fascists aimed at the 
dissolution of all political groups and politically motivated sports clubs, 
which pursued irredentist goals and came close to dissolving all South 
Tyrolean associations, as the use of German alone could be interpreted 
as irredentist.
Significantly, following Mussolini’s rise to power, Ettore Tolomei was 
installed as Senator and from July 1923 was given the authority to implement 
his ‘32 Provvedimenti per l’Alto Adige’ [32 Provisions for South Tyrol].5 
These measures were ef fectively a programme of renationalization: the 
German South Tyroleans were to be de-nationalized in respect of their 
German identity and re-nationalized as full Italians. The programme perme-
ated all spheres of society, from the individual to the institutional. It stipu-
lated a new regional administration by fusing South Tyrol with Trentino, 
took away from Bozen/Bolzano the status of capital, introduced a ban 
on German press and books, and introduced an exclusively Italian school 
system. Locally it meant the renaming of German villages and streets, the 
establishment of Italian podestà, the prohibition of German Alpine clubs. 
Families were af fected as they were subjected to the Italianization of their 
Christian and family names, while individuals were forced to eradicate any 
German traces in their households and to avoid using the German language 
completely. One example shows the extent of the disrespect with which the 
Italian of ficials acted against tradition, and the ef forts they exerted to eradi-
cate the language: in Völs am Schlern/Fiè allo Sciliar in the lower Eisack/
Isarco valley the family name Pitscheider became Pezzei; Gall became 
Cassani; Verant Ferrandi; Wieser Viseri; Planötscher Planecceri; Futerer 
Flora (named after the daughter’s first name); Marmsaler Dal Monte; 
Schaller Scala; Kritzinger Conti; Oberhuber Bosin (the wife’s name); 
5 See the Appendix to this chapter.
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Schrof fenegger Migari and Huber Demaso.6 Those who did not want to 
have their names Italianized could not be forced to, but if any citizen wished 
to seek assistance from the of ficials it was a condition that they Italianized 
their names before they were eligible for help. Thus the programme of the 
Provvedimenti was enforced by the threat of total exclusion. At a time of 
great hardship and need this meant for many that co-operation was ef fec-
tively obligatory.
Cultural resistance: The Catacomb schools
The new school curricula were designed to immerse German South Tyrol 
children in Italian culture and language and result in their Italianization. 
The intention was to embed the process of Italianization in the heart of 
the family. Mussolini’s policy of denationalization was not accepted with-
out resistance by the South Tyroleans. Although there was no organized 
resistance in the form of a revolt, the establishment of so-called ‘catacomb’ 
schools was a concrete form of active protest against the Italian administra-
tion. The editor of the Volksbote and guiding spirit of the South Tyroleans, 
Canon Gamper, urged the South Tyroleans to recover their schooling 
system through the creation of home schools. These resistance schools were 
based on the idea of the first Christians who, unsure of their safety, wor-
shipped in hidden catacombs. The catacomb schools were organized and 
led by priests and teachers who had been dismissed from the of ficial school 
system under the denationalization programme. Teaching materials were 
smuggled across the mountains from Austria and Germany. The smugglers 
were mostly German nationalists, but later the smuggling of material was 
undertaken by members of the Völkische Kampfring Südtirol (VKS). The 
political inf luence of these groups explains both the Catholic-conservative 
6 Nössing, Völs, 558.
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and the nationalist-völkisch orientation of the teaching curricula in the 
catacomb schools.
In these schools the teachers undermined the fascist denationalization 
policy and reinforced German language and culture. The schools operated 
in a fraught environment often using primitive resources. Furthermore, 
teachers were regularly arrested by the Italian government, which had 
become aware of their existence. This meant the schools struggled to create 
any sense of continuity and stability. Nonetheless, the symbolic importance 
of the catacomb schools in the 1920s cannot be underestimated. Resistance 
against the fascist system was thus not a violent military exercise but rather 
accomplished through the cultural infrastructure, in the same way as the 
early Risorgimento nationalist movement had operated.
The struggle for South Tyrolean monuments
The German speaking South Tyroleans were understandably less successful 
when it came to resisting Mussolini’s campaign against Austrian symbols 
and monuments representing German culture in Tyrol. The denational-
izing campaign sought to erase all traces of German culture by replacing 
them with Italian ‘lieux de memoire’. In Bozen/Bolzano, for example, the 
Walther memorial, the Laurin fountain and the Bozen/Bolzano museum 
came under particular Italian scrutiny as these were most intimately linked 
with German culture.
Just as the memorial to Dante Alighieri in Trient/Trento (which looked 
to the north for nationalist reasons) symbolized the relationship between 
‘Welsch-Tyrol’ and Italy, so the memorial to Walther von der Vogelweide 
(who looked south for similar reasons) which stood on the square of the 
same name was a symbol of German South Tyrol and its allegiance to 
German culture. Consequently, the fascists wished to remove it from the 
centre of the town and replace it with a Drusus memorial. Drusus was 
deeply rooted in Tolomei’s vision of a new Italian Bozen/Bolzano, he was 
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‘the Latin hero who conquered Oberetsch to forge new paths for the Roman 
civilization.’7 However, a monument to Drusus was never erected. Instead 
Walther was moved to the suburbs of Bozen/Bolzano for the duration of 
the fascist regime. He fell victim to the reinterpretation of South Tyrolean 
history. The Laurin fountain also became unacceptable under the dena-
tionalization campaign as ‘the statue presented a battle scene between the 
German King Dietrich von Bern and the Dwarf King Laurin, the mythical 
leader of the Ladinish Dolomites.’8 It was widely regarded as a symbol of 
the South Tyrolean bond with the surrounding countryside. Dietrich was 
the German hero who had defeated the Italians. Tolomei was well aware 
of the significance of this statute as a symbol of South Tyrolean resistance 
and thus regarded it as anti-Italian. In 1933 the statue was destroyed, the 
culprits were never identified or caught.
Besides the erection of a memorial to Mussolini in Waidbruck/Prato 
Isarco, the so-called Aluminium Duce, and at the Bozen/Bolzano Financial 
Bureau, the simultaneous erection of ossuaries at Reschen Pass/Passo Resia 
and at the Brenner/Brennero near Gossensass/Colle d’Isarco are of great 
symbolic significance in this war of memorials. In these ossuaries the remains 
of Italian soldiers were entombed, who were killed during the First World 
War – allegedly in the battle for South Tyrol. These ‘victims’ – the invented 
figure of 650,000 soldiers comes up time and again – have been used, to 
cement the Italian claim to South Tyrol.9 However, in reality, the frontline 
in the First World War was approximately eighty kilometres south of the 
Brenner/Brennero border. The annexation of South Tyrol had occurred 
without any physical resistance, there had been no need for any soldiers 
to fight never mind die. The soldiers symbolically entombed in ossuaries, 
had in fact been exhumed and transported from the south of Italy. The 
graveyard was a staged and invented lieu de mémoire, a cynical propaganda 
campaign to legitimize the annexation of South Tyrol and transform it into 
a battle site of virtue that justified Italian national claims.
7 Thomas Pardatscher, Das Siegesdenkmal in Bozen (Bozen: Athesia, 2002), 34.
8 Pardatscher, Siegesdenkmal, 36.
9 Pardatscher, Siegesdenkmal, 181.
Italianization under Mussolini, 1923–1932 41
Finally, the Bozen/Bolzano museum attracted Italian attention as it 
was largely dedicated to preserving and displaying Tyrolean culture and 
indigenous traditions. However, it was the museum’s imposing steeple 
that attracted Tolomei’s critical scrutiny. Tolomei argued that the stee-
ple was problematic because it blocked the view from Bozen/Bolzano to 
the Rosengarten/Catinaccio mountain range. However, the only place in 
Bozen/Bolzano from which this view was partially obstructed was from 
the Siegesplatz [Victory Square], where the fascist regime was planning 
to erect a memorial celebrating the annexation of South Tyrol. The real 
reason that Tolomei set his sights on the museum’s steeple was because it 
appeared to dominate the town. In the blinkered gaze of Tolomei’s obses-
sive Italianization program, the steeple represented South Tyrolean cultural 
resilience. As the historian Rolf Steininger astutely concluded, the steeple’s 
destruction bore all the hallmarks of the Italian Middle Ages when ‘the 
victorious family would truncate the steeple of the conquered party’.10 
There was also a more visual and basic reason for its destruction: beside it 
in the town skyline the Siegesdenkmal, the fascist memorial by the Talfer 
Bridge, looked relatively unimpressive. As the fascist centre of remembrance 
was Bozen/Bolzano, no competition could be tolerated in the war of the 
monuments. In 1934 Tolomei had the steeple demolished.
The monument of victory
The cultural homogenization of South Tyrol via the war of the monu-
ments would not have been so far-reaching had the fascists not destroyed 
the German South Tyrol memorials. Their goal was the renationalizing of 
South Tyrol; therefore they had to fill the vacated squares with alternative 
memorials. No other place in South Tyrol displayed this ef fort more vividly 
than Talfer Square (today’s Victory Square). By the end of the war in 1918 
10 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 107.
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the foundations for the erection of a memorial to the Austrian Emperor 
were in place, but these were completely removed in favour of the construc-
tion of a colossal neo-classical triumphal arch in white marble, which was 
built between 1926 and 1928.
The Siegesdenkmal [victory monument] symbolically stands at the 
‘interface’ between the Italian and German-speaking parts of the town. The 
Siegesdenkmal, with its aggressive nationalist inscription, has served as a 
reminder to South Tyrol of the denationalization since 1928: ‘Hic patriae 
finis. Siste signa. Hinc ceteros excoluimus lingua legibus artibus’ [Here are 
the borders of the fatherland. Let us claim these grounds. From this point 
on we brought to the others the language, law, and arts]. It is not only the 
chauvinistic content of the inscription, but also its geographical dominance 
that has caused such of fence to Bozen/Bolzano’s German-speaking resi-
dents. By overlooking the river Talfer and the Bozen/Bolzano museum it 
literally towers over the traditionally German area of Bozen/Bolzano. In 
fact, viewed from the ‘German side’ of town the monument is the most 
imposing part of an ensemble of buildings constructed in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s as architectural statements of fascist power. The monument 
continues to declare the Italian ‘fatherland’s’ claims on South Tyrol and 
the imposition of its culture, and by its continued existence unapologeti-
cally memorializes this contentious fascist past to all the inhabitants of 
Bozen/Bolzano.
The industrial zone near Bozen/Bolzano
The symbolic attempts to destroy the collective memory of the South 
Tyroleans were steadily f lanked by economic actions. Among other meas-
ures the South Tyroleans, traditionally a rural society, were prevented from 
passing their land down intact to a chosen heir, rather they were forced to 
sub-divide their property thus weakening the landholdings as they passed 
from one generation to the next. Furthermore, these same farmers were 
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discriminated against when it came to seeking credit approval to support 
or develop their farms. In 1935 a massive industrial zone was established 
in the agrarian centre south of Bozen/Bolzano, local farmers were ousted 
with negligible financial compensation for their lost orchards, which in 
many cases had been their sole source of income. The establishment of an 
industrial zone on the meadows of Bozen/Bolzano had two main aims: 
first it would facilitate a sustainable change in the rural landscape through 
forced industrialization; secondly it meant that the industrial settlements 
would attract thousands of migrant workers from Italy into South Tyrol 
facilitating a sort of Italian plantation. The fact that the settlement of 
industrial labourers, like those who worked in the new aluminium plant, 
made absolutely no economic sense, due to a lack of raw materials in the 
region and the absence of a neighbouring market for the end product, 
was disregarded by the administration whose priority was the creation of 
a strong Italian workforce in Bozen/Bolzano that would further advance 
the policy of Italianization in the area. The relocation costs were heavily 
subsidized to ensure that Bozen/Bolzano was seen as an attractive economic 
prospect for Italians. From April 1936 financial subsidies for up to 130km 
were introduced for all long haul goods transportation by train to and 
from the Bozen/Bolzano industrial zone. This meant that it would cost 
no more than the transportation to business regions such as the Veneto 
and Lombardy.11
The newly enlisted Italian workers were housed in specially designed 
settlements, the so-called ‘semi rurali’, half-rural dwellings closely connected 
to the industrial zone. As Lill has argued, there was little ‘doubt the Italian 
fascists put the entire weight of modernity behind the industrialization 
of the Tyrolean traditions with their new urbanization.’12 Separate Italian 
settlements in a new fascist style, which were strictly separated geographi-
cally from the traditional German South Tyrolean residential areas, were 
designed to cement the fascists’ claim on the northern province.
11 Lill, Südtirol, 157.
12 Lill, Südtirol, 158.
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Tolomei’s policy of denationalization hinged on the successful destruc-
tion of the economic heart of German South Tyrol. Thus in 1935, he abol-
ished the German Raif feisen Bank and founded the Federazione delle 
Casse rurali dell’Alto Adige. He also integrated the local Sparkasse with 
the Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano. However, there were also other social 
and cultural prongs to the campaign, for example, the establishment of an 
Italian-speaking radio station in Bozen/Bolzano, the building of a hippo-
drome in Meran and a campaign to encourage land acquisition by Italian 
peasants through the Ente di Rinascita Agraria delle Tre Venezie (ERA). 
Essentially, Tolomei’s Provvedimeti represented an ideologically based cam-
paign of systematic destruction of the German South Tyrolean’s collective 
identity. Had the policy been ef fectively carried out, hardly anything would 
have been left of the South Tyrolean minority and their German identity 
would have become little more than a footnote in history.
The Weimar Republic and South Tyrol:  
The Stresemann–Mussolini Dispute of 1926
Outside South Tyrol Mussolini’s politics were being closely observed, most 
particularly in Germany. The height of the Italianization policy in South 
Tyrol coincided with the apparent economic recovery of the Weimar 
Republic when it entered into a period of political stability and strength. 
The middle years of the Weimar Republic 1924–1929 were its golden years. 
As the Republic stepped out of the shadows of the Versailles Treaty, the 
economy (with the help of American funding) underwent an astonishing 
recovery. In this climate political extremists on the left and right lost their 
relevance and power. By the mid-1920s, and after being accepted into the 
League of Nations, the German Reich was again in a strong position within 
international politics. The government of the Weimar Republic sought to 
improve its popularity by fulfilling foreign minister Gustav Stresemann’s 
Risorgimento aspirations. Stresemann had declared the intention of 
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providing ‘a voice for more than ten million Germans outside the Reich’s 
borders’.13 Bolstered by Bavarian intellectuals’ support, which had emerged 
as early as 1919, Stresemann challenged Mussolini in the Reichstag regard-
ing his South Tyrolean policy of Italianization.
The so-called ‘battle of words’ between Stresemann and Mussolini in 
February 1926 was an indication of the political tension emerging between 
Italy and Germany. This exchange must be understood in the light of the 
changes in the political landscape in Europe, above all the Locarno Treaty 
of October 1925 in which Germany had guaranteed France the preser-
vation of its Western border. After Locarno Germany became a serious 
player on the international diplomatic stage as it was also allowed to join 
the League of Nations. It demonstrated its increased international status 
by focusing on the cultural autonomy of German minorities abroad, an 
issue which had become very important for Germany following its loss of 
territory as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany thus embarked 
on a direct collision course with Mussolini, who was somewhat weakened 
internationally after failing to secure the Brenner/Brennero border in the 
Locarno Treaty. Il Duce therefore reacted all the more sensitively to any 
criticism of his South Tyrol politics.
Throughout the winter of 1925–1926 the Bavarian and wider German 
media reacted negatively to the enforcement of fascist politics in South 
Tyrol. An irritated Mussolini responded by informing the German ambas-
sador that Germany had a choice: it could be a friend or foe to Italy. The 
brewing tensions came to a head when on 6 February 1926 the prime min-
ister of Bavaria, Heinrich Held accused Italy of ‘raping the German culture 
in South Tyrol.’14 Mussolini immediately launched a verbal attack that was 
to polarize the Italian-German relationship. He accused Germany of an 
anti-Italian campaign and dismissed German nationalist sentimentality. 
Furthermore he denied Held’s claim that there was a systematic policy of 
Italianization in South Tyrol. Essentially, Mussolini argued that the South 
Tyroleans were not a national minority but rather an ethnic relic that would 
13 Lill, Südtirol, 75.
14 Lill, Südtirol, 94.
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be cleared away by Italianization. He also added that Italy would never 
withdraw its national f lag from the Brenner/Brennero Pass, but threatened 
that instead it would carry it even further afield.
The German foreign minister Stresemann’s response to Mussolini’s 
blustering and threats was very revealing. Stresemann was a liberal and 
a democrat and therefore anti-fascist, however, he introduced nation-
alist undertones into his speech in the Reichstag on 9 February. While 
he dismissed Mussolini’s demagogy, he acknowledged and accepted the 
political situation in Europe pertaining to South Tyrol: ‘South Tyrol has 
been assigned to Italy through the peace treaty. The question of Italian 
sovereignty over South Tyrol is settled.’15 However, he underscored the 
responsibilities that came with Italy’s annexation of the area, responsi-
bilities that were based not just on international law, but crucially on an 
‘international moral code’.16 Thus he reminded Italy of the recommenda-
tion ‘of the allied and associated nations’ and of the words of the Italian 
president in the Roman parliament that Italy was to pursue a very liberal 
line towards their new citizens.17 The Reichstag minutes reported ‘Hear! 
Hear!’ and strong support for Stresemann in the Parliament. Stresemann 
proceeded to delight his parliamentary audience by reciting Pecori-Giraldi’s 
1918 proclamation, which blatantly contradicted Italian policy in South 
Tyrol since 1925:
As much as Italy desires to imprint on this soil its spirit and its laws, as remote is 
its desire to suppress other races and languages. (Hear! Hear!) In those villages 
where there is a mixed population, schools in all relevant languages will be intro-
duced. (Hear! Hear!) German-speaking communities will possess German-speaking 
schools … (Hear! Hear!) German will remain the language in the classroom … (Hear! 
Hear!) Gentlemen, this is the first declaration which the German population of 
South Tyrol were exposed to on the very day they have witnessed through military 
occupation that they have become citizens of another country.18
15 Walter Freiberg, Südtirol und der italienische Nationalismus: Entstehung und 
Entwicklung einer europäischen Minderheitenfrage. Dokumente, Josef Fonatana, ed. 
(Innsbruck: Wagner, 1990), 351.
16 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 351.
17 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 351.
18 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 352.
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Stresemann, no doubt encouraged by the raucous and appreciative response, 
branched out and cited other Italian politicians such as Titoni, Bonomi, 
and even King Victor Emmanuel III, all of whom had uttered sentiments 
of tolerance and cultural sensitivity towards: ‘People of other nationalities 
who are unified with us.’19 Stresemann was also tactically astute in highlight-
ing the Italian concerns for their own minorities based abroad:
Italy for instance has just placed value on a decree by South Slavonia to regulate 
the minority question by a decree dated 24 September 1923. South Slavonia grants 
minorities total opportunity for development within the national realm; they enjoy 
freedom within their religion, their press, associations, and assemblies. They have the 
right to establish schools and reformatories within which their own language can 
be used. These were claims made by Italy itself, which would lead to the assumption 
that they would use a similar political template for the German minorities based in 
the region of South Tyrol.20
Stresemann, of course, concluded by highlighting the obvious: the reality 
for South Tyrol under the control of Ettore Tolomei and his Provvedimenti 
was quite dif ferent and amounted to little other than a deliberate policy 
of ‘Entdeutschung von Südtirol’ [de-Germanization of South Tyrol]. 
Stresemann was able to use Mussolini’s own description of the process as 
Italianization and pointed out that Mussolini had described it as one of his 
core policies. This reality stood in stark contrast to the assurances ‘which 
the South Tyrolean population were given throughout their annexation 
by Italy.’21
Stresemann’s criticism of the de-nationalizing policy was ef fective 
and clear: ‘The denationalization issue was pivotal for the protection of 
minorities.’22 He was also conscious of denying Mussolini’s claims of an 
anti-Italian boycotting campaign by distancing himself from the boycott-
ing of Italian goods which had been undertaken mainly in Bavarian circles. 
His speech represented a scathing criticism of the Italian state’s handling 
19 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 352.
20 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 352.
21 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 353.
22 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 353.
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of its newly acquired territory in South Tyrol. While this in ef fect meant 
that Stresemann was commenting on, and interfering in, Italian domestic 
politics, he justified this on the basis that ‘the German public had taken a 
passionate stance based on the cultural connection with German South 
Tyroleans.’23 Stresemann had also implicitly articulated other grounds for 
Germany’s right to comment: the policy of Italianization in South Tyrol 
was contrary to international law and morality.
Stresemann’s hard line against Mussolini also applied to the Locarno 
problem, which lay at the heart of the debate between the two politicians: 
‘In the Locarno negotiations Italy has attempted to secure the Brenner 
border in an international agreement. Our response to that request was, I 
think, self-evident. Firstly, it was directed at the wrong party. Austria has to 
decide about the Brenner Pass as Austria borders with Italy. For our part we 
had no intention of interfering with Austria’s right to self-determination.’24 
This assertion of Stresemann’s is extremely interesting. He withdraws from 
the political debate by hiding behind a judicial formality, thus rejecting 
Germany’s political responsibility in the issue of the stability of borders in 
Europe, which only eight years previously had witnessed the close military 
alliance between Germany and Austria. Stresemann’s ambiguity about 
Germany’s role in South Tyrol, between law and morality, was deliber-
ate as he knew he was playing on existing Italian insecurities regarding its 
northern borders. It placed the South Tyrol issue within the context of 
German Risorgimento nationalism and was intended to provoke Mussolini 
and his strategist Tolomei who constantly stressed the Italianitá of South 
Tyrol. They could therefore see Stresemann’s comments as symptomatic 
of an aggressive German nationalism threatening the integrity of Italy. 
Stresemann continued the nationalist discourse, with the enthusiastic 
appreciation of his audience, by claiming that that seven years after the 
Versailles Treaty Weimar Germany was ‘big enough and united enough to 
take on those who expressed desires to move against Germany’.25
23 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 354.
24 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 355.
25 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 358.
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Stresemann’s speech and, in particular, his expression of a German 
nationalist sentiment was evidence of a new political confidence that was 
emerging in the Weimar Republic by 1926. Germany was slowly begin-
ning to cope with the aftermath of the war and, due to massive finan-
cial aid from the United States, the economy was beginning to recover. 
In 1926, Stresemann had started the process of reintroducing Germany 
into the community of world states by entering the League of Nations. 
With this he marked the end of the post-war era and the beginning of a 
new political order in Europe within which Italy – by means of the secret 
treaty of 1915 as one of the beneficiaries of the war – would be limited in 
its political aspirations. Weimar’s new national confidence was so strong 
that Stresemann openly criticized the Versailles Treaty through which 
‘millions of German citizens were forced to live under foreign rule, which 
was totally at odds with the idea of a people’s right to self-determination.’26 
Stresemann’s declaration that ‘it is the right of the German population to 
feel a connection with people of the same blood living in another state, 
a right which no one can remove or contest’27 was ef fectively providing 
the rationale for Germany to become the protector of South Tyrol, a role 
traditionally played by Austria.
Stresemann’s pointed positioning of Germany vis-à-vis Italy on the 
international stage also had a clear domestic rationale. Stresemann’s pro-
nounced anti-Italianism – which from his own political perspective could 
be equated to a strong anti-Fascism – was designed to unite all diverging 
political parties in the Parliament. To this end he was successful as his 
speech was received with approval from all sides of the political spectrum 
in the German parliament. Stresemann was trying to create a basic national 
political consensus which would incorporate all parties, even the strongly 
nationalist ones from southern Germany. The Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) 
increasingly defined itself as the voice of the suppressed German minor-
ity in Italy since Austria, the traditional voice of the South Tyroleans, was 
marked by political impotence.
26 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 358.
27 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 359.
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Despite Innsbruck’s strong support of South Tyrol, Vienna remained 
weak and half-hearted in its attempts to confront Mussolini’s policies in 
South Tyrol. However, the dispute between Mussolini and Stresemann 
did prompt a reaction from the Austrian prime minister, Rudolf Ramek. 
In the wake of Stresemann’s speech Ramek criticized the Italianization of 
South Tyrol, but he also appeased Mussolini by referring to South Tyrol 
as ‘Oberetsch’, which was a translation of the fascist term Alto Adige. As 
a result of this somewhat ambiguous stance he came under more criticism 
from the North Tyrolean camp than from Italy. An Austrian prime minister 
who was so mindful of Mussolini’s fascist sensibilities that he could not 
even refer to South Tyrol by its Tyrolean name was not going to be taken 
seriously as a spokesman for South Tyrolean interests.
The Tyrolean delegate Kolb illustrated during the same national assem-
bly debate how dif ferently the Innsbruck parliament dealt with the South 
Tyrol issue: he referred to Wilson’s fourteen points in the context of the end 
of the war in 1918, and to Austria’s neighbourly right to have a say in South 
Tyrol. This became even more relevant in the face of the Italianization of 
German-speaking South Tyrol as this had become ‘eine Weltfrage’ [a global 
issue],28 and was no longer just a bilateral problem. To conclude his long 
speech, Kolb quoted the famous section of Eduard Reut-Nicolussi’s 1919 
speech, in which he expressed his pain at the separation of South Tyrol 
from its fatherland Austria. This emotional reminder of the fate of South 
Tyrol was honoured in the parliament and was greeted with ‘vigorous and 
lasting acclamation and applause. – The speaker was congratulated,’29 and 
Tyrolean delegates in Innsbruck had thus reassured themselves that they 
were the true defenders of South Tyrol’s interests in Austria.
Despite the polemic in Vienna, Innsbruck and Berlin, no one in 1926 
raised the issue of the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero, not even Stresemann. 
Even if many politicians would have wished to see a geographical revision 
of the border, the timing and the political climate in Europe were not 
conducive to such a debate. Stresemann had other worries, and the South 
28 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 437.
29 Freiberg, Minderheitenfrage, 447.
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Tyroleans acknowledged that he was not in a position to revise the Treaty 
of St Germain. Germany was trying gradually to ease the ef fects of the 
Versailles Treaty and would not attempt to revise the stipulations of the 
Treaty for Austria. This option was first articulated by Adolf Hitler who was 
beginning to establish his national socialist party at the end of the decade, 
f loating the idea of ‘nationale Sammlung’ [national unification].30
Nevertheless, the German Reich had firmly positioned itself against 
Mussolini regarding the issue of South Tyrol and had thus adopted the role 
of the vigilant observer that Austria was unable to sustain. Consequently, 
the German-speaking South Tyroleans placed their political hopes in 
Germany, the stronger of the two German states. Bozen/Bolzano now 
looked to Berlin rather than to Vienna. However, it was not until the Nazi 
era that the South Tyroleans had their hopes seriously raised regarding the 
potential end to the fascist de-nationalization of South Tyrol and a move 
towards the German Reich.
Appendix: Ettore Tolomei’s 32 Provisions for South Tyrol
1. Unification of Alto Adige and Trentino into a single province with 
Trento as its capital.
2. Appointment of Italian municipal secretaries (podestà).
3. Revision of the (citizenship) options and closure of the Brenner border 
for all persons to whom the Italian citizenship was not granted.
4. Provisions to hinder Germans and Austrians from entering and stay-
ing in Italy.
5. Obstruction of German immigration.
6. Revision of the census of 1921.
7. Introduction of Italian as the of ficial language.
30 Lill, Südtirol, 75.
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8. Dismissal of German of ficials or transfer to the old (Italian) 
provinces.
9. Dissolution of the ‘Deutscher Verband’ (German association).
10. Dissolution of Alpine associations not af filiated with the Italian Alpine 
Club, transfer of all Alpine refuges to the Italian Alpine Club.
11. Proscribe the names ‘Südtirol’ and ‘Deutsch-Südtirol’.
12. Shutting down of the Bozen newspaper Der Tiroler.
13. Italianization of German local names.
14. Italianization of public signs and inscriptions.
15. Italianization of street names.
16. Italianization of the Germanized surnames.
17. Removal of the Walther von der Vogelweide monument from the 
Walther Square in Bozen.
18. Increase of Carabinieri troops excluding German units.
19. Preferential treatment of  land acquisition and immigration of 
Italians.
20. Request of non-interference by foreign powers in South Tyrolean 
af fairs.
21. Elimination of German banks, establishment of an Italian mortgage 
Bank.
22. Establishment of border customs of fices in Sterzing and Toblach.
23. Generous support of the Italian language and culture.
24. Introduction of Italian nursery and primary schools.
25. Introduction of Italian secondary schools.
26. Strict control of foreign university diplomas.
27. Expansion of the ‘Istituto di Storia per l’Alto Adige’.
28. Realignment of the territory of the Diocese of Brixen and strict sur-
veillance of clergy activity.
29. Exclusive use of Italian in trials and in court.
30. State control of the Chamber of Commerce and the agricultural 
authorities (corporazioni).
31. Extensive programs for new rail networks to facilitate the Italian-
ization of Alto Adige (rail projects Milan–Mals, Veltlin–Brenner, 
Agordo–Brixen).
32. Increase of the number of army personnel in Alto Adige.
Chapter 5
Under the Shadow of the Third Reich, 1933–1938
Most German South Tyroleans welcomed the arrival of Adolf Hitler in the 
Reich Chancellery in 1933. They had experienced post-World War I Europe 
as a period of oppression and hardship. The rise of Benito Mussolini from 
1922 and the implementation of the ‘Provvedimenti’ had compounded and 
exacerbated their post-war grievances and left them feeling isolated and 
beleaguered. Thus the German South Tyroleans regarded the new chan-
cellor in Berlin with cautious optimism hoping that in him lay a brighter 
German future that would include them. Nor was this sense of optimism 
groundless, Hitler had nurtured the idea of uniting South Tyrol with the 
German Empire in the early days of his national socialist movement. In 
his proposed trajectory for the party in 1920 he emphasized his position 
with direct reference to Wilson’s fourteen point program: ‘Unification of 
all Germans based on the idea of self-determination for all races.’1 He 
also strongly criticized the German foreign minister Walter Simons for 
accepting the annexation of South Tyrol by Italy as inevitable.
Later however, and coinciding with the rise of Mussolini, the very prag-
matic Hitler changed his approach to South Tyrol. He saw in Mussolini a 
natural ally on the international stage. Shortly after Mussolini took power 
in October 1922 Hitler clarified his position on South Tyrol to Italian 
diplomats emphasizing that the importance of Italy as an ally was of con-
siderably more value and relevance to Germany than ‘200,000 well-treated 
Germans as opposed to millions of totally oppressed Germans.’2 It was 
clear that Hitler would not allow the South Tyrol situation to queer the 
pitch for Italian-German co-operation. He made clear to Mussolini that the 
1 Lill, Südtirol, 139.
2 Lill, Südtirol, 140.
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South Tyrolean issue no longer existed and therefore had no implications 
for their relationship.
Hitler’s willingness to abandon the South Tyrol issue was indicative of 
how important he considered a political relationship with Mussolini. This 
was clearly articulated in Hitler’s political manifesto Mein Kampf, which 
emerged after Hitler’s prison sentence in the fortress of Landsberg. In this 
book he repeatedly addressed the question of South Tyrol in line with 
his ‘Heim ins Reich’ [Home into the Reich] philosophy, stating that the 
question of South Tyrol had to be subordinate to the relationship between 
Italy and Germany.3 South Tyrol, according to Hitler, had always been 
‘the German people’s Hecuba’ and had been a question that ‘our infernal 
press had inf lated to a degree that would be disastrous for the German 
people.’4 Hitler explained clearly that the interests of South Tyrol had to 
be subordinate to the interests of the Reich:
It is important to note that the regaining of lost regions of a race or state is one of 
the first steps in the regaining of political power and the independence of the moth-
erland. In such a case the interests of the lost region must be cast aside in favour of 
those regarding the ultimate freedom of the motherland. The liberating of oppressed 
or annexed regions is not generally the result of the wishes or protests of those left 
behind, but rather the result of the wishes of the sovereign power with which they 
were formerly united.5
In an open attack on the politicians of the Weimar Republic, who supported 
the South Tyrol’s quest for reunification with the rest of Tyrol, Hitler asso-
ciated the campaign for reunification with a Jewish conspiracy. As far as 
Hitler was concerned those who elevated the South Tyrolean issue above 
German international interests, and most particularly, a German-Italian 
relationship were traitors. He explained: ‘It is in the interests of Jews and 
Habsburg sympathizers to hinder a federal German state that one day could 
 
3 Helmut Alexander, Stefan Lechner and Adolf Leidlmair, Heimatlos: die Umsiedlung 
der Südtiroler (Innsbruck and Bozen: Tiroler Landesinstitut, 1993), 21.
4 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich: Franz Eher, 1926), 520.
5 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 688.
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lead to an emancipated German fatherland. It is not out of love for South 
Tyrol that they are making such a fuss, but rather out of fear of a possible 
German Italian agreement.’6
However, due largely to Mussolini’s lack of interest, Hitler’s dreams of 
a German-Italian agreement did not materialize immediately. Once Hitler 
came to power in 1933, he focused on the domestic consolidation of the 
NSdAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party), and more gradually 
the expansion of German political power into Europe. Mussolini’s ambiva-
lence mutated into suspicion and rejection. In 1935 Hitler occupied the 
Rhineland and thus broke the terms of the Versailles Treaty, without any 
resistance from the Allies. Germany left the League of Nations, and Hitler 
allowed Hermann Göring to confirm to the international community 
the existence of a German air force and to announce the rearmament of 
Germany. Finally, in that same year the Saarland question was settled by 
plebiscite which resulted in an overwhelming consensus of the German 
people in favour of being part of the German Reich. Unsurprisingly, the 
Nazis turned this into a huge propaganda issue, celebrating the result of 
the referendum as a validation of the Nazi system. The national socialist 
regime’s political isolation was concealed behind gestures of military power 
and political strength. Hitler appeared unstoppable. He had made no secret 
of his desire to reunite his birthplace Austria with the German Reich. The 
reunification of Germany and Austria would have meant German troops 
on the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero, a scenario Mussolini dreaded. Thus 
the government in Rome and the German-speaking South Tyroleans both 
became convinced that Hitler’s troops would, sooner or later, march all the 
way, as far as the linguistic and ethnic divide between the Germanic and 
the Italian worlds at Salurn/Salorno. Mussolini moved decisively to pre-
vent the German expansion into the South, hence he drew up the Roman 
Protocols in March 1934 which sought to support Austria and Hungary 
and bind them more closely to Italy.7
6 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 709.
7 Lill, Südtirol, 144.
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The more suspicious Mussolini became of Hitler’s ambitions, the 
more Hitler sought to forge a relationship with Mussolini. Hitler’s spe-
cial envoy, Hermann Göring, had announced in Rome in November 1933 
that Germany would never again raise the issue of South Tyrol. In order 
for Hitler to achieve his aim of a strong German-Italian relationship he 
had to convince Mussolini that he was willing to sacrifice German South 
Tyrol. Ironically, neither Rome nor South Tyrol believed Hitler’s declara-
tions in this regard. In the light of his openly and oft-expressed wish to 
bring Austria back to the homeland, which had resulted in a pro-Nazi 
atmosphere in South Tyrol, Mussolini and the German-speaking South 
Tyroleans regarded his utterances on South Tyrol as merely tactical. For 
Mussolini Hitler’s apparently conf licting statements on South Tyrol, Austria 
and the German vision of Heimat compounded his distrust; for the South 
Tyroleans it fostered hope.
However, the wider international interests of Germany and Italy 
brought the two dictators to an agreement when, in 1936, Germany acknowl-
edged the Italian annexation of Ethiopia as a result of the Abyssinian war, 
and Italy in turn supported Germany’s campaign in the Spanish Civil War. 
Both Italian campaigns paved the way for the Rome-Berlin axis. During the 
Abyssinian campaign Mussolini had af fronted the main western powers, 
whereas Hitler had benevolently supported the annexation. The involve-
ment in Spain cemented the de facto relationship between Hitler and 
Mussolini, as both dictators were now facing the united disapproval of 
the other main powers. In October 1936 the German and Italian foreign 
ministers Galeazzo Ciano and Konstantin Hermann Karl Freiherr von 
Neurath forged the Axis alliance. Both declared they were anti-Com-
munist and staked out their various geographical spheres of interest. The 
German Reich was looking to expand in the East and thus agreed to leave 
the Mediterranean to Mussolini.
With this, Italy had secured a German guarantee of the Italian posi-
tion and a German recognition of Austria’s integrity. Hitler’s desire to 
build a close relationship with Mussolini was fulfilled, and until 1945 he 
regarded this as binding. All of the sacrifices the Reich made for Italy in 
the succeeding years, the military aid in Greece and North Africa, the 
liberation of the Duce in 1943 and the creation of the Repubbliccá di 
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Salò, must be understood in the context and spirit of the 1936 agreement 
between Hitler and Mussolini. Crucially for the South Tyroleans, this 
treaty included Germany’s definitive rejection of the German South Tyrol’s 
claim to return to the Reich.
Hitler paid an of ficial visit to Rome on 7 May 1938 in order to reassure 
Mussolini that the border at the Brenner Pass would remain untouched by 
Germany. This guarantee smoothed the way for a full Italian sanction of the 
Munich agreement of August 1938,8 which increased Hitler’s inf luence 
in central Europe through the annexation of the Sudetenland. In South 
Tyrol Hitler’s visit to Rome marked a U-turn in the propaganda of the 
Völkischer Kampfring Südtirol (VKS), but it also meant the beginning 
of the painful realization that Hitler rated his friendship with Mussolini 
above their reunification with the German Reich. South Tyrol was reduced 
to the ‘Schmiere auf der Achse Berlin-Rom’ [grease on the Berlin-Rome 
Axis]. Rudolf Lill points out that while Hitler’s assurances that he was no 
longer interested in South Tyrol did not make the Option period of 1939 
inevitable, it certainly made it the most likely outcome.9 Conrad Latour 
added that after the ‘Handstreich von Prag’ [Coup in Prague] – the unlaw-
ful occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia – the political mood in Rome 
became very anti-German. Mussolini was governed by his fears that Hitler 
could proceed to Yugoslavia and thus threaten his sphere of interest on 
the Balkan peninsula. Viewed in this light, the idea of relocating German 
South Tyroleans to the Reich, which became known as the ‘Option’, could 
be regarded as an attempt to pacify Italy.10
8 Conrad Latour, Südtirol und die Achse Berlin-Rom 1938–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlagsanstalt 1962), 30–31.
9 Lill, Südtirol, 145.
10 Latour, Achse Berlin Rom, 31.
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National Socialism in South Tyrol
It is important to understand the history of National Socialism in South 
Tyrol from its inception, in order to fully grasp the significance of the later 
Option period for South Tyrolean identity. As has already been noted the 
resistance to Tolomei’s catalogue of sanctions in South Tyrol had been 
restricted to civil disobedience and the establishment of the catacomb 
schools, which was supported by the Catholic Church. However, by the 
1930s resistance had become more pronounced and more radically anti-Ital-
ian11 mutating from the passive resistance of aristocrats, clerks and farmers 
to active resistance.12 The Italian historian Umberto Corsini attributed the 
advent of this new resistance to a political shift to the right and to the emer-
gence and inf luence of völkisch ideas in German-speaking coteries north of 
the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero on the political discourse of resistance 
in South Tyrol. On the other hand many of the young South Tyroleans 
protested against their established ethnic and political representation in the 
Deutscher Verband (DV) accusing it of insuf ficient political activity. This 
new, politicized youth no longer voiced their protest through the channels 
of traditional catholic institutions, but rather found a new way to express 
themselves through the ‘Befreiungsideologie des Nationalsozialismus’ 
[liberation ideology of National Socialism] even though this National 
Socialism was a variant of the governing fascism. With this came a shift 
in focus: the older generation were still motivated by a hope of reunifica-
tion with the fatherland, Tyrol, whereas the younger generation directed 
their energy towards the idea of unity with the German Reich. The Reich’s 
national liberal and national socialist parties appealed to South Tyrolean 
youth because they argued for the abolition of the Versailles Treaty (and 
with that also the provisions of the Treaty of St Germain), along with the 
renaissance of German national pride and the unification of all Germans 
in one fatherland.
11 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 203.
12 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 203.
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The German general elections in September 1930 revealed massive 
support for Hitler’s party and those involved in National Socialism inter-
preted this as a mandate for a national renaissance. In South Tyrol it resulted 
in the creation of national socialist groups. 1931 and 1932 witnessed the 
emergence of the local NS groups in Meran/Merano and Bozen/Bolzano 
respectively, initially organized by resident Austrians and Germans, who 
stressed the similarities between Italian Fascism and National Socialism. 
Whilst Tolomei welcomed these movements as a ‘counterweight balanc-
ing traditional Austrian irredentism,’13 the more pragmatically minded 
Mussolini was concerned about the implications of such a development. 
He advised the new Bozen/Bolzano prefect Giuseppe Mastromattei only to 
accept National Socialism within the ranks of German nationals resident in 
Italy. However, he was anxious that the development of National Socialism 
among South Tyroleans be curbed.14 Mussolini was somewhat restricted 
in even this endeavour as he did not wish to of fend Hitler. As early as 1933 
it was obvious that containing the growth of National Socialism in South 
Tyrol would be impossible.
As well as the development of NSdAP branches in South Tyrol a home-
grown movement of youth resistance organizations emerged from as early as 
1928. These groups rejected fascist assimilation and instead focused on the 
preservation of South Tyrolean folklore as a defense against Italianization.15 
The most significant of these small groups was the ‘Nibelung’, from which 
emerged the student group ‘Walther von der Vogelweide’, formed by Bozen 
secondary school pupils. This cultural movement, professed ‘Heimattreu’ 
[loyalty to the homeland] and aimed at ‘Befreiung’ [liberation] of South 
Tyrol, was closely connected to the völkisch idea, but did not imitate unlaw-
ful organization patterns. While they held secret meetings their focus was 
on educating their members by means of lectures on history, literature and 
politics. Significantly, their musical evenings and music camps were largely 
attended by Germans and Austrians from the bündisch or national socialist 
13 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 204.
14 See Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 205.
15 Alfons Gruber, Südtirol unter dem Faschismus (Bozen: Athesia, 1974), 35.
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organizations indicating the strong connection between these cultural 
resistance organizations and National Socialism.16
In general these organizations did not attract the attention of the 
authorities, only occasionally provoking a Carabinieri response when, for 
example, they organized the laying of wreaths at the memorials of Tyrolean 
freedom fighters or the handing out of f lyers encouraging people to boy-
cott Italian businesses.17 Recital communities were also formed during this 
period to safeguard collective traditions and music. The creation of these 
societies during the fascist period represented a deliberate protest against 
cultural and linguistic assimilation.
These relatively informal groups, which were familiar with contempo-
rary political currents and which sympathized with the national socialist 
movement, provided the perfect recruiting ground for the prolific national 
socialist cells after 1933. The process was made easier by the centralization of 
these groups in the Gau-Jugend-Rat in 1932. In 1934, the Gau-Jugend-Rat 
was renamed the Völkischer Kampfring Südtirol (VKS), which ref lected 
the strong inf luence of the German national socialist movement. During 
this period the VKS, under the leadership of Felix Gasser, consciously 
modeled itself on the ideological development of the Reich18 in order to 
ensure the closest possible alliance with German society.
In 1934, the Italian state banished VKS leaders Hillebrand and Gasser 
in the hope of crushing National Socialism in South Tyrol. However, in 
view of the developing relationship between Italy and Germany and the 
rapidly changing political climate, any Italian hopes of moving ef fectively 
against the emergence of National Socialism within its borders were com-
promised. Hence, in 1933 at the beginning of the Third Reich two diametri-
cally opposed groups in South Tyrol stood looking to Germany for future 
guidance: the VKS and the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland 
(VDA), which comprised the Catholic resistance group of Gamper and 
the conservative South Tyroleans. However, as Corsini and Lill observe, 
16 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 206.
17 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 207.
18 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 207.
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the VKS managed to harness the widespread belief in Hitler’s ‘Heim ins 
Reich’ philosophy to bolster its own powerbase in South Tyrol, whereas, 
the conservatives, who also placed considerable hope in Hitler’s power to 
bring the South Tyroleans into the Reich, nevertheless rejected the ideol-
ogy of National Socialism.19 As the hopes for unification with Germany 
became increasingly associated with National Socialism the conservatives 
lost considerable ground. Furthermore, the ideological dif ferences between 
the VKS and the conservatives meant that cooperation became impossible. 
As a result of the dominance of National Socialism in South Tyrol, central 
figures, for example, Canon Michael Gamper who represented the Catholic 
wing, began to dissociate themselves from the ‘Heim ins Reich’ idea.
The South Tyrolean tendency to project all its hopes onto National 
Socialism and Hitler was only strengthened by the continuing policy of 
Italianization. Its annual calendar was dotted with fascist holidays, Tolomei’s 
Provvedimenti were assiduously implemented, migrant Italian workers were 
an ever more prominent feature of life in South Tyrol, and the industrial 
area gave Bozen/Bolzano a very un-Tyrolean and industrialized appearance. 
Visitors to South Tyrol at the end of the 1920s could already attest to an 
ever more Italian South Tyrol, even though Tolomei’s Provvedimenti were 
never totally accomplished, for example, the Italianization of South Tyrol 
family names was a ‘dead letter’.20
The Catholic Church also limited linguistic and cultural assimilation 
through self-confident engagement in favour of the German-speaking 
Catholics. Their self-confidence was based on the Lateran Pact of February 
1929 between the Catholic Church and Mussolini, which stated that the 
Church would enjoy a certain degree of freedom within the fascist state. 
In particular Article 22, which placed the care of all believers (German and 
Italian) in the hands of the church, and Article 39 which gave further power 
to the Pope in Rome regarding seminaries, had positive repercussions for 
South Tyrol. These articles guaranteed the Church autonomy over its f lock 
and institutions, which the Italian state was bound to protect. Mussolini 
19 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 271.
20 Gruber, Südtirol unter dem Faschismus, 52.
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accepted this diminution of his otherwise absolute power in South Tyrol 
because he was aware that he could not af ford to alienate the support of 
Italian Roman Catholics. If, while appeasing Italian Catholic opinion and 
winning their support for his European ambitions, he incidentally accorded 
greater freedoms to the South Tyroleans, that was a by-product he was will-
ing to accept. However Canon Gamper, once he had secured the support 
of his senior Bishop, Josef Geisler, exploited this protection and power 
af forded to the Catholic Church in order to resist and to become the guid-
ing spirit behind those South Tyroleans who resisted the Nazis.21
Meanwhile the VKS, under the leadership of Felix Gasser, Otto 
Waldthaler and Peter Hofer, openly embraced the ideology of the German 
National Socialism. Student activists such as Norbert Mumelter, Robert 
Helm and Karl Nicolussi were key figures in the reorganization of the VKS 
into sectioned paramilitary groups, which in 1936 adopted the ideology and 
the NSdAP ‘Führer Prinzip’ [the principle of leadership]. They sought to 
prepare South Tyrol for what they regarded as its inevitable inclusion into 
the German Reich. Based on this conviction they wanted to streamline 
South Tyrolean society in the way Germany had been restructured when 
the Nazis came to power:
No-one openly predicted when Hitler would ‘bring South Tyrol home’, would it 
coincide with the Anschluss with Austria, or follow an agreement or dispute with 
Mussolini. There was however, a widespread belief in the readiness of a land and 
people determined to achieve unification with Germany. The goal was to then pro-
vide the Führer with a dependable and powerful following.22
The limitless optimism of the VKS with regard to ‘Heim ins Reich’ [Return 
to the Empire] for South Tyrol, along with numerous undercover activi-
ties (such as visits to the cemeteries of Austrian soldiers from the First 
World War in the Dolomites and in Trient/Trento, or the military training 
of young men in secret locations) fuelled the general conviction among 
German-speaking South Tyroleans that Hitler would bring South Tyrol 
21 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 150.
22 Corsini and Lill, Südtirol 1918–1946, 276.
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into the Reich. Gradually, the South Tyroleans were behaving less like 
victims of oppression, but instead were entering a phase of optimism and 
preparation, consciously looking to what they believed would be a brighter 
future. The ideology of National Socialism along with the guarantee of 
self-determination for all Germans articulated by Hitler convinced many 
in South Tyrol that there was a realistic future for them in the Reich and 
the fatalism of the 1920s was replaced with pro-active optimism in the 
1930s. The Saarland referendum of 1935 was regarded as a clear indication 
of German Risorgimento nationalism, which was expressed in South Tyrol 
as ‘Heute die Saar, wir übers Jahr’ [Today the Saarland, our turn next year]. 
In 1938 the Anschluss with Austria further confirmed this conviction: 
Austria was now part of the German Empire and National Socialism seemed 
unstoppable. South Tyrol was the next logical step in the German Reich’s 
march forward. The followers of the VKS and also the DV pinned all their 
hopes on this eventuality. However, Hitler and Mussolini had other plans 
for South Tyrol: the people of South Tyrol were to be presented with an 
option of whether to stay or leave the Heimat. The option literally forced the 
South Tyroleans to choose between Heimat and identity: they could stay in 
their homeland and sacrifice their Austro-German identity or leave South 
Tyrol to retain their Austro-German traditional way of life. Consequently, 
the VKS, whose fortunes and hopes were so wedded to German National 
Socialism were left in the untenable position of having to sell an ‘option’ 
to their people that negated everything they represented.

Chapter 6
The Option and German Rule in South Tyrol, 
1939–1945
The belief among South Tyroleans that Hitler represented their best hope 
of salvation from fascist Italy ran very deep, despite the fact that at no stage 
had any of their representatives succeeded in securing any such guarantee 
from Hitler. In fact, before Hitler’s accession to power, a small delegation 
of South Tyroleans met with him on 31 March 1932 in the Braunes Haus in 
Munich. The conversation that ensued should have dashed any hopes the 
South Tyroleans had that Hitler might be their saviour. The South Tyrolean 
delegation, led by the lawyer and politician Eduard Reut-Nicolussi and 
Norbert Mumelter, sought to persuade Hitler to include South Tyrol in 
the Reich thus saving it from fascist Italy. During this revealing encounter 
Hitler spelled out clearly his position on the South Tyrol and the limits 
to his support. South Tyrol, he explained, would not be included in the 
Reich for two fundamental reasons. From a strategic point of view, South 
Tyrol was vital to Hitler’s relationship with Mussolini, which was too 
important to jeopardize. From an ideological point of view, South Tyrol 
did not have the same claims on the Reich’s protection as the Germans in 
Poland, who he felt – in accordance with his racial theory of inferior and 
superior races – were clearly oppressed by ‘an inferior race’. There was little 
doubt that Hitler was willing to sacrifice the South Tyroleans for what he 
considered to be the greater good of Germany. In fact, Hitler intended to 
use South Tyrol to strengthen the German–Italian relationship by creating 
organizations that would build bridges between Berlin and Rome.
The reaction of this small delegation to what must have been a devastat-
ing experience was to inform the political development of the South Tyrol 
during the Nazi period: they returned home and continued to maintain 
(and possibly believe) that Hitler would still rescue South Tyrol. In ef fect, 
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their refusal to accept Hitler’s calculated rejection of their claims instigated 
a culture of denial and blind hope in Hitler’s Reich. It was in this confused 
climate in 1934 that the VKS was established with the express intention of 
seeing South Tyrol embraced within the fold of the German Reich. Despite 
Hitler’s unambiguous position on South Tyrol, the VKS and large swathes 
of the public chose to believe that Hitler merely wished to lull Mussolini 
into a false sense of security regarding the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero, but 
that he would, when the opportunity presented itself, expand his empire as 
far Trient/Trento. This was, in many ways, the politics of self-delusion and 
desperation. To accept Hitler’s position on South Tyrol would have meant 
not just accepting political failure, but also devastating cultural rejection 
and the end of any hopes that their German identity could be saved from 
the ravages of Italianization.
The VKS nurtured their belief in Hitler over the years that followed: 
the example of the Saarland referendum of 1935 of fered them an example 
of a German population voting itself into the Reich and with the Anschluss 
of Austria to Germany in March 1938 the VKS could almost literally feel 
the Reich encroaching. However, so did Mussolini who had not been 
of ficially informed of the Anschluss and thus felt threatened. Ironically, for 
the South Tyroleans, this resulted in Hitler, in a bid to reassure Mussolini 
and maintain their political relationship, travelling to Rome in May 1938 
to reassure his comrade of the integrity of the Brenner border. In ef fect, 
this meant that Hitler was publicly reaf firming the place of South Tyrol 
in Italy and, therefore, denying it any place in a new Reich. The implica-
tions of Hitler’s rejection of South Tyrol were devastating for the VKS: the 
party now had to cast South Tyrol as a sacrifice for the völkisch ideology 
it had propagated since its inception. Perhaps this contradictory position 
was best summed up by one of the VKS leaders, Norbert Mumelter, when 
he declared: ‘Für Grossdeutschland muss man selbst seine Heimat opfern 
können’1 [In order to support the Greater German Empire one has to be 
prepared to sacrifice one’s Heimat!].
1 Rolf Steininger, Südtirol: Vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart (Innsbruck: 
Studienverlag, 2003), 42.
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The VKS’s position became increasingly dif ficult since their entire 
raison d’être was to prepare the people of South Tyrol for reunification 
with the Reich.2 Although it was becoming ever more obvious that Hitler’s 
goal of building a ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ of all Germans was subject to prag-
matic considerations such as the developing friendship with Mussolini, the 
VKS could not af ford to antagonize the leadership in Berlin by pushing 
its claims. Not surprisingly, the VKS found it increasingly hard to provide 
consistent pro-German leadership in South Tyrol. Rudolf Lill has argued 
that the enthusiasm for National Socialism in South Tyrol was a manifes-
tation of national patriotism rather than of any real approval of National 
Socialism. Lill’s contention is particularly relevant for the continued sup-
port for National Socialism in South Tyrol after 1938. For, despite Hitler’s 
rejection of South Tyrol, belief in the Reich remained the South Tyroleans’ 
way of expressing loyalty to their besieged German identity.
However, loyalty to the Reich and the spiritual notion of the homeland 
was to take on a meaning the South Tyroleans could never have foreseen 
and one that would devastate the very identity they sought to protect. 
Throughout 1938 and early 1939 both Mussolini and Hitler’s positions 
regarding the German-speaking population in South Tyrol began to alter. 
Mussolini’s tiring of South Tyrolean resistance to Italianization, and Hitler’s 
increasing need for soldiers meant that both men began to see the removal 
of the German-speaking population from South Tyrol as solution to the 
ongoing South Tyrolean problem. Basically, they concluded, the South 
Tyrolean issue was not going to go away, so the people must.3
In 1939 Heinrich Himmler and the Italian foreign minister Count 
Ciano drafted an agreement between Hitler and Mussolini which had 
at its heart the relocation of the German South Tyrolean people into the 
German Reich. This agreement was of ficially called the ‘Option’ as it 
of fered the South Tyroleans a choice: to leave their Heimat and become 
‘Reichsdeutsche’ [citizens of the German Reich] in the Reich or to remain 
in the Heimat and become fully Italianized. Those that opted for the latter 
2 Lill, Südtirol, 172.
3 Lill, Südtirol, 71.
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were promised compensation for the loss of material possessions and they 
were promised an area of settlement where all South Tyroleans could live 
together in one group. The alternative was equally stark: if they decided to 
stay in South Tyrol they had to abandon their Germanness, their language 
and their customs, and would keep their Italian passport.
The VKS, who had not been consulted during the drafting of the 
Option agreement, found itself in an impossible position, torn between the 
political interests of two dictators. Furthermore, the VKS still could not 
af ford to alienate Hitler by insisting on its desire for South Tyrol within 
the Reich. In other words, despite the fact that the Option amounted to 
a violation of everything the VKS had espoused since its establishment 
it was powerless to articulate its horror, in fact it had to rally behind the 
Option and ensure its success. The VKS, ironically, had few options itself 
and continued, as it always had, in the desperate hope that Hitler could yet 
be convinced of the South Tyrolean claim on the Reich. Thus it focused on 
the hope that if the South Tyroleans could be persuaded en masse to opt 
for life within the Reich, Hitler might be moved to protect their Heimat. 
In ef fect, the VKS had to replace the Nazi credo ‘Blut und Boden’ [blood 
and soil], with the notion of ‘Blut oder Boden’ [blood or soil]. The aban-
donment of the congruity of land and ‘racial belonging’ fundamentally 
undermined the VKS’s credibility in South Tyrol. Inevitably, in the coming 
years the VKS was reduced to a mere receiver of orders rather than an active 
political organization.
Peter Hofer, leader of the VKS, began to urge the South Tyroleans 
to opt out of South Tyrol and into the Reich. He argued that the South 
Tyroleans were needed in the Reich to ensure the ‘völkische Überleben 
Deutschlands’ [survival of the German race]. Ironically, he was strongly 
supported by Ettore Tolomei who was eager to rid South Tyrol of German 
speakers. However, it was a rumour that had the greatest impact on people’s 
decision whether to stay or go: the ‘Sicilian legend’ claimed that those South 
Tyroleans that chose to stay would be deported to Sicily and would thus 
lose their Heimat and the Reich. This rumour is credited with massively 
increasing the numbers of those that opted to leave South Tyrol for reset-
tlement in the Reich. Ironically, once it became obvious how many South 
Tyroleans were willing to leave, both Italy and Germany tried to quell the 
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Sicilian legend. Germany feared it could not cope with such an avalanche 
of people pouring into the Reich; Italy envisaged state bankruptcy if it 
had to pay compensation to the eighty-six per cent of South Tyroleans 
opting to leave Italy.
This situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany could 
not provide any land suitable for all the South Tyroleans. Himmler sug-
gested French Burgundy because of its hills and climate which allow the 
production of fruit and wine. However, Burgundy remained under the 
control of the Vichy regime and was therefore not an option. The Crimean 
peninsula was then proposed, but the Reich lost possession of it to Russia 
before any settlers could move there. It was, in fact, Polish Galicia where a 
few contingents of South Tyroleans were resettled between 1942 and 1944. 
However, the German defeat at Stalingrad in 1943 and the withdrawal of 
the Wehrmacht from Eastern Europe brought an end to the resettlement 
plans for the South Tyroleans. Furthermore, the majority of those who made 
the move remained in provisional settlements, mainly in Innsbruck and 
Munich, and a number of them returned to South Tyrol after the war.
Thus the Option was a massive failure. By 31 December 1939, eighty-
six per cent of approximately 250,000 South Tyroleans had opted to leave 
their homeland. However, in the period from 1939 to 1943 only 75,000 
(thirty-seven per cent) relocated, and of these 20–25,000 returned home at 
the end of the Second World War. However, the impact of the Option lay 
less in its success or failure and more in its meaning for the collective iden-
tity of the South Tyroleans. In response to the Option the society divided 
into two camps: the ‘Dableiber’ [those who opted to stay in South Tyrol] 
and the ‘Optanten’ [those willing to leave]. This divide was a painful and 
often acrimonious one and bitter rifts developed akin to those witnessed in 
other parts of the world af fected by civil war. Families were torn apart, best 
friends parted for good, children turned against parents, siblings against 
each other. Quite apart from those entrenched in their decisions to go 
or stay, there were many who could not decide, who oscillated painfully 
between the two options. The German-speaking population and its very 
understanding of identity was torn apart by the reality of the Option. The 
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option experience spawned an entire literature written by survivors which 
testifies to the depth of the trauma.4
In 1943 fascist rule ended in Italy, Mussolini was overthrown and Italy 
joined the Allies in an ef fort to defeat Hitler and put an end to the war. 
Hitler installed Mussolini as president of the short-lived Repubblicá Sociale 
di Salò at Lake Garda as a final act of friendship. South Tyrol remained a 
region of Italy although it came under German rule as it was part of the 
‘Operationszone Alpenvorland’ [Operation zone of the Alpine foreland] 
along with Trient/Trento and Belluno. This rule did not fulfil the pre-
war aspirations of South Tyrol for unification with Germany as it did not 
provide a path into the German Reich, and the German troops behaved 
as if they were occupying a foreign land. For the duration of the twenty 
months the troops spent in the area until the final surrender in May 1945, 
young South Tyroleans were coerced into the Wehrmacht and special police 
regiments although this was a violation of international law.
Between 1943 and 1945 South Tyrol remained under autocratic rule 
even though the rulers spoke German. The Nazi Gauleiter of Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg, Franz Hofer organized a South Tyrolean security service (SOD), 
which took over the police duties of the Gendarmerie. There were no major 
hostilities against the Italian population, but the anti-Italian mood mani-
fested itself in the destruction of a number of fascist monuments in South 
Tyrol.5 The German language and culture in South Tyrol experienced a 
sort of revival: street signs turned bilingual again, Ladin reappeared beside 
Italian, and Tyrolean folk traditions were revived. The German schools 
reappeared and German mayors replaced the podestà. However, critical 
South Tyrolean voices were still silenced, for example, the Dolomiten news-
paper and the publishing house Athesia were closed. The SOD sought out 
and arrested former anti-Option members of the community, many were 
expelled from the country or sent to concentration camps. The national 
4 Georg Grote, ‘Gehen oder bleiben? Die Identitätskrise der deutschsprachigen Süd-
tiroler in Optanten- und Dableibergedichten der Optionszeit, 1939–1943’, Modern 
Austrian Literature, Vol. 37, No. 1/2 (2004), 47–70.
5 Gatterer, Kampf gegen Rom, 770.
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socialist regime implemented their racist ideology more rigorously than 
Mussolini had ever done, which resulted in the persecution of the Jewish 
community in Meran/Merano.
The proximity of the Reich became more apparent as South Tyrol and 
particularly Bozen/Bolzano became the target of increasingly larger air 
raids from the Allies, which ceased only when the German troops retreated 
back across the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero in May 1945. This was the 
hour the resistance groups in South Tyrol had waited for. Until then they 
had played a relatively unimportant role. There were two organizations, 
the Italian ‘Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale’ (CLN) and the German 
‘Andreas-Hofer-Bund’ (AHB). The AHB, established in 1939, had recruited 
mainly from the population that chose to stay in South Tyrol. It fought 
for a reunited and anti-fascist Tyrol, whereas the CLN’s aim was to pre-
serve the Brenner/Brennero border. The members of the AHB aided the 
Allies in South Tyrol by seeking out national socialists in hiding in order to 
build a strong relationship with the Allies. It was this relationship of trust 
that eventually led to the Allied permission for the founding of the South 
Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP) on 8 May 1945. The leaders of the party, Erich 
Amonn, Friedl Volgger and Josef Raf feiner had all belonged to the group 
of the ‘Dableiber’ during the war, and the group was completed by Canon 
Michael Gamper, the Catholic symbol of resistance against the Nazis.
The deciding moment however fell to the better informed CLN who 
had the situation in the palm of their hands during the surrender process 
in Bozen/Bolzano, taking over the government from the German troops 
before the AHB had time to implement their desire to reunite with North 
Tyrol. On 3 May 1945 the CLN took over the government of the country 
as far as the Brenner Pass/Passo Brennero and did so in the name of Italy. 
To reinforce the Italian claim on South Tyrol the carabinieri hoisted the 
Italian f lag on the border post before the American troops marched in.

Chapter 7
The World and the South Tyrol Issue, 1945–1946
The post-World War II world witnessed a fundamentally altered political 
landscape in Europe. The rules of international politics were defined anew, 
some old players disappeared, and some new ones would dominate af fairs 
for the next fifty years. Crucially, Europe was replaced at the centre of world 
politics by the bipolarity of Washington and Moscow. In this new world 
South Tyrol became little more than a pawn in the ensuing international 
political game.
The post-war world and the South Tyrol Question
One of the most significant novelties in Europe was the extended presence 
of the United States of America. The American involvement in World 
War II had, similarly to in World War I, proved decisive, marking a turn-
ing point, which resulted in the victory of the allied anti-Hitler coalition. 
In contrast to the post-World War I period, however, America remained 
present and active on the European political scene after 1945.1 A series of 
conferences of foreign secretaries in Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam 
between 1942 and 1945, in which the United States played a central role 
demonstrated that it was now a ‘global player’.
However, the US were not the only major world power with global 
plans: the USSR under Josef Stalin was embarking on a course of Communist 
1 The rapid withdrawal of troops from Europe after 1918 was regarded as a mistake in 
the United States and one the American administration would not repeat.
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global expansion. As a member of the anti-Hitler coalition, Stalin was deter-
mined to stake his claim in Europe and expand Communism westwards. 
With the dissolution of the anti-Hitler coalition following the end of the 
war, the three main western powers, the USA, Great Britain and France 
focused on containing Stalin. The western allies had several reasons for 
concern. First, Stalin was moving the western border of the USSR further 
into Poland, which was compensated (without any consultation with the 
Allies) with areas of eastern Germany. Secondly, Stalin was also adminis-
trating the Soviet Occupied Zone (SBZ), that was to become the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), without any consultation with the Allies.
As a result of these pressures Europe became focused on the opposing 
interests of the two new superpowers: the US and the USSR. In this new 
political climate minority ethnic issues such as the South Tyrol question 
were, if not ignored, considered only in relation to larger issues of European 
stability. The Allies’ interests in the Alpine region were driven by domestic 
security concerns or the wider anxieties regarding Communism and neu-
tralizing Germany. In fact, the only significance that the South Tyrol issue 
had for the Allies was in relation to Austria. While Austria had fought on 
the side of Germany, in November 1943 under the Moscow Declaration, 
the main Allies had agreed to regard it as a victim of German aggression. 
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the war the Allies never failed to high-
light that Austria had fought with Germany during the war and thus bore 
a degree of responsibility.
Great Britain, for example, feared that the Austrian Republic might 
drift towards communism. Austria, for its part, was anxious to secure a 
peace treaty with the Allies that would settle its ambiguous post-war status. 
Although negotiations began in 1947, they fell victim to the emerging 
Cold War between the US and the USSR and were not actually concluded 
until April 1955. The so-called Moscow Memorandum is generally seen as 
the beginning of Austrian post-war sovereignty and neutrality.2 Hence 
Austria, morally weakened and struggling to assert its own post-war sov-
2 The Memorandum formed the basis of the Vienna Treaty or Staatsvertrag, on 15 
May 1955, which marked the beginning of Austria’s sovereignty and neutrality.
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ereignty, was not in a position to speak up for or declare any interest in 
South Tyrol and its fate.
Needless to say, Germany ef fectively disappeared as a political power 
in Europe. Hence Germany was no longer of any real significance to the 
South Tyrolean issue. There was no German government prior to 1949 
and government established under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had only 
limited sovereignty and deliberately avoided any issue associated with the 
Nazi era. Chancellor Adenauer considered it more important to tackle 
the legacy of the Third Reich. The German population, however, main-
tained an interest in and af finity with South Tyrol: for example, Germans 
empowered by the economic miracle in the 1950s increasingly chose South 
Tyrol as a holiday destination.
Italy’s post-war claim on South Tyrol was strengthened by various fac-
tors. Due to its change of allegiance in 1943 Italy was on the winning side 
by the end of the war and strove to cement its possession and occupation 
of South Tyrol. This was facilitated by the fact that the former protective 
powers of South Tyrol – Austria and Germany – were at the mercy of the 
Allies until 1952 and 1955 respectively. All the Allies agreed that Germany 
and Austria should not be given any opportunity to unite at any time in 
the future. Furthermore, after World War II, there was no international 
agreement akin to the secret London Treaty, or Wilson’s fourteen points. 
Thus any hopes South Tyrol may have harboured of being reunited with 
Austria were short-lived. In the post-war climate the Allies approached the 
question of the reunification of South Tyrol with Austria from a practical, 
rather than an ethnic or philosophical perspective. Hence, when the US 
brief ly considered the return of South Tyrol to Austria, this was not based 
on any notion of rectifying the injustices of World War I, but rather to 
strengthen Austria in an ef fort to make her independent of Germany.3 In 
May 1945, the US State Department acknowledged that South Tyrol was 
‘historically, culturally and traditionally Austrian and its population at the 
3 Lill, Südtirol, 236.
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end of the war is very predominantly Austrian’.4 However, its principal 
focus was on how the ‘return of South Tyrol to Austria would benefit the 
political and economic restructuring of Austria’.5
Italy did not appreciate the US State Department’s rather cavalier 
conclusion that the loss of South Tyrol for Italy ‘would be negligible com-
pared to what Austria would gain.’6 Italy astutely gauged the US fears and 
instead of dismissing them argued the reverse was true. The Italian foreign 
minister Alcide deGasperi pointed out that the risks of a repeat of National 
Socialism were higher if Italy had armed northerly neighbours in the event 
of another Anschluss between Austria and Germany. In a memorandum 
to the Allies, the Italian government raised the issue of the special role of 
South Tyrol for Italy and supported it with the demographic and economic 
facts of 1919. DeGasperi also claimed that the Italian government would 
grant South Tyrol a similar sort of autonomy as it had prior to Fascism. 
This, he argued, was a major concession in view of the fact that the South 
Tyroleans had supported Hitler until May 1945, whereas Italy had fought 
Fascism since from 1943 on.7
While Austria argued that the most democratic solution to the issue 
would be a plebiscite in South Tyrol,8 the Allies were more concerned with 
wider security issues. Faced with the continuing expansion of the USSR, 
the western allies sought to turn ‘Italy into a useful member of the concert 
of European states which would look to the west rather than orientate 
herself towards the east. To achieve this it was necessary to support Italy 
both politically and economically’.9 On 5 July 1945, the US foreign secre-
4 Cited in Rolf Steininger, ‘Die Südtirolfrage 1945/46 und das Gruber-deGasperi 
Abkommen’ in Anton Pelinka and Andreas Maislinger, eds, Handbuch zur neueren 
Geschichte Tirols. Vol. 2: Zeitgeschichte, Part 1: Politische Geschichte (Innsbruck: 
Wagner, 1993), 347–398, 348.
5 Steininger, ‘Südtirolfrage 1945/46’, 348.
6 Steininger, ‘Südtirolfrage 1945/46’, 348.
7 Lill, Südtirol, 236.
8 Lill, Südtirol, 236.
9 Steininger, ‘Südtirolfrage 1945/46’, 349.
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tary, James F. Byrnes, summed up the dilemma and the rationale behind 
the allied position on South Tyrol:
In the long run do we have more to gain by sparing Italy any more humiliation 
than by satisfying the claims of Austria. I lean more towards the former alternative. 
One cannot say that the acquisition of Bozen is essential for a free and independ-
ent Austria, it could rather be a source of danger should Austria fall under Russian 
inf luence.10
Allied fears of USSR aggression outweighed any considerations of legiti-
macy or argument. As the British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin concluded: 
‘in theory the Austrians have the better argument, however handing over 
the power stations of South Tyrol to them could openly give the Russians 
a helping hand with which they could pressurise Italy.’11 In view of these 
considerations, the Allies supported Italy’s claim to South Tyrol. Principle 
was yet again sacrificed to fear, political pragmatism and wider security 
imperatives. In real terms the price of the international fear of communism 
was paid by South Tyrol.
In return for the guarantee of the Brenner/Brennero border Italy was 
expected to facilitate the return of those South Tyroleans who had left the 
area under the Option arrangement between 1939 and 1943. In order to 
avoid burning all diplomatic bridges, especially with Austria, the British 
government encouraged cooperation between Italy and Austria on the issue 
of autonomy for German-speaking South Tyroleans.12 Italy succumbed 
to this pressure and agreed to cooperate in relation to the return of South 
Tyroleans to their homeland and to grant the region a certain degree of 
autonomy. The details of this arrangement were drawn up in 1946 under 
the Gruber deGasperi agreement.
10 Steininger, Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart, 64.
11 Steininger, Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart, 64.
12 See Steininger, ‘Südtirolfrage 1945/46’, 354f f.
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The domestic situation in post-war South Tyrol
As a result of the Option of 1939 post-war South Tyrol was divided and 
fragmentized. Vulnerable without its traditional protectors, it faced a 
strengthened Italian state. At a fundamental level South Tyrol had lost 
something else, something possibly more vital to any freedom campaign: 
the moral high ground. The South Tyroleans were seen to have supported 
Hitler and thus they were not only on the losing side, they were on the 
wrong side. They were tainted by the atrocities of the Nazis and morally 
contaminated.
South Tyrol’s altered landscape is particularly obvious when one con-
siders the demographics of the region: at the end of the war the 40,000 
South Tyroleans who had chosen to stay in the homeland were ‘legitimate 
Italian citizens’. The 230,000 who had opted to relocate were without rights, 
regardless of whether they had already left Italy or were, by the end of the 
war, still awaiting their emigration to Germany. The 75,000 who had left 
could only return if they received Italian consent. South Tyrol also played 
host to an ever-increasing Italian population of some 100,000.13 Those 
South Tyroleans who had opted for Hitler’s resettlement programme were 
to pay a high price to return to the homeland. Those who availed themselves 
of the ‘return option’ lost German citizenship and had to accept Italian 
citizenship and the Italian presence in South Tyrol.
On 8 May 1945, the South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volks-
partei, hereafter SVP) was established to represent the German and Ladin-
speaking people of South Tyrol.14 The SVP sought to distance itself from 
Fascism and National Socialism by stressing its links with the Catholic 
Church, represented by Michael Gamper, and the political legacy of the 
Deutscher Verband (outlawed by the fascists in 1926). The SVP attempted 
to of fer the South Tyroleans a political voice. They were met, naturally, 
13 Lill, Südtirol, 233.
14 Franz Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol 1945–1972 (Bozen: Raetia, 1998), 
16.
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with scepticism and suspicion by the Italians in South Tyrol, for example, 
the Italian prefect Bruno de Angelis denounced the SVP as a manifesta-
tion of German Fascism.15
The SVP wished to act as the sole representative of the South Tyroleans, 
thus it had to heal wounds inf licted during the Option period and thereby 
prevent any schism in the political lobby group it sought to create. This 
entailed walking somewhat of a tightrope: the SVP had to support those 
of the option settlement in returning to South Tyrol while simultaneously 
distancing itself from the scheme and its Nazi and fascist ideology.16 The 
fact that Canon Michael Gamper, the voice of those who had rejected the 
option and the Nazis, became a key figure in the SVP made the party’s task 
considerably easier. Gamper gave the SVP a direct link with the Roman 
Catholic Church and a considerable degree of moral legitimacy.
While the short-term aims of the SVP were clearly more pragmatic, 
nonetheless, from the outset it focused on wider, more fundamental cul-
tural and political issues. Initially, the SVP had to cleanse South Tyrol of 
its Nazi legacy and this involved dealing with all outstanding aspects of the 
option arrangement and the political rehabilitation of any South Tyroleans 
who had served in German special police in South Tyrol from 1942 to 1945 
and the Wehrmacht throughout the war. In a sense this formed part of the 
party’s healing agenda. The party also had to ensure it laid out clear core 
and long-term political objectives. The founding assembly focused thus on 
the recovery of the cultural, economic and linguistic rights of the South 
Tyroleans. It promised to bring peace and order to the land and, ultimately, 
to achieve self-determination for South Tyrol by legal means.
The final decision by the Allies to leave South Tyrol to Italy was met 
with horror in South Tyrol, and, in contrast to 1918, resulted in mass protests 
across all of Tyrol. Early 1946 was characterized by strikes, mass rallies17 
and petitioning18 reiterating the call for reunification with Austria. The 
15 Lill, Südtirol, 237 and Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 17.
16 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 210.
17 See Lill, Südtirol, 243.
18 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 320f.
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protest banners called out for ‘Justice for South Tyrol’, a plea that fell on deaf 
ears. There was no international diplomatic support for these requests. The 
Allied decision in Paris left the people of South Tyrol feeling as they had 
in the wake of World War I: oppressed, impotent and ignored. The SVP 
played a crucial role in articulating this sense of exclusion and injustice and 
thereby created a strong political consensus that reunified South Tyrolean 
society. This political cohesion both reaf firmed a sense of shared collective 
identity among the German-speaking population and was the basis of the 
SVP’s long-lasting political success in the post-war world.
The Gruber deGasperi agreement of 1946
The immediate post-war fate of South Tyrol was settled by an agreement 
drawn up between the relatively powerless Austrian foreign minister Karl 
Gruber and his Italian counterpart Alcide deGasperi in Paris in September 
1946. Under diplomatic pressure from Europe and America and against the 
backdrop of the protests in South Tyrol, both parties sat down to finally 
decide a legal agreement that would resolve the outstanding issues relating 
to the return of South Tyroleans impacted by the Option arrangements 
and the issue of autonomy for the region.
The opening sentence of the agreement, which was in English, set the 
tone when it guaranteed: ‘German speaking inhabitants of the Bolzano 
Province and of neighbouring bilingual townships of the Trento Province 
will be assured a complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking 
inhabitants.’19 This declaration was supported by the substance of the 
agreement which allowed for resettlement of those South Tyroleans who 
wished to return to Italy and granted them Italian citizenship. For the 
South Tyroleans, Adolph Leidlmair has argued that this issue was ‘not a 
19 Gruber-deGasperi Agreement as printed in Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 
328.
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political issue but one of survival for the German people and a means of 
preventing the infiltration from the South which had restarted in 1945.’20 
In other words, the South Tyroleans regarded this issue as vital not only 
to post-war healing, but also to of fset the continued immigration policy 
by the Italian state. DeGasperi grasped that the implications of this were 
both historical and current, but nonetheless had to bow to international 
pressure in securing the return of these South Tyroleans. Under the agree-
ment bilingualism became central to the resolution of the cultural question: 
road signs and of ficial documents were to appear in both languages and 
crucially children could once again be educated in their mother tongue. 
Other aspects of the fascist Italianization programme were also reversed, 
for example, the Italianization of family names, and travel and trade restric-
tions were eased.
The Gruber deGasperi agreement had three main ef fects which would 
characterize the politics of South Tyrol in the national and international 
arena in the following years:
1. The Brenner border was permanently pledged to Italy. All politi-
cal endeavours by the SVP as well as the protective power Austria 
would therefore have to focus on the issue of autonomy. Any hopes 
for self-determination and/or reunification with Austria were per-
manently relinquished.
2. Austria had managed to internationalize the issue of South Tyrol 
and secure a say in the fate of South Tyrol. It once again became 
a Schutzmacht, a protective power, a role which it took seriously 
from 1955.
3. The fusion of South Tyrol with Trient/Trento was rejected in 
both provinces and resulted in the internal resistance of the South 
Tyrolese population, especially in connection with the implemen-
tation of repressive neo-fascist politics in the early 1950s.
20 Adolf Leidlmair, Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft in Südtirol (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1958), 
81.
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In essence, the Gruber deGasperi agreement justified the retention 
of the Brenner border by awarding a kind of autonomy to South Tyrol.21 
This appeased the Austrian side and eased the pressure created by the open 
demonstrations for reunification in Tyrol. Italy had secured the permanency 
of its northern border and won international approval by appearing to 
concede on the issue of autonomy. However, because the agreement did 
not specify the exact geographical area to be covered by the autonomy, it 
allowed deGasperi to play with geography and thereby honour the letter 
rather than the spirit of the agreement.
Following the agreement deGasperi declared that the negotiated auton-
omy related to both Bozen/Bolzano and Trient/Trento. The new Italian 
constitution of January 1948 incorporated Article 116, which allowed for 
the creation of an autonomous region Trentino-Alto Adige. This meant 
that the regional parliament in Trient/Trento was able to outvote the 
German minority by 5:2. Thus the agreement was honoured and, at the 
same time, the balance of power in northern Italy remained the way it had 
been before the agreement.
As a result of this interpretation of the autonomy by the Italians the 
agreement of 1946 was regarded by the South Tyroleans as a fundamental 
failure in relation to their central aspirations for autonomy. The reaction on 
the ground in South Tyrol was one of dismay and impotent rage. Gruber 
was almost immediately placed in the position of having to defend his role 
in brokering the deal. He argued that he had been motivated by ‘a pas-
sionate desire to achieve the best possible outcome for Austria and South 
Tyrol in an exceptionally dif ficult situation.’22 He also complained that the 
nature of the negotiations, for example, the use of multiple languages but 
21 Austria made other attempts in 1946 in conjunction with these talks to secure a 
solution to the South Tyrolean issue, for example, Gruber had suggested splitting 
South Tyrol in Bozen/Bolzano, so that the Italians retained the ‘Unterland’ south 
of Bozen/Bolzano and the economically important industrial zone as well as the 
right to the hydroelectricity. When this failed, he proposed that Austria would be 
satisfied with the return of the Pustertal/Val Pusteria. This idea was rejected by the 
council of foreign ministers in June 1946.
22 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 389.
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never German added to his dif ficulties. In an evaluation of the agreement 
and the role of Gruber it must not be forgotten that the agreement was 
hatched in a political environment hostile to all things German – even to 
the language.23 Nonetheless, the agreement of 1946 compounded a history 
of disappointment for South Tyrol and resulted in a sustained period of 
civil and political resistance.
It was precisely this characteristic, the ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’, which 
Karl Gruber used in defence of his signature under the agreement in 1946. 
He later repeatedly commented that the agreement was never intended 
to be an international contract, and he also conceded that he was aware 
of ambiguities in it that could be interpreted dif ferently by the Italians.24 
DeGasperi, for his part, signed because he wished to pacify the western 
allies but also intended to contain the very popular demand in South Tyrol 
(and in Trient/Trento!): ‘Los von Rom!’ [Away from Rome], whilst Gruber 
was most interested in achieving any kind of internationally binding Italian 
obligation regarding the question of the return of the former ‘Optanten’ 
and the recognition of Austria as an international partner in the South 
Tyrol question.
23 Günther Pallaver, ‘Südtirol 1943–55: Internationale Aspekte’, in Anton Pelinka 
and Andreas Maislinger, eds, Handbuch zur neueren Geschichte Tirols, Vol. 2: 
Zeitgeschichte, Part 1: Politische Geschichte (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1993), 423–448, 
424.
24 Steininger, ‘Südtirolfrage 1945/46’, 386.

Chapter 8
Disquiet and Unrest, 1947–1960
In late 1947 it rapidly became clear to the German-speaking South Tyroleans 
that the long-awaited autonomy was a hollow construct, strategically inter-
preted by deGasperi to avoid actually fulfilling the promise. In fact, the 
period from 1947 to 1960 marked a renewed and re-energized phase of 
Italianization with little hope of international intervention or support for 
South Tyrolean culture. Much of the legislation introduced in the 1950s 
to Italianize South Tyrol represented little more than a resurrection and 
refashioning of old fascist law.
Renewed Italianization
The early 1950s witnessed a series of laws which reinforced Italian cul-
ture, language and norms and permitted the prohibition of all things for-
eign (i.e. German). These laws went so far as to allow the State to give 
preferential treatment to Italians in certain sectors of the economy and 
confiscate land from non-Italian South Tyroleans.1 In March 1952 the 
programme of Italianization was given renewed legal status. For example, 
among other things, the law stopped a practice in place since 1948, whereby 
South Tyroleans returning from the front had been granted low ranking civil 
service jobs. From 1952 these secure jobs were denied to the South Tyroleans 
and reserved instead for Italian speakers. As Steininger has pointed out: 
‘From July 1952 all internal of ficial business in South Tyrol was to be carried 
1 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 475.
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out in Italian, even that between German of fices.’2 The emphasis on the 
Italian language helped to ensure the exclusion of the German-speaking 
population from the apparatus of the state and further erode any sense of 
cultural determination. For example, in February 1955 Italian citizens (i.e. 
German-speaking South Tyroleans) were prohibited from having foreign 
(i.e. German) names and were forced to adopt Italian names when engag-
ing in any way with the Italian state, even at local level.
Apart from limiting the German-speaking population’s role in the 
public service and thus denying them access to safe and secure employ-
ment, the Italian state also attacked their property rights. In autumn 1953 
an old military law was introduced which prohibited private dwellings 
within a certain distance of military installations and the border. This was 
ef fectively used as a pretext to confiscate South Tyrolean land.3 In March 
1955 Rome reintroduced the authority to confiscate property for ‘state pur-
poses’, a policy which had been used to undermine the German-speaking 
population economic position during the fascist period.4
However, it was the state-assisted migration of southern Italians to 
South Tyrol which created the greatest discontent among the German-
speaking population. In October 1953, Canon Gamper published what 
was to become a watershed article in the Dolomiten in which he likened 
the impact of this policy of ‘infiltration’ to a ‘death march’ for the German-
speaking population:
The deliberate infiltration of our people is going full speed ahead. After 1945 and 
after the Paris agreement thousands migrated from southern Italy whilst the return of 
some tens of thousands of our relocated natives was prevented. From year to year the 
number of our indigenous people is decreasing and this against an uncanny increase of 
immigrants. We can probably set the date, using these statistics, for the day when we 
will be a defenseless minority in our own homeland. And this will occur in a region 
where not so long ago the Italians constituted only 3% of our population. It is a death 
march we find ourselves on since 1945 unless we are saved in our final hours.5
2 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 476.
3 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 476.
4 Steininger, Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart, 77.
5 Dolomiten (28 October 1953).
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The policy of Italian immigration was understood as a deliberate policy 
to outnumber the German-speaking population in their own homeland. 
Furthermore, many young and able South Tyroleans were forced to emi-
grate as a result of the discriminatory employment policies adopted during 
this post-war Italianization period.
In South Tyrol the policy of Italian migration combined with a post-
war housing programme resulted in even further social and economic 
discrimination against the German-speaking population. The housing 
programme was a nation-wide programme to eradicate slum-like condi-
tions in many northern Italian industrial towns, and in its aims were posi-
tive and progressive. However, in the South Tyrolean context it had quite 
dif ferent political and social implications. Under the scheme it was the 
poorest section of society living in the slums near Bozen/Bolzano’s indus-
trial zone that were eligible. These areas were entirely populated by those 
who had immigrated from southern Italy. However, those German-speaking 
South Tyrolans who were living in equally poor conditions and were also 
excluded from most of the jobs in the industrial zone, were not eligible as 
they often owned the leaking roof over their heads. Thus in South Tyrol 
this ostensibly progressive housing programme became just another plank 
of the discriminatory Italianization policy.
It is interesting that in 1991 Sepp Mitterhofer, a prominent activist of 
the bombing period, cited this immigration policy as one of the reasons 
that he abandoned politics in favour of violent resistance.6 Mitterhofer 
regarded the immigration policy and the housing programme as integral 
parts of the Italianization policy. He recalled:
Poor men with their possessions in a cardboard box arrived in droves and almost 
daily from the south at the Bozen train station. They were then housed in dilapidated 
barracks. After a few weeks, however, they received adequate accommodation in the 
form of a new-state built apartment, as they received more credits than the South 
6 Sepp Mitterhofer and Günther Obwegs, Es blieb kein anderer Weg: Zeitzeugenberichte 
und Dokumente aus dem Südtiroler Freiheitskampf (Meran: Arkadia, 2000), 37.
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Tyroleans for the duration of their time in the inferior barracks. After a few months 
they sent for their families and grandparents.7
The housing programme was given extra financial weight in South Tyrol 
as a result of a decision to equate the Province of Bozen/Bolzano with 
the emergency centres of Rome, Naples and Milan.8 This was regarded 
by the German-speaking population as a deliberate attempt to strengthen 
the impact of the housing programme as an instrument of Italianization. 
In comparison to the rest of Italy, and due mostly to the sharp increase in 
population between 1952 and 1955, the Province of Bozen/Bolzano was 
entitled to 2,350 million lire, 1,450 to Bozen/Bolzano and 900 assigned 
to the remainder of the region.9 These funds supported the building of 
apartment blocks in the industrial zone, largely to house the Italians ‘who 
had been brought to South Tyrol to assimilate it into the country.’10
This was a form of ethnic supplantation. Indeed, in 2004 Franz 
Widmann, SVP party member described the apartment blocks as symbols 
of ‘Italian oppression and politics of foreign infiltration.’11 This sense of 
grievance was compounded by the fact that the programme by-passed the 
South Tyrolean administration, despite the fact that under the autonomy 
housing should have been controlled by the province. Instead, the Italian 
government sent the funds directly to the region for the construction of 
these apartments.12 By by-passing the South Tyrolean local government 
and ef fectively ignoring its autonomous status the Ina Casa (Italian state 
housing agency) was able to sidestep regional policy and operate on the 
basis of national policy. In October 1957, the minister for public works, 
Guiseppe Togni, exacerbated the situation when he sent a telegram to the 
mayor of Bozen/Bolzano, Giorgio Pasquali, announcing that a further 2.5 
million lire was to be provided for the extension of the town with ‘5,000 
7 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 37.
8 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 344.
9 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 344.
10 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 401.
11 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 62.
12 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 477.
Disquiet and Unrest, 1947–1960 89
apartments, churches and buildings for social and public services.’13 This 
announcement resulted in Pasquali drawing rezoning plans that would 
provide for an increase in Bozen/Bolzano’s population in the following 
thirty to thirty-five years from 83,000 to 150,000. This plan was described 
by Austrian newspaper proprietor, Fritz Molden, as ‘a public commitment 
to the policy of planned immigration.’14 It was obviously the aim of the 
Italian government to further industrialize South Tyrol and thus facilitate 
the increase of the Italian immigrant population to fifty-five or sixty per 
cent of the overall population of the region.15
The SVP was under no illusions that this generous funding for build-
ing programmes was anything other than Italianization masquerading as 
social assistance. In 1957, the SVP leader, Silvius Magnago, criticized the 
controversial housing scheme, highlighting its discriminatory nature:
We cannot avoid the impression that Italy is playing politics, and that means nation-
alist politics. This is further proven by the fact that other areas of Italy are in greater 
need than Bozen, yet the government is providing more billions to Bozen for the 
building of apartment blocks than to other cities. It is worth noting also that not 
even ten per cent of this money has been spent on the South Tyroleans.16
The sense of panic among the South Tyroleans could be expressed in little 
more than prophecies of doom. For example, in May 1957 the Dolomiten 
warned that ‘Bozen would drown in a sea of Italians’.17 It was the housing 
issue that underscored the emptiness of the supposed autonomy agreed 
in 1946. While the SVP had been considering the need to denounce the 
political unity with Trient/Trento, it was the housing programme that 
actually prompted action. Thus, in early in 1959 the SVP withdrew its 
representative from the regional government in Trient/Trento.
13 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 367.
14 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 430.
15 Fritz Molden, Vielgeprüftes Österreich: Politische Erinnerungen (Vienna: Amalthea, 
2007), 144.
16 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 366.
17 Dolomiten (10 May 1957).
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In parallel with the South Tyrolean domestic issues there were dip-
lomatic endeavours by the Austrians, who had become increasingly dis-
satisfied with Italy’s treatment of the South Tyroleans. Between 1957 and 
1959 Austria and Italy engaged in talks in an attempt to ‘solve’ the South 
Tyrolean issue. This period was marked by a singular lack of progress; the 
historian Rudolf Lill has characterized the period as one of ‘diplomatic 
stagnation’. The frustration regarding the South Tyrol problem in Rome, 
Vienna and Bozen/Bolzano resulted in a hardening of the respective politi-
cal positions. In South Tyrol this meant the radicalization of significant 
amounts of individuals within the German-speaking population.
The emergence of violence
A growing sense of rage and impotence regarding the systematic Italian-
ization of the region was simply awaiting a focus, a cause célèbre, to be 
transformed into a form of tangible protest. This came with the ‘Pfunderer 
Buam’ [the boys from Pfunders] case. On 16 August 1957 a low-ranking 
member of the Italian finance administration, Raimondo Falqui, was found 
dead after being involved in a fight with a group of village boys at a local 
inn in Pfunders/Fundres. The reasons for his death remain unclear to this 
day, but the seven local boys were rounded up and arrested within days. All 
seven were found guilty and received long prison sentences ranging from 
ten to twenty-four years. The ‘Pfunderer Buam’ case helped to crystallize 
the growing sense of anger regarding discrimination against the German-
speaking population of the region. The state authorities had insisted on 
a charge of ‘political murder’, thus situating the case at the heart of the 
regional tensions between the Italian state (represented in this case by the 
murder victim) and the disenfranchized German-speaking population 
(represented by the accused).
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Another group around the printer Hans Stieler had carried out a series 
of ‘six mostly harmless’18 explosions on railway lines in the Bozen/Bolzano 
and Brixen/Bressanone areas between late August 1956 and January 1957. 
The Stieler group had also been arrested swiftly, and their court case pre-
sented another focal point for the growing sense of injustice in South Tyrol. 
In December 1957 they were convicted and their case was reported in the 
Dolomiten with great sympathy for the young men involved.19 There was a 
sense of collective lament for these young men, who had lost their freedom 
in a bid to draw the attention of the world to the plight of South Tyrol.20
The significance of these bombings lay not in their capacity to cause 
damage, but in the fact that they changed the location of the political 
discussion by dragging it out onto the streets. Through their frustrations 
and resentment political activists, mostly men, took matters into their own 
hands and began to make use of the destructive skills they had learned 
during the war. With this, the issue of South Tyrol took on a new dimen-
sion. The protest against Rome now comprised all of the traditional ele-
ments of national Risorgimento, both in its political aim (separation from 
Italy and self-determination for South Tyrol) and in its choice of political 
instruments (rejection of the political parties, fermenting of frustrations 
and the beginning of paramilitary action).
Sigmundskron, November 1957
In November 1957, the SVP organized a protest rally at Sigmundskron/
Castel Firmiano to vent the growing anger of the South Tyrolean popu-
lation. The rally was an overwhelming success at which 35,000 German-
18 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 298 and Hans Karl Peterlini, Südtiroler 
Bombenjahre: Von Blut und Tränen zum Happy End? (Bozen: Raetia, 2005), 376.
19 Dolomiten (2 January 1958).
20 Widmann, Es stand nicht gut um Südtirol, 298.
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speaking South Tyroleans demanded the right to self-determination and an 
end to the false autonomy status of 1948. The SVP under Silvius Magnago 
managed to channel the disgruntled voices of protest, which could easily 
have erupted and triggered something more violent, into the relatively 
moderate protest ref lective of the party line. Magnago’s speech is widely 
regarded as pivotal in convincing many potential hardliners to adopt his 
motto of ‘Los von Trient’ [Away from Trento] rather than the more radi-
cal ‘Los von Rom’ [Away from Rome]. During his speech he repeated the 
words ‘Los von Trient’ like a mantra to focus the public on the idea that the 
solution to their predicament lay in the ending of the region with Trient/
Trento rather than in separation from Italy. It is widely accepted that on that 
day he succeeded in harnessing the frustration of the South Tyroleans into 
support for a campaign to achieve a comprehensive and meaningful form 
of autonomy. His support base far exceeded the actual membership of the 
SVP, and his support was so overwhelming that he would use it to exert 
political pressure in all future negotiations with the Italian government.
The Dolomiten, which was closely associated with the SVP, marvelled at 
how Magnago had managed an explosive situation and transformed it into 
a powerful political demonstration. It warned that the call for autonomy 
‘should be heard where Italian decisions are made about South Tyrol’s 
politics and where there is a move to stoke the fires here. It is possible that 
the simmering kettle might boil over, which would be in nobody’s interest, 
least of all Italy’s.’21 Thus the SVP under Magnago kept the kettle just below 
boiling point, which gave them considerable clout in subsequent negotia-
tions. At Sigmundskron Magnago was transformed into the uncrowned 
king of South Tyrol, a reality that was also quickly recognized in Rome.
While Sigmundskron made Magnago’s career, it also ended the fragile 
accord between the men of politics (in the SVP) and the paramilitaries 
of the Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol (South Tyrol Liberation commit-
tee, hereafter the BAS). Magnago’s speech set a moderate tone that alien-
ated the paramilitary wing. The leaders of the BAS, for example, Sepp 
Kerschbaumer, considered the day a bitter disappointment and a wasted 
21 Dolomiten (18 November 1957).
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opportunity. Kerschbaumer was angered that Magnago defused the public 
frustration rather than harnessing it as a mandate to adopt a much harder 
line when dealing with Italy.
A further indication of the heightened tensions in the area were the 
numerous Italian counter-demonstrations, which were more than just a 
response to Sigmundskron. Many of the Italian protests were encouraged 
by member of parliament Andrea Mitolo. The Italian demonstrations had 
taken place early in 1957 and increased tensions considerably between the 
two communities: during these protests the Giovane Italia (Young Italy 
movement) had called for an abolition of the Paris Treaty and an end to 
all initiatives designed to increase South Tyrolean autonomy. Furthermore, 
the Italian protestors were beginning to define themselves as a minority 
suppressed by the German-speaking majority in South Tyrol. The whole 
question of South Tyrol’s autonomy was developing into an ethnic strug-
gle between Italian and German South Tyroleans. What followed was an 
escalation in the political and military arenas, and the SVP began to lose its 
leading role. South Tyrol sat poised on the edge of an abyss of violence and 
extremism, as Christoph Franceschini noted: ‘In 1961 a civil war appeared 
on the horizon in South Tyrol.’22
Career of a ‘terrorist’
The path that South Tyrol followed during this period from civil protest 
to violence and extremism can perhaps best be understood by examining 
the development of a typical terrorist who emerged from that political 
environment. Sepp Kerschbaumer presents the historian with the classic 
22 Christoph Franceschini, ‘Die Welle der Sprengstof fanschläge in Südtirol’, in Anton 
Pelinka and Andreas Maislinger, eds, Handbuch zur neueren Geschichte Tirols, Vol. 2: 
Zeitgeschichte, Part 1: Politische Geschichte (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1993), 467–508, 
467.
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biography of a contemporary South Tyrolean activist. He was born in 
1913, a salesman in the small town of Frangart/Frangarto near Bozen/
Bolzano, a practising Catholic, helpful and popular, a faithful follower 
of the SVP and chairman of the party in his hometown. However, the 
political climate of the mid-1950s challenged his loyalty to the SVP, and 
during this period he turned away from the organization on the grounds 
that its politics had become too weak and cowardly.23 In a symbolic act 
of protest he raised the f lag of South Tyrol above the church steeple in 
Frangart/Frangarto. This was illegal and provoked an immediate reaction 
from the local police. Kerschbaumer was arrested and during his subse-
quent interrogation reiterated his conviction that the South Tyroleans 
had as much a right to express their identity as the migrant Italians. This 
logic fell on deaf ears and he served a prison sentence for his assertion of 
South Tyrolean identity. As a further protest he went on hunger strike, an 
act that elevated him to the status of regional hero. Kerschbaumer became 
a symbol of the civil disobedience and resistance to the Italian hold over 
South Tyrol. Increasingly disillusioned by the SVP’s alleged acceptance of 
the 1948 status of autonomy, in 1956 he resigned from his party post thereby 
breaking his connection with the political route. Instead he founded the 
BAS with Josef Crepaz (50) and Karl Titscher (35). Kerschbaumer was 43 
at the time and father of a number of young children. From outside the 
ranks of the SVP Kerschbaumer attempted to initiate a dialogue, writing 
countless letters to SVP members and politicians in which he called for 
a more decisive political strategy. Slowly, however, he became convinced 
that ‘success could not be achieved with the weapons of the mind alone’.24 
Consequently the group turned into an illegal organization, which planned 
a new wave of violent protest.
Kerschbaumer’s organization provided a home for other individuals 
disillusioned with SVP politics, such as Georg Klotz and Franz Muther, who 
joined BAS in 1957. Kerschbaumer began to slowly develop BAS units which 
23 Franceschini, ‘Sprengstof fanschläge’, 469.
24 Franceschini, ‘Sprengstof fanschläge’, 470.
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by 1961 had a core of 200 members and confidants.25 At Sigmundskron in 
1957 BAS leaf lets were circulated calling for an end to Italian occupation 
of South Tyrol: ‘We want to remain German and refuse to be the slaves 
of another race which occupied our land through fraud and betrayal and 
for the last 40 years has exploited us with a colonial system worse than 
the methods once used in Africa.’26 In view of Kerschbaumer’s hardline 
approach it is hardly surprising that he, like so many others, was disillu-
sioned with the tone of Sigmundskron. Magnago’s ‘Los von Trient’ did 
not go far enough for him as he wanted ‘Los von Rom’. Only five days 
later the first attack of the BAS occurred, symbolically at the grave of the 
architect of South Tyrol’s Italianization, Ettore Tolomei. A few days later 
attacks were carried out in Laas/Lasa in the Vinschgau/Val Venosta, and 
guerrilla warfare now became a very real accompaniment to politics in 
South Tyrol.
Simultaneously, the military conf lict became a more professional af fair 
as the BAS secured support from sympathizers in North Tyrol and wider 
Austria. In Innsbruck the journalist Wolfgang Pfaundler founded a BAS 
unit, which organized military training and the transportation of explosives 
and guns for the South Tyrol fighters. The smuggling of illegal weapons 
and explosives over the Alps led to some extraordinary adventure stories 
such as those of Kurt Welser’s trips in his Volkswagen beetle which was 
crammed with explosives.27 Or the story of young and attractive women 
who travelled on their own across the border at the Brenner Pass/Passo 
Brennero carrying kilometres of fuse wire in their luggage.28 Some even 
ventured alone over the ice-capped mountains from the Austrian Ötztal 
to the Passeiertal/Val Passiria with rucksacks full of ammunition and guns. 
All of these tales provided raw material for myths and legends that entered 
the collective memory of future generations of South Tyroleans.
25 Franceschini, ‘Sprengstof fanschläge’, 471.
26 Reprint of the BAS leaf let in Elisabeth Baumgartner, Hans Mayr and Gerhard 
Mumelter, Feuernacht. Südtriols Bombenjahre (Bozen: Raetia, 1992), 121.
27 Peterlini, Südtiroler Bombenjahre, 82.




Substantial sums were needed for the armament of the South Tyrolean 
fighters, and resources were provided by inf luential Austrian figures.29 
Some key media magnates contributed generously, for example, Wolfgang 
Pfaundler, Gerd Bacher (chief editor of the Viennese newspaper Express) 
and the Austrian newspaper mogul Fritz Molden. The Northern Tyrolean 
BAS also boasted a sizeable number of intellectuals who supported the 
cause, among them were Alois Oberhammer, member of the provincial 
government, Josef Dengler, legation councillor in the foreign ministry, 
Winfried Platzgummer, the former assistant to the state secretary Franz 
Gschnitzer, and Felix Ermacora, expert on international law and book 
author. For the head of the movement, Kerschbaumer, the resistance was 
not an ideological exercise but rather a crucial form of self defence. Conf lict 
between Kerschbaumer and his financial backers seemed inevitable because 
of the dif ferent constellation of its members, and when disagreement 
emerged it was over the issue of the leadership of the BAS and the char-
acter of the attacks.
The involvement of the North Tyroleans in the campaign gave the 
South Tyrol issue an international dimension. The Viennese government 
also became more active in its attempts to internationalize the problem. 
At the same time Austrian endeavours to find a solution to the issue in 
bilateral talks with the Italian government were entirely fruitless, as the 
Italians simply reiterated the view that the Paris Treaty had been imple-
mented and was unalterable. In 1958, in the face of the Austrian call for 
autonomy for South Tyrol, the Italian government intensified its already 
restrictive politics in South Tyrol, which led to a further deterioration of 
the situation.
In 1959, Vienna decided to bring Italy under diplomatic pressure by 
internationalizing the issue. The Austrian government debated whether 
29 See Rolf Steininger, Südtirol zwischen Diplomatie und Terror, 1947–1969, vol. 2 
(Bozen: Veröf fentlichung des Südtiroler Landesarchivs, 1999), 506.
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to involve the international court of justice in The Hague, but it was the 
SVP’s suggestion to involve the United Nations that was ultimately pur-
sued.30 The new Austrian foreign minister Bruno Kreisky highlighted the 
South Tyrol issue in New York on 21 September 1959 and announced in 
his speech his intention to bring the issue before the UN plenary at the 
next available opportunity provided there was no progress in the talks with 
Italy in the meantime.31
As a result of this international pressure, Italy finally reacted and 
of fered the option of secret talks. As this of fer yielded no result, either, 
Vienna did as it had threatened and brought the issue of South Tyrol to the 
United Nations. On 31 October 1960, the UN plenary session unanimously 
decided on Resolution 1497/XV, which stated that the South Tyrol issue 
was to be solved by a bilateral agreement between Italy and Austria. This 
was a major triumph for Austrian politics. Through this resolution South 
Tyrol had become an international issue and Austria her of ficial protector. 
With great expectations Kreisky entered talks with his Italian counterpart 
in January, May and June 1961 from which, however, once again no concrete 
results were achieved. Then, during the night of the 11 and 12 June 1961 
South Tyrol witnessed the ‘Feuernacht’ [night of fire].
30 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 486f f.
31 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 487.

Chapter 9
Explosions and Settlements, 1961–1972
The beginning of 1960s witnessed an arms race between East and West, 
between the USSR and the United States. In 1956 the Russian quashing of 
the Hungarian uprising had caused considerable alarm among the political 
leaders of Western Europe and America. In October 1957, the launch of 
the Russian satellite Sputnik, which placed Russia at the forefront of the 
space race, was regarded by the American president Dwight D. Eisenhower 
as an ‘immense threat to the West’. The containment of Communism 
became Washington’s highest priority and its consequences dominated 
the world. In April 1961, the US under John F. Kennedy sought to invade 
Cuba and oust Castro in what is known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This 
failed strike strengthened Cuba’s relationship with the USSR and resulted 
in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962–1963. The world sat on the verge of 
a nuclear war.
In Europe this Cold War manifested itself in the physical division of 
Germany into east and west. Despite the head of the GDR Walter Ullbricht’s 
assertion that ‘No one intends to erect a wall here!’ that is exactly what 
happened in 1961. In this fragile world climate any further destabilization 
in central Europe was considered highly undesirable by the US and its 
Western European allies. The nascent violence and organized armament of 
South Tyrolean ‘freedom fighters’, created a very delicate political environ-
ment in the heart of the Alps, one that could potentially destabilize Italy, 
a member of NATO, and her neutral neighbour Austria.
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1961 in South Tyrol:  
Bombs and tentative steps towards political progress
Throughout 1960 the BAS movement had been incapacitated by internal 
divisions regarding the appropriate use of violence. This dispute manifested 
itself in an attempted coup against Sepp Kerschbaumer, the leader of the 
BAS, by Wolfgang Pfaundler of the North Tyrol BAS and Georg Klotz 
of the South Tyrol BAS. Both these men believed that the BAS should be 
prepared to use violence against human as well as strategic targets while 
Kerschbaumer was fundamentally opposed to taking the BAS in that direc-
tion. While Kerschbaumer ef fectively asserted his leadership over the BAS 
organization in South Tyrol, these internal divisions were ultimately adding 
to the BAS descent into violence by 1961 and thereafter.1 However, not 
only North Tyrolean sympathizers willing to join in the ‘liberation of South 
Tyrol’ complicated Kerschbaumer’s ef forts, it was also the strong interest 
among Austria’s political circles in the activists’ plans that turned clear-cut 
protest into a multi-layered power struggle. It has emerged that even the 
Austrian foreign minister Bruno Kreisky was not only informed about the 
BAS’s plans to strike, but encouraged the activists to express their protest 
strongly.2 When the bombing attacks started in an organized fashion in 
1961, the activists could thus be sure that their actions were watched with 
silent approval in Vienna.
In January 1961, after another round of failed talks between Austria 
and Italy on the South Tyrolean issue, BAS members attacked two symbolic 
targets: Ettore Tolomei’s house in Glen/Gleno near Montan/Montagna 
and the aluminium statue of Benito Mussolini, the so-called ‘Alu Duce’ 
at the Montecatini plant in Waidbruck/Ponte Gardena. In March, the 
BAS bombed some of the unfinished apartment blocks associated with 
1 See Peterlini, Feuernacht, 65f f.
2 Eva Klotz, Georg Klotz: Freiheitskämpfer für die Einheit Tirols (Vienna: Molden, 
2002), 78, and Hans Karl Peterlini, Feuernacht. Südtirols Bombenjahre: Hintergründe, 
Schicksale, Bewertungen 1961–2011 (Bozen: Raetia, 2011), 68.
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the planned immigration and housing policy of Italianization in Bozen/
Bolzano and Meran/Merano. The strategic bombing campaign continued 
in April when a bomb exploded beside an Italian settlement in Sarntal/Val 
Sarentina, and a few days later in front of the Italian Bar Ferrari in Tramin/
Termeno. Miraculously, the family owners living in the building were not 
injured. Finally, the station of the financial police in Schlanders/Silandro 
and the high pressure water pipes of the Montecatini plant in Marling/
Marlengo were targeted.
Finally, during the night from 11 to 12 June 1961, in what became known 
as ‘Feuernacht’ [night of fire], factions of the North and South Tyrol BAS 
bombed and destroyed thirty-seven electricity pylons in South Tyrol, nine-
teen of which were in the vicinity of Bozen/Bolzano.3 The intention of 
these attacks was to cripple the industrial zone in Bozen/Bolzano, the eco-
nomic symbols of the Italianization policy that brought Italian workers to 
Bozen/Bolzano and excluded South Tyroleans. The bombs failed to bring 
the aluminium furnaces to a halt, however the attacks succeeded in making 
the South Tyrolean issue front page news all over the world.
Tragically, the Feuernacht attacks claimed the life of an innocent 
victim, the roadworker Giovanni Postal, who was killed in Salurn/Salorno 
as he attempted to defuse an explosive device.4 With the death of its first 
victim, the South Tyrol fight for freedom had lost is innocence. Ironically, 
Sepp Kerschbaumer was blamed for the planting of that lethal device, 
although from the outset he had been so ideologically opposed to target-
ing human beings. The SVP and the Austrian government were careful to 
condemn the violence,5 while using the opportunity to call on Italy to 
engage in meaningful talks to find a solution.
In response to this escalation in violence the Italian authorities deployed 
a further 25,000 police and soldiers in the region. They quickly located and 
arrested a huge number of activists and sympathizers. In the confines of 
the Carabinieri barracks those arrested were subjected to torture resulting 
3 Peterlini, Südtiroler Bombenjahre, 111f f.
4 Peterlini, Südtiroler Bombenjahre, 129.
5 See Dolomiten (13 June 1961).
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in confessions from all of them.6 Two of the prisoners, Franz Höf ler and 
Anton Gostner, died in custody, and despite ef forts by the authorities to 
conceal the true cause of death, it became public knowledge that they had 
died as a result of torture.7 These revelations led to a wave of protests and 
resulted in a perceptible shift in public opinion in favour of the activists, 
if not necessarily of their methods.
In the wake of the Feuernacht what remained of the BAS in both South 
and North Tyrol became more radical, adopting guerrilla warfare tactics. 
However, at best, these sporadic attacks maintained the pressure on the 
political process rather than altering it in an fundamental way. During this 
period the South Tyrolean activists Luis Amplatz and Georg Klotz became 
symbolic figures engaged in a David and Goliath struggle against the for-
midable Italian security service. They promoted this view of themselves in 
the international media, for example, the in February 1964 in the Italian 
weekly magazine Europeo and in an interview the following month given 
by Luis Amplatz to the German periodical Spiegel where he was able to 
put forward his case: ‘The Italians stole our land from us and in the current 
situation there is nothing left for us but to fight for our homeland.’8 There 
were other colourful reports in the German yellow-press magazines Bunte 
and Quick. The problem of armed warfare was partly misrepresented and 
exaggerated, Klotz and Amplatz were portrayed as ‘Tolle Bomber’ [Brilliant 
Bombers], who fought for their freedom on the ‘Heisse Erde Südtirol’ [Hot 
soil of South Tyrol]. This international coverage often downplayed the fact 
that this fight involved bomb attacks on Carabinieri barracks and patrols, 
and that human beings were deliberately singled out as victims.
Amplatz and Klotz were not the only renegade fighters, there were 
also the ‘Pusterer Buam’ made up of Josef Forer, Siegfried Steger, Heinrich 
Oberlechner and Erich Oberleiter, whose attacks resulted in severe crack-
downs by the Italian authorities. The Italians eventually used undercover 
agents to infiltrated the activist groups in order to paralyze or neutralize 
6 Peterlini, Feuernacht, 196f f.
7 Peterlini, Südtiroler Bombenjahre, 129f f.
8 Cited in Franceschini, ‘Sprengstof fanschläge’, 499.
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them. On 7 September 1964, Amplatz was shot dead in a mountain hut 
by one such agent, Christian Kerbler. Kerbler was also given the task of 
killing Klotz, but this plan failed and Klotz escaped, severly injured, over 
the main Alpine ridge into Austria, and from then on Klotz soldiered on 
alone without Amplatz.
The armed struggle for South Tyrol thereafter became more clandes-
tine, as foreign secret services, extremists and above all Austrian sympa-
thizers appeared on the battleground. The attacks, which continued until 
the end of the decade, took as its victims mainly members of the Italian 
police and financial authorities. There were also civilian victims on the 
South Tyrolean side, for example on 25 September 1966 ‘when at night 
the eighteen-year-old farmer’s son Peter Wieland was shot dead by soldiers 
on his way to a bar.’9
However, towards the end of 1969 the attacks petered out and later 
attacks, which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s usually coincided with stagna-
tion in the political progress towards autonomy.10 The attacks were predict-
able in that symbols of Italian Fascism present in South Tyrol were targeted, 
such as the ossuary in Burgeis/Burgusio (31 March 1978), the Monument 
of Victory in Bozen/Bolzano (30 September 1978) and Tolomei’s grave 
(9 March 1979). These attacks resulted in tit-for-tat retaliation by Italian 
extremists who targeted German symbols such as Silvius Magnago’s apart-
ment (23 July 1978), the Andreas Hofer memorial in Meran/Merano (26 
October 1979) and South Tyrolean cable cars (4 December 1979) which rep-
resented South Tyrol prosperity. These waves of violence caused great unrest 
within South Tyrol, but had little or no ef fect on the political situation.
It is clear that the general public in South Tyrol was deeply ambivalent 
about these guerrilla fighters, for example, Georg Klotz’s wife Rosa repeat-
edly claimed that she was made to feel like an outlaw in South Tyrol because 
of her husband’s activities.11 However, the reaction to the protagonists of 
the Feuernacht was more benign, and with the death of Kerschbaumer 
9 Franceschini, ‘Sprengstof fanschläge’, 506.
10 Peterlini, Bombenjahre, 319.
11 See Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 230.
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in December 1964 in Verona prison, it was transformed into respectful 
support for what he had tried to do in the name of South Tyrol. On 7 
December 1964 Kerschbaumer died of a heart attack in prison in Verona 
and was buried a few days later in St Paul’s church in his home village of 
Frangart/Frangarto. His funeral turned into an expression of huge public 
commitment to him and to his political aims as the head of BAS. Over 
20,000 people attended, most notably Silvius Magnago.12 This was an 
important political statement, almost like a second Sigmundskron, and 
it turned into a kind of public af firmation of the wave of violence of June 
1961.13 The mass public and political support displayed at this funeral was a 
clear message to the politicians in Rome: South Tyrol stood united behind 
Kerschbaumer and his life-long work embracing diplomacy and arbitration, 
but there was also a readiness for sacrifice and violence to achieve South 
Tryolean autonomy.
A legal stage: The trials in Milan
The allegations of of ficial torture of BAS suspects in Carabinieri custody 
resulted in the infamous Carabinieri trials in Trient/Trento, which resulted 
in the acquittal of all ten Carabinieri on trial.14 There was considerable 
international protest in the wake of this trial, and the Italian justice system 
was seriously undermined. As a result, the trial of 94 activists accused of 
the bombings of Feuernacht was closely watched by the world’s media.15 
12 Josef Fontana, ‘Ohne Anschläge keine Neunzehnerkommission, ohne Neunzehner-
kommission kein Paket?’ in Elisabeth Baumgartner, Hans Mayr and Gerhard 
Mumelter, eds, Feuernacht: Südtirols Bombenjahre (Bozen: Raetia, 1992), 130–146, 
137.
13 Fontana, ‘Neunzehnerkommission’, 138.
14 Peterlini, Südtiroler Bombenjahre, 184.
15 Of the 94 arrested 87 were from South Tyrol, 6 from Austria, 1 from Germany. All 
were charged with 92 bomb attacks, 77 of these were connected to the bombing of 
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The fact that the trials were located in Milan was an indication that the 
Italian state was aware that its justice system was also on trial and must 
appear neutral.
The trial took place over seven months in 1963 and 1964 and all ninety-
four activists were found guilty. The most severe sentences were handed out 
to Wolfgang Pfaundler, Luis Amplatz, Kurt Welser and Heinrich Klier, each 
of them receiving a twenty-year prison sentence. Eight men were sentenced 
to between ten and twenty years, amongst them Sepp Kerschbaumer, thirty-
five (including twenty-seven detainees) received ten years and twenty-seven 
(including seventeen detainees) were acquitted or granted amnesty. That 
meant that forty-six South Tyroleans walked away free as they had served 
their sentence whilst in custody, but twenty-two remained in prison.16
The court case, played out in Milan, had a significant impact on the per-
ception of the South Tyrolean issue among the Italian public. As Gatterer 
argued: ‘For the first time in Italy the history of South Tyrol from 1918 to 
1960 in its political, cultural, economic and human context was laid open 
like a book through the accounts of witnesses. The newspapers reported 
these events thus bringing them to life for the general public. In the end 
it felt as if it was the Italian state which had been convicted.’17 Prior to 
this legal dramatization of the issue, South Tyrol had been a relatively 
unknown northern region, in which, many Italians believed, a few rebel-
lious Germans, most of them former Nazis, lived. However, as the jour-
nalist Umberto Gandini noted, the defendants were careful to dissociate 
themselves from the Nazis or the image of the ‘romanitic political hero so 
prolific in Italian history.’18 In particular, Sepp Kerschbaumer managed to 
alter the picture the Italian press had painted of the ‘dinamitardi’. During 
the court case he and his fellow-accused appeared as ordinary people who 
the electricity pylons and the rest to railway tracks, industrial and military grounds, 
electrical structures and domestic residences.
16 Franceschini, ‘Sprengstof fanschläge’, 496.
17 Claus Gatterer, Aufsätze und Reden (Bozen: Raetia, 1991), 304.
18 Umberto Gandini, ‘Wachsendes Unbehagen’ in Elisabeth Baumgartner, Hans Mayr 
and Gerhard Mumelter, eds, Feuernacht: Südtirols Bombenjahre (Bozen: Raetia, 
1992), 154–157, 154.
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had been continually repressed by the Italians and, in desperation, had 
resorted to violent means to draw attention to their struggle. As Peterlini 
observed, they appeared as ‘sincere young men, some older, many of them 
with children and families at home, all in suits and ties, farmers, craftsmen, 
simple people dressed up for the courtroom as if for Sunday mass, led in 
in heavy chains …’19
The activists were not accused of high treason under sections 238 
and 241 of the Italian constitution, but rather of the more minor of fences 
of the possession of weapons and explosives. This made a more lenient 
sentence possible as the accused explained that the political aims of their 
actions had not been the separation of South Tyrol from Italy and the 
drive for self-determination, but the implementation of the autonomy 
promised to them by Italy in 1946. There was almost a riot in the court-
room as Sepp Kerschbaumer mentioned the aim of autonomy which was 
incorrectly translated by the interpreter as autodecisione that is, self-deter-
mination. It took a few moments for the tape to be replayed to confirm 
that it was in fact ‘Landesautonomie’ Kerschbaumer had said. The shift 
towards ‘Landesautonomie’ was primarily a classic legal trick, chosen with 
the sole purpose of mitigating the punishment of the defendants, but it 
also announced a shift in paradigm in the armed struggle in South Tyrol.20 
There was substantial evidence to contradict the suggestion that it was 
autonomy the bombers had been after. Josef Fontana reported that before 
the ‘Night of Fire’ he was unsure whether Kerschbaumer was fighting for 
self-determination or autonomy. When he interrogated Kerschbaumer on 
their walks together in Milan prison Kerschbaumer responded by saying 
that ‘he was reluctant to come up with political aims which seemed out of 
reach’, and he added that the BAS should ‘only support the politics that 
served the Bozen-Innsbruck-Vienna relationship,’21 which autonomy clearly 
did, while separation would have led to possible bilateral problems in the 
relationship between Italy and Austria.
19 Peterlini, Bombenjahre, 211.
20 See Peterlini, Bombenjahre, 210.
21 Fontana, ‘Neunzehnerkommission’, 142.
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Nevertheless, there was enough evidence for the state prosecutor to 
accuse the defendants of treason, including f lyers stating their aims and 
objectives. A conviction for treason would have ensured a sentence of life 
imprisonment. The fact that this course of action was not pursued was 
regarded in South Tyrol as a conciliatory gesture by the Italians. This course 
of action did also have significant advantages for Italy: the freedom fighters 
had had to claim that they were fighting for a degree of autonomy thereby 
denying the goal of self-determination. Italy had forced the activists to 
remove the notion of self-determination from the political agenda. Now 
all sides, Rome, Vienna and Bozen/Bolzano, could devote their energies 
to focusing on the provision of such autonomy.
The importance of the Milan trials for the question of South Tyrol 
cannot be overestimated. They marked the change from the classic nation-
alist concept to a more modern regionalist one. After Milan the South 
Tyrol question presented itself in a fundamentally dif ferent light: the aim 
of reunification that had dominated the discourse since 1919 was finally set 
aside. All further attempts to destabilize the political situation by bombs 
and assassination attempts could be dismissed by all sides involved – by 
the SVP as well as by Rome – as acts of terrorism which had no further 
role to play in the political context.
Impact of the ‘Night of Fire’
The Feuernacht caused reverberations within the SVP. A section of the 
party known as the ‘Aufbau’ [construction] were highly critical of Magnago 
for failing to protect the interests of the South Tyrolean economy in the 
wake of the Feuernacht. The ‘Aufbau’, led by Roland Riz, Toni Ebner and 
Erich Amonn, urged Magnago to be aware of his ‘obligations towards the 
Italian state’ and pursue a less confrontational line in negotiations with 
Rome. They expressed the hope that the Italian government would in 
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turn be more conciliatory towards South Tyrol.22 The ‘Aufbau’ were also 
critical of what they called ‘some imprudent and extreme elements’ in the 
SVP, who had been fully aware of the BAS plans for the Feuernacht.23 
Magnago managed to survive this internal crisis and preserved the party’s 
strong role as the single representative of the German South Tyroleans in 
the ensuing talks about a settlement of the South Tyrol question with the 
Italian government.
There has been considerable debate about whether the ‘Night of Fire’ 
led directly to the Italians’ attempts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. 
However, on 1 September 1961 the minister for the interior Mario Scelba 
established the so-called ‘Commission of 19’.24 The commission comprised 
eleven Italians and eight South Tyroleans and was mandated to analyse the 
South Tyrolean situation over three months and present suggestions for a 
solution to the government. Josef Fontana has argued that the establish-
ment of this commission was an indication of how vulnerable the Italian 
government felt in the wake of the bombing attacks.25 There is little doubt 
that it took a combination of political demands and the pressure of violent 
activism on Italy to trigger the political dialogue which resulted in a long-
lasting political solution.26
Italy was also under considerable international diplomatic pressure: 
on 28 November 1961 Austria had secured a second UN resolution on the 
South Tyrolean issue. The establishment of the commission gave Italy the 
advantage of being able to deal with the problem of South Tyrol internally. 
Furthermore, the SVP’s involvement in the commission meant that it had 
been forced to pin its colours to the mast and abandon critical opposition. 
From Italy’s perspective the commission also excluded Austria, the prover-
bial thorn in its side for so long. Steininger argues that the commission was 
22 Lill, Südtirol, 307.
23 These accusations were directed at Franz Widmann and Hans Dietl. See Hans Karl 
Peterlini, Hans Dietl: Biografie eines Südtiroler Vordenkers und Rebellen (Bozen: 
Raetia, 2007), 190.
24 Steininger, Südtirol zwischen Diplomatie & Terror, Vol. 2, 560.
25 Fontana, ‘Neunzehnerkommission’, 146.
26 Lill, Südtirol, 305.
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yet another Italian delaying tactic, which is borne out by its slow progress.27 
In South Tyrol it was certainly regarded as another tactical manoeuvre by 
the Italian government. The commission only really gained momentum in 
January 1963, when the European Council envoy, Paul Struye, requested 
information on its progress. The commission’s report did not actually 
appear until 1964, three years after the ‘Night of Fire’.28
In April 1964 the commission released its final report which became 
the foundation for a durable solution to the South Tyrol situation. In a 
climate of deep mistrust the ‘Commission of 19’ was able to lay the corner-
stones of autonomy for the area. The commission drew up in essence ‘what 
would become the package, of ficially accepted by the SVP in 1969.’29 This 
was not a totally new autonomy, but rather a far-reaching modification of 
the existing regional autonomy of Trentino-Alto Adige.30
The ‘Südtirol Paket’ and the Second Statute of Autonomy  
in 1972
In long negotiations with the Italian governments between 1962 and 1969, 
Fanfani, Leone, Moro and Rumor, Magnago achieved the ‘Südtirol Paket’ 
[South Tyrolean Package] which consisted of 137 measures, twenty-five 
sub-measures and thirty-one footnotes, which, in their entirety, did not 
constitute full autonomy, but something very close to it. The existing 
region Trentino-Alto Adige, which had come into being in 1948, was not 
abolished but weakened by the Paket, to such a degree that it became a 
mere institutional framework. Both provinces gained their own legisla-
tive autonomy. Crucially, this agreement came with an implementation 
27 Steininger, Südtirol zwischen Diplomatie & Terror, Vol. 2, 560.
28 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 492.
29 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 502.
30 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 502.
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committee, the Commission of Nine, to negotiate the details of the new 
statute of autonomy. This new statute came before the Italian chamber 
and the Senate in 1971.31
Magnago had been so successful during the negotiations because he 
had survived various Italian governments and was thus probably better 
informed than most others around the negotiation table. He combined this 
advantage with sheer tenacity and doggedness when dealing with Rome. 
Magnago also came to the table with an incredibly strong mandate from 
his party and the German-speaking population of South Tyrol. However, 
it was still quite a task to persuade the SVP to accept the deal brokered 
in 1969.
On 22 November 1969, the SVP accepted the Südtirol Paket after a long 
and painful debate. The vote of 538 to 492 in favour of the deal revealed 
that a significant minority remained opposed. Magnago had had to fight 
hard to convince his party that it was the best deal possible for South Tyrol. 
In the end the fact that even its opponents did not have a better alternative 
proved decisive in swinging the vote in favour of the Paket.32
Through the Second Autonomy Statute of 1972 South Tyrol became 
the ‘Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano’ and received the rights to far-reaching 
self-rule. The autonomy extended to essential areas pertaining to the run-
ning of collective organizations: libraries, higher education and museums 
were now under the aegis of Bozen/Bolzano, as were cultural exhibitions 
and traditional customs, hunting, fishing, the Alpine economy, nature 
protection, roads and the civil service, communication, transport, tourism, 
farming, social services and the conservation of culture. With all of this 
came the one concession already granted in 1948: equality of the German 
language in schools and public services. With this bilingualism in the 
public services was guaranteed.
31 Giorgio Delle Donne, ‘Die Südtirolfrage 1955–1972’, in Anton Pelinka and Andreas 
Maislinger, eds, Handbuch zur neueren Geschichte Tirols, Vol. 2: Zeitgeschichte, 
Part 1: Politische Geschichte (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1993) 449–466, 466.
32 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 505.
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Steininger argued that ‘this treaty presents little more that the exten-
sion of Italy’s responsibilities to South Tyrol according to the settlement of 
1948, which had then not been granted.’33 However, the new statute did go 
further than what had been granted in 1948. The granting of water rights, 
for example, demonstrated that the new statute even touched upon the 
vital interests of Italy in South Tyrol. Having the rights to the waterways of 
South Tyrol had in fact been one of the key reasons Italy wished to secure 
the region in 1919. This was also one of the main reasons why South Tyrol 
was not given back to Austria in 1945. Italy was now to place this important 
economic and political lever back into the hands of the South Tyroleans. 
However, it was not until the summer of 2007 that the water rights were 
ef fectively handed over to South Tyrol, but 1972 was nonetheless important 
as it showed Italian good will and granted the South Tyroleans the right to 
claim these titles back – another novelty in comparison to 1946.
The most significant dif ference to 1946, however, was a guaranteed 
scheme of implementation of these provisions in a follow-up catalogue, the 
so-called ‘Durchführungsbestimmungen’. This meant that full autonomy 
would not be immediately ef fective. It came in gradually over the following 
years and depended heavily on the political relationship between Rome 
and Bozen/Bolzano, as this determined the speed of the implementation. 
It was envisaged that the full impementation of the Statute would take 
up to five years, but in fact it took until 1992 before suf ficient substantial 
advances had been made to allow Austria as the former protective power 
to comfortably ratify the process. At this point Austria confirmed that the 
provisions of the treaty had been implemented and submitted a declaration 
of cessation of the dispute over South Tyrol to the UN. Shortly after that 
Austria joined the EU, after Italy had withdrawn its veto.34
33 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 506.
34 This had been a contentious issue between the two countries. In fact, in 1967 the 
Italian foreign minister Fanfani had claimed that the Italian veto on Austria’s mem-
bership of the EEC would not be lifted until ‘the solved the issue of terrorism in 
South Tyrol’. See Peterlini, Bombenjahre, 311.

Chapter 10
Under Autonomy Rule: South Tyrol since 1972
The gradual implementation of the Second Statute of Autonomy since 1972 
has generally, and with justification, been hailed as a great success for the 
German-speaking South Tyroleans. By 2005, the South Tyroleans were the 
best protected linguistic minority in Europe, if not the world. This is a source 
of great pride for the South Tyroleans. Far from sitting back and simply 
enjoying the achievement, South Tyrol has become pro-active in the area of 
global minority issues. In order to share the acquired knowledge in achieving 
an autonomy, the Europäische Akademie [EURAC, European Academy] 
was founded in Bozen in 1992. One of the branches of this research institute 
focuses exclusively on advising minorities all over the world who seek to 
achieve similar autonomous status. The EURAC far exceeds the remit of 
earlier institutions such as the ‘Südtiroler Wirtschafts- und Sozialinstitut’, 
the ‘Südtiroler Kulturinstitut’ or the ‘Gamper-Werk’ which were established 
by South Tyroleans to work for the region’s autonomy.1
The granting of autonomy itself has resulted in the restitution of many 
of the cultural institutions that supported and cultivated the cultural iden-
tity of the German and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans. South Tyrol now 
has its own free press, it has, since 1997, its own university, there is an abun-
dance of radio and television programmes in German and Ladin. It should 
be noted that Italian is also protected under the provisions for autonomy 
and hence there are also many Italian-speaking institutions. Identification 
with South Tyrol is exceptionally high with eighty per cent of the Germans 
and Ladins expressing pride in being South Tyrolean.2
1 Lill, Südtirol, 308.
2 See Antony Evelyn Alcock, The South Tyrol Autonomy (Bozen: Südtiroler Landesamt, 
2001), 24.
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The Paket also proved economically beneficial for South Tyrol. The 
area is now wealthier than ever before, mainly due to the reformed tax 
system that allows the country to retain ninety per cent of its taxes and 
reinvest them in South Tyrol. The unemployment rate is extremely low 
in the international context and has continued to remain low at three per 
cent3 in the face of the financial global crisis which began in 2007. The 
traditional pillars of the economy, farming and tourism, enjoy success due 
to a combination of constant innovation, high quality control and intel-
ligent marketing.
To conclude a story which has been laden with tragedy and oppres-
sion with a happy ending is tempting, however, the story is not over. South 
Tyrol is still an integral part of European developments, this time in its 
attempt to implement the options the EU provides for regional develop-
ment, both economic and political. It is therefore important to analyse 
current political developments, namely South Tyrol’s regionalist drive and 
the realities in the ‘Regional State’ of South Tyrol. It is also a vital part of 
such an analysis to look at the discourse of memory in today’s South Tyrol 
as it is in the memory of a collective identity and in its interpretation of 
its own history that a people’s understanding of themeselves manifests 
itself most clearly.
Towards autonomy
It was the implementation of the Paket through the Second Statute of 
Autonomy in 1972 that allowed for a degree of emancipation for the 
German-speaking South Tyroleans. The 1972 Statute also provided the 
basis for the peaceful co-existence of the German, Ladin and Italian pop-
3 Landeshauptmann Luis Durnwalder quoted this figure in a speech given to the 
European Forum in Alpbach, Austria, on 22 August 2010.
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ulations inhabiting the alpine region of northern Italy.4 In contrast to 
the 1946 First Statute of Autonomy, which resulted in the much loathed 
‘Region Trentino-Alto Adige’ with its vague promises for the German South 
Tyroleans, the Second Statute comprised a catalogue of 136 measures to 
guide the implementation process. The fact that implementation was rather 
slow was not due to deliberate obstruction from either side, but resulted 
rather from the political insecurity in Italy caused by continuously changing 
governments in Rome. In 1972 the country was renamed the ‘Autonome 
Provinz Bo zen-Südtirol’ [autonomous Province of South Tyrol]. Under 
its statute the province is entirely responsible for the education system 
which is bilingual: pupils are educated through their mother tongue and 
then also learn the other language. The province’s administration is also 
run on a bilingual basis; to this end in 1977 the patentino, the certificate 
of bilingualism, was introduced. This has reputedly become ‘one of the 
most hated documents, especially among the Italians,’5 as it is essential for 
entrance into public service. Public service is also governed by the pro-
portional ethnic representation of all three linguistic groups living in the 
province: Germans, Italians and Ladins. The intention behind this system 
of proportional representation, according to Article 62 of the Statute, is 
to ensure that all groups are represented by the public service and that 
members of the German and Italian linguistic group can converse with 
all public institutions. The right of proportional representation governs 
almost all areas of public administration with very few exceptions (such 
as the police and the military) meaning that all posts must be filled on the 
basis of a detailed ethnic distribution system.
Article 62, however, stipulates that redundancies related to the propor-
tional system are not possible and a balance can only be achieved through 
new personnel being employed gradually. Thus, the census that takes place 
in South Tyrol every ten years is very important as it is on the basis of the 
4 Markus Warasin, ed., Unsere Sache ist gerecht: Südtirol als Thema der österreichischen 
Aussenpolitik vor dem Hintergrund der europäischen Einigung (Bozen: Athesia, 2005), 
82.
5 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 515.
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census results that the proportional representation is modified. Since 1981 
the Italian census has required that the all South Tyrolean citizens indicate 
which linguistic group they belonged to. Apparently, many Italian-speakers 
have declared themselves to be German-speaking in order to have access 
to the greater proportion of jobs allocated for German-speakers in the 
public services.6
The Ladin population
Of particular significance in the moral context of the autonomy is the 
treatment of linguistic minorities within the German minority in Italy, 
namely the Ladin population. Ladin, a dialect within the Rhaeto-Roman 
language, is still spoken by some 35,000 speakers in the Grödner Tal/Val 
Gardina/Val Gherdëina, the Gadertal/Val Badia, and in the Fassatal/Val 
di Fassa in the Province of Trento and Buchenstein/Livinallongo/Col di 
Lana in the Province of Belluno. When Italy annexed South Tyrol, the 
Ladins found themselves in a peculiar position. While they proclaimed their 
strong ties with the German-speaking South Tyroleans, Mussolini’s fascists 
insisted the Ladins were genuinely Italian. In fact, Tolomei declared that 
Ladin was merely a bastardized Italian accent. Consequently, the Ladins 
felt the full force of the Italianization process with the added insult that 
they were considered to be little more than inferior Italians who needed 
re-indoctrination.
According to the First Statute of Autonomy of 1948 the Ladin popu-
lation within South Tyrol was entitled to educated through Ladin only 
in the first class. It was only as a result of the implementation of the 1972 
statute that the Ladins secured the same cultural freedom as the German-
speakers when the first Ladin schools were established. Article 62 of the 
Second Statute of Autonomy stipulates that the Ladins are to be politically 
6 Steininger, Südtirol im 20. Jahrhundert, 520.
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represented both in the South Tyrolean local parliament and in the regional 
parliament of Trient/Trento with at least one delegate.
The fact that the Ladins are divided among the three Italian prov-
inces South Tyrol, Belluno and Trient/Trento means that dif ferent levels 
of minority protection apply, which is something the Ladins themselves 
do not regard as appropriate. Time and again the Ladin population has 
objected to what they regard as a pressure to assimilate and the exploitation 
of Ladin issues by both the German and the Italian side.7
The creation of a pan-Ladin organization across the dividing province 
boundary lines could strengthen their political standing in the respective 
local parliaments and also nationally. Indeed, there are early signs of the 
emergence of a pan-Ladin movement: political parties are forming and a 
Ladin newspaper has been founded. On 25 September 2010, the Ladinians 
held their first pan-Ladin cultural day in Prösels Castle on the Schlern 
plateau, and it is more than likely that in the future Ladin representatives 
from all three provinces will focus more on the preservation of their col-
lective identity and thus create a united Ladin political voice.
Problems of a multilingual society
Not all areas of public life saw a speedy implementation of the Statute of 
1972. To take but one exception, it took a long time for German to become 
equal to Italian in court. This was basically due to the initial unwillingness of 
many Italian solicitors to learn German and who, due to the nature of their 
employment, could not be replaced overnight. However, overall progress 
in the autonomy issue was so impressive that, in 1992, Austria agreed to 
an Italian suggestion to finally end their dispute over South Tyrol and to 
7 See Mateo Taibon, ‘Die Ladiner: Minderheit auf dem Rückzug’, website of the 
Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker, <http://www.gfbv.de/voelker/europa/ladiner>, 
accessed 15 October 2010.
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draft a declaration to the UN which would state this formally. Austria 
became a full EU member in 1995,8 and the relationship between the two 
European members has been one of good neighbourly cooperation since. 
This demonstrates that the granting of autonomy not only quelled South 
Tyrolean anxieties concerning their future, but also improved the bilateral 
relationship between the neighbour states Austria and Italy.
The road to gaining full of ficial recognition for the German language 
and South Tyrolean customs and traditions has not always been smooth 
and creating a multilingual society such as the South Tyrolean one is not 
without its challenges. The political ef forts to institutionalize German in 
public life have led to some curious developments over the years. In the 
1990s, for example, the SVP spoke out strongly against German classes in 
Italian schools and argued that such a practice would dilute the cultural 
identity of all linguistic groups. Equally, there are no bilingual schools, in 
which German and Italian are taught in parallel.
This practice has occasionally been labelled cultural apartheid yet it 
derives from the Statute of Autonomy of 1972 which introduced two kinds 
if autonomy: a territorial autonomy for South Tyrol and a cultural auton-
omy for all three linguistic groups living within South Tyrol. The aim was 
to allow all three groups to develop individually without interference from 
the other two. Such cultural compartmentalization may seem outdated in 
the era of global networks and internet communication, but it ref lected a 
genuine attempt by the architects of the autonomy to support the minor-
ity culture. The SVP has always stressed that this practice maintained the 
purity and thus the strength of the German language spoken in South 
Tyrol, which was, after all, the main distinguishing factor between the 
two ethnic groups and of particular significance to the minority.9 The SVP 
never advocated an ethnic division between Italian and German speakers, 
but the party was always opposed to the completely parallel use of both 
languages by all people living in the province. The SVP believed that the 
8 Warasin, Unsere Sache ist gerecht, 110f f.
9 See Alcock, South Tyrol Autonomy, 20.
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completely parallel use of both languages could result in a situation where 
neither language was learnt or spoken properly.
It is the practice in South Tyrol that children, from kindergarten age 
onwards until the end of secondary school, are educated in their mother 
tongue and gradually learn the other language. In a third step English is 
being introduced, so that all South Tyrolean students will eventually fulfil 
the European Council requirement whereby each European citizen should 
speak their mother tongue, the language of their neighbour and English as 
the lingua franca of Europe. South Tyrol quite consciously aims to to place 
itself at the forefreont of regional development in Europe and it wishes to 
be a model for other border regions similar to South Tyrol.
A high level of language competence in all languages (i.e. the mother 
tongue, the language of the neighbour and English), is also of strategic 
importance to South Tyrol. Through English it can demonstrate its own 
cosmopolitan and international characteristics. At the same time English 
is the language of international tourism and the widespread use of English 
will allow South Tyrol to promote its high-quality tourism products on 
the international stage. Finally, English opens the gates to international 
economic markets and can help South Tyrol to compete for market share. 
South Tyrol as a region which has traditionally, if not always voluntarily, 
been multilingual, has undoubtedly many advantages in this competition, 
which only a few regions in Europe can match.

Chapter 11
The Regionalist Drive since 1989
The ratification of the Second Autonomy Statute by the central govern-
ment in Rome in 1972 and the successful implementation of its guidelines 
in the 1970s and 1980s – despite varying opposition from ever-changing 
administrations in Rome – led to the emergence of a robust self-confidence 
amongst the German-speaking South Tyroleans. They accepted their posi-
tion within the framework of the Italian state and the autonomy. However, 
suddenly at the end of the 1980s this steady political and economic progress 
in the region was faced with massive changes on the global stage.
A new era dawns in 1989
When, in 1989, the Berlin wall came down it appeared that the end of the 
post-war European divide between an American west and a Soviet east 
was in sight. The ef fects of this historic event were quickly felt around 
the world and revived a number of political processes which had for dec-
ades lain dormant. German reunification was only the most spectacular 
amongst them. Austria now saw an opportunity to utilize the favourable 
climate to its advantage. With the removal of the Iron Curtain economic 
cooperation with the Soviet Union was possible, and the creation of a new 
agreement concerning the country’s membership in the EU became a real 
option. In view of the rapid integration of Europe, Austria considered it 
to its advantage to join the EU.1 The new dynamics in world politics were 
1 Warasin, Unsere Sache ist gerecht, 137.
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also felt in the Central Alps. South Tyrol regarded these moves with trepi-
dation, fearing that Austria’s new political initiatives might threaten the 
relationship between North and South Tyrol, and could thus damage the 
process of cooperation in the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpenländer (ARGE 
ALP, the cooperative community of Alpine countries), which had begun 
in the 1970s. The ARGE ALP, comprised Bavaria, Tyrol, South Tyrol, 
Vorarlberg, Graubünden and Lombardy (founding members since 1972). 
At a later stage Trient/Trento (1973), Canton St Gallen (1982), Tessin 
(1988), and Baden-Württemberg (1992) also joined. The prime ministers 
involved discussed common issues relating to regional trade and commerce, 
planning, culture, health and economics on an annual basis. The decisions 
reached at these meetings had the status of recommendations. However, 
the very existence of such a forum demonstrated the need for cross-border 
cooperation. Nonetheless, it was also clear that within the framework of 
the ARGE ALP major changes of territorial and national, administrative 
and political realities were not possible.2
South Tyrol’s claim for the acquisition of the ‘most comprehensive 
form of autonomy from Italy possible’ needed international support, and 
this could not to be achieved through the instruments the ARGE ALP 
provided. Self-determination was still heralded by the SVP as the ultimate 
political goal for South Tyrol. In their 1993 manifesto the SVP outlined 
self-determination as the political ideal which embraced ‘autonomy in all 
aspects of public life’. It also articulated the desire to achieve the ‘restric-
tion and abolition of the power of the central state’, in order to achieve the 
highest degree of political emancipation for the country and its people.3 
The SVP attempted to use the Paket of 1972 and South Tyrol’s autonomy 
to seek greater proximity to North Tyrol and to loosen the political ties 
with Italy as far as possible. South Tyrol was bound by its obligations as a 
part of the Region Trento-Alto Adige. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the 
Gruber deGasperi agreement, Rome had used the existence of this region 
to suppress Bozen’s political aspirations. This had been possible because the 
2 Warasin, Unsere Sache ist gerecht, 137.
3 SVP Political Program 1993, 3.
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Italian-speaking majority in Trient/Trento retained the upper hand in any 
decision taken in the regional parliament in Trient/Trento. Over the years, 
the region had undergone modifications that allowed South Tyrol more 
political space, but the existing region was still seen as a major obstacle to 
political participation both in Italy and in the European context.
Consequently, ways of superseding the existing region were investi-
gated. In March 1990, at a meeting of the regional government (No. 33, 
March 1990) an SVP delegate, Siegfried Brugger, presented a landmark 
concept for reform. He suggested that the very existence of the region 
should be critically investigated. Brugger argued that as the autonomies 
of both Bozen/Bolzano and Trient/Trento were almost fully realized, the 
Region Trento-Alto Adige was virtually superf luous as a political entity. To 
replace it, a supraregional parliament could be established whose function 
would be advisory rather than executive and that would relate to Trient/
Trento, South Tyrol, perhaps also Tyrol and Vorarlberg.
Brugger acknowledged that this vision was perhaps wishful thinking, 
however it did in fact foreshadow the future European region. Brugger 
cited the president of the regional parliament, Franco Tretter, who had 
claimed that South Tyrol, Trient/Trento, and also the surrounding Tyrol, 
were regarded as minority partners by the stronger regions of the Veneto, 
Lombardy and Bavaria. Their position could be strengthened through a 
common regional parliament. Brugger did not deny that the creation of such 
a parliament could pose challenges, as it was something completely new in 
international law. However, he argued that it also of fered the opportunity 
to implement the cooperation agreement of 1993 between Italy and Austria, 
which was due to be ratified once the Paket was fully implemented. This 
revolutionary vision for regional reform, which foresaw the dissolution of 
the Trento/South Tyrol region and the creation of a new region, including 
North Tyrol (at that time not even a member of the EU), needed support 
from political circles within South Tyrol, Rome and Vienna if it were to 
stand any chance of becoming reality.
North Tyrol reacted positively. Alois Partl, Landeshauptmann (prime 
minister) of Tyrol, spoke favourably of a European Region of Tyrol (in 
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1991), which would include South Tyrol.4 Rome was less enthusiastic about 
the idea. The implementation of the 1969 Treaty was complete, and Austria 
was willing to declare an end to the disagreement with Italy over the South 
Tyrol issue. This finally happened in 1992. South Tyrol was experiencing 
the benefits of a wide-reaching autonomy within the Italian state, which 
was more extensive than any autonomy granted to other ethnic minorities 
in Italy. Ordinarily, Rome would have reacted forcefully to any perceived 
attempt by South Tyrol to gain even greater freedom from Rome. However, 
in the 1990s Italy was in the grip of the most serious political crises since 
World War II and thus failed to muster much resistance.
The political climate for regional development was favourable in Europe 
as cross-border cooperation between regions f lourished elsewhere. The 1980 
European Framework for Cross-Border Cooperation between Regions, the so-
called Madrid Treaty, had given regional initiatives the legal framework 
to solve cross-border problems, using the principle of subsidiarity. Article 
1 stipulated the constitutional limits of the parties involved, in order to 
make sure that regions would not interfere with state policies. However, 
the Madrid Treaty provided significant economic and political freedom, 
which could be used creatively by European regions.
South Tyrolean politicians watched carefully how the Madrid Treaty 
was implemented into regional policy in various parts of Europe. How the 
cooperation of pro-regional European politicians works is exemplified in 
the private papers of Oskar Peterlini, the then president of the Regional 
Council of the Autonomous Region Trentino/South Tyrol, documents he 
deposited in the Südtiroler Landesarchiv in Bozen/Bolzano. This corpus 
of unedited letters5 comprises a heavily annotated manuscript of a speech 
given by Johannes Rau, the then prime minister of the German state of 
Nordrhine-Westphalia. On 25 September 1991, Rau gave this presentation 
at an AGEG conference (Association of European Border regions) on 
the German-Dutch border area of Legden. In this presentation, entitled 
4 Warasin, Unsere Sache ist gerecht, 141.
5 Photocopies of all documents are in the author’s possession. They will be cited as 
Peterlini Private Papers.
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‘Perspectives on regional collaboration in Europe’ the prime minister of 
Germany’s most densely populated state argued for a strengthening of cross-
border coordination between regions and for a decentralized ‘Europe of  the 
Regions’. The sections of Rau’s speech that were highlighted by Peterlini 
provided him with a number of arguments which he employed for his 
political strategy: the propagation of the European Region Tyrol-South/
Tyrol. Peterlini recognized in Rau’s speech the implicit power in the role 
that border regions were beginning to play in propelling ‘European unifica-
tion’; as Rau observed, these regions had acquired ‘bridging functions in 
the process of European unification’.6 Rau argued against the centralizing 
inf luence of Europe and in favour of regional diversity:
From the viewpoint of border regions we have to state: Europe must not be cen-
tralized in its structures. Europe must allow the regions room to develop. It must 
incorporate the regions’ vitality and their characteristics into the process of European 
unification. Political union within Europe does not mean: the levelling of national 
characteristics to a mean average. European unification must not become synony-
mous with mediocrity. Political union must preserve and include the diversity of 
the European regions.
Peterlini was particularly interested in Rau’s suggestions for a path towards 
a ‘Europe of the Regions’:
1. The establishment of the principle of subsidiarity in all treaties of 
the political union;
2. Creation of a Commission for the Regions which would focus on 
the interests of regions, states (Länder) and autonomous commu-
nities in the EU;
3. Representation of the states (Länder) and regions in the EU’s 
Council of Ministers and a veto for those areas directly af fecting 
their rights and interests;
4. The states’ (Länder), regions’ and autonomous communities’ right 
to involve the European court of law.
6 Peterlini Private Papers.
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Rau’s aspirations for a Europe of Regions accorded precisely with the 
aims of the SVP and Peterlini: the federalization of the EU and the crea-
tion of the Europaregion Tyrol, which would be internationally accepted 
and thus emancipate South Tyrol even further from the Italian state.
The European Region
In November 1991, Peterlini presented the SVP’s position on regional 
policy publicly at an international conference in Strasbourg. In his paper, 
entitled ‘European Parliament – Regions of the Community’, he criticized 
the fact that Europe was a confederation of states in which the national 
governments alone made the decisions. The elected European parliament 
was fighting for authority, and the regions were even further removed from 
political participation in Europe. As Peterlini outlined: ‘A Europe which 
is gaining more and more power and inf luence, which takes over an ever-
increasing part of the administration and the legislation of the national 
states and its regions, cannot and must not be ruled by the executive of 
individual states.’7 According to international federal principles, democratic 
legislation should rest on the pillars of two parliaments, the European 
parliament which was elected by the European people, and a second cham-
ber which was comprised of representatives from the regions and states 
(Länder) of Europe. Within this chamber, which would participate in 
European legislation, representatives of the autonomous states (Länder) 
and regions could express their ideas because all those communities they 
represent are entitled to an ef fective and legally binding European minor-
ity protection framework.
At this seminal conference, Peterlini expressed South Tyrol’s willing-
ness to contribute the benefit of its experience in achieving autonomy. It 
7 Peterlini Private Papers.
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was in this context that he first f loated his idea of a ‘European Region Tyrol’ 
(with the inclusion of North Tyrol and South Tyrol-Trentino on the basis 
of their close historical links) to a European audience. He explained to 
the conference delegates that after the entry of Austria into the European 
Community this ‘Europaregion’ could become a model of how a cross-
border region could gain access to the European platform and pave the 
way for other such regions. This cautious attempt by Peterlini to create a 
cross-border region with the North was placed in the context of interna-
tional environmental protection and other such cross-border arrangements 
in the Alpine region. Protection of the environment, air pollution control, 
traf fic congestion control and the protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
were, according to Peterlini, ‘not issues that a national state can be expected 
to deal with on its own’.8 However, he realized, that these were issues that 
could not be solved simply by the af fected region, either.
Peterlini deliberately used ecological issues as examples of how region-
alism could function in order to def lect any potential criticism emanating 
from Italian circles. Nonetheless, his vision of cooperation between North 
and South Tyrol was, in fact, revanchiste. It remained dif ficult for politi-
cians within the SVP to advocate this Europaregion idea without being 
accused of Pan-Tyroleanism. At the same time it was obvious that the crea-
tion of a Europaregion would cause a shift in power within the Alps. This 
was a concern to politicians and a series of letters between Peterlini and 
Andreas Khol of the Austrian Nationalrat in June 1993 illustrates some of 
the issues. In response to a letter of Peterlini’s dated 4 June 1993, in which 
he outlined his vision of a new Europaregion, Khol signalled his general 
support. However, he also clearly outlined his concerns and priorities 
regarding the distribution of power:
I am of the opinion that we must set the tone in this European region and that the 
unification of North and South Tyrol is the primary aim. I would regret seeing 
this European region of Tyrol suf fer the same fate as the existing one born of the 
Gruber-deGasperi agreement, where the Trientians have the majority and rule over 
us Tyroleans from South and North Tyrol. This is my biggest concern and therefore 
8 Peterlini Private Papers.
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I wish that the initiative for the Europaregion Tyrol should come from North and 
South Tyrol, on our conditions and equipped with a legislative that retains our 
dominance in our own country.9
A week later Peterlini responded reassuringly to Khol’s letter: ‘I would 
just like to dispel your concerns that in a future Europaregion, Tyrol the 
Italians would have the upper hand’. He proceeded to outline a demo-
graphic profile that revealed that in any future Europaregion the German-
speaking element would outnumber the Italian portion 2:1. To drive his 
point home, he provided Khol with the following headcount:
 Italian population of Trentino (incl. Ladins) 449,852
 Italian population in South Tyrol (1991 census) 116,914
 Total 556,766
 German speaking population of South Tyrol 287,503
 Ladin speaking population of South Tyrol  18,534
 Total population of Tyrol (1991 census) 631,410
 Total 937,44710
Peterlini’s demographic reassurances to Khol are a clear indication that 
the idea of a Europaregion was motivated by power politics (in particu-
lar to secure autonomy which had been denied them between 1948 and 
1972) rather than a intrinsic belief in European integration. This exchange 
of letters between Peterlini and Khol occurred against the backdrop of 
a decision taken by the four local parliaments (Tyrol, Vorarlberg, South 
Tyrol and Trient/Trento) on 2 June 1993 to draft ‘Modellvereinbarungen 
für die Schaf fung einer Europäischen Region’ [model agreements for the 
creation of a European region]. According to this decision the parliaments 
stated:
9 Peterlini Private Papers.
10 Peterlini Private Papers.
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The new European situation requires the particular and permanent ef forts of all 
states (Länder) to preserve the cultural, historical and social diversity of the con-
tinent. As well as the obvious advantages of a large economic market there is the 
threat of a soulless community with a culturally undif ferentiated identity, in which 
smaller communities could be in danger of disappearing or being located on the 
margins of society.11
The details of this ‘Modellvereinbarung’ were to be drawn up by a group 
of experts and of ficials from the three regions of Tyrol, South Tyrol and 
Trient/Trento. Subsequently, two expert bodies, the tavola ronda [round 
table] and an inter-regional commission discussed the possible character-
istics of the new region. The status of the region would have to adhere 
to the stipulations of the Madrid Treaty of 1980 and the Austro-Italian 
agreement of January 1993 (Rahmenabkommen über grenzüberschreitende 
Zusammenarbeit), which focused on cross-border communication.
The ‘round table’ outlined the results of this intensive collaboration 
in its Relazione sul lavoro svolto da maggio 1995 a maggio 1996 [report 
on the work conducted between May 1995 and May 1996]. Within this 
report numerous practical suggestions were made for possible cooperation: 
exchanges of subject specialists and experts, development of economic 
and cultural elements, homogenization of directives concerning labour 
law, common quality norms and professional degrees, and a fostering of 
language courses and the display of the shared culture in common exhibi-
tions. Tourism was identified as an area where major cooperation would 
be desirable, and it was suggested that tourism should be developed on a 
pan-regional basis.12
It was not only in Vienna, Rome and Brussels that this suggestion 
was accepted but most importantly is was tolerated by the South Tyrolean 
population which had to accept the close cooperation with its neighbouring 
province. The idea of a Europaregion had to be carefully explained to the 
public, especially in South Tyrol, as many were sceptical about the crea-
tion of another region when the much hated Region Trentino-Alto Adige 
11 A photocopy of the decision of the four parliaments is in the author’s possession.
12 A photocopy of the commission’s report is in the author’s possession.
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was not yet fully a thing of the past. Thus the SVP, at its Lichtenberg party 
convention of 1994, published a declaration that outlined to the popula-
tion of South Tyrol the advantages of such a new region. They argued that 
the creation of ‘equal living and working conditions’ in the new European 
region was ‘also to encourage a common political identity and a communal 
orientation towards Europe among the multilingual populace’. The SVP 
envisaged that the region would ‘become a wider homeland (Heimat) 
wherein every community could retain its specific cultural identity and 
simultaneously pursue common interests through appropriate institutional 
channels.’13
Meanwhile, in 1995, the two prime ministers (Landeshauptmänner) 
of Tyrol and South Tyrol, Wendelin Weingartner and Luis Durnwalder, 
opened a joint Tyrol of fice at the EU in Brussels. This, in ef fect, created the 
initial infrastructure for any future Europaregion. Rome objected strongly 
to the new Tyrol of fice, according to the Italian interior ministry it was 
a ‘subversive act’ and a ‘seditious anti-Italian move.’14 In 1997, the Italian 
court of constitutional justice agreed with the ruling that the of fice should 
not have been sanctioned as its existence undermined the legitimacy of the 
Italian state in the area of foreign policy. While in 1998 a change in the 
Italian constitution resulted in an end to hostilities over the Brussels Tyrol 
of fice, Rome’s concerns regarding Bozen’s regionalist tendencies continued. 
Meanwhile, South Tyrolean self-confidence grew in the wake of a number 
of significant infrastructural projects completed in the latter half of the 
1990s. Amongst these was the Bozen airport, the Meran–Bozen motorway 
(MEBO), the refurbishment of the Bozen museum and the establishment 
of the Free University of Bozen in 1997.
On the political stage, the creation of a European region was taking 
shape, thus establishing a forum for regional politics in Brussels and, at 
the same time, minimizing the political inf luence of Rome and Vienna 
on Tyrol. The European region thus became a forum, which could be 
13 A photocopy of this document is in the author’s possession.
14 Peter Pernthaler, Die Identität Tirols in Europa (Vienna and Bozen: Springer, 2007), 
260.
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instrumental in containing the economic and political rift between the 
two parts of Tyrol, which had emerged since the 1970s. The political desire 
to equip the new Europaregion with proper institutions peaked in the 
drafting of the so-called Toniatti Proposal. This proposal, devised by the 
Trientine university professor Roberto Toniatti, suggested a statute for 
the Europaregion Tyrol, which aimed at the introduction of legislative 
bodies such as a council, a convention and a first minister. This draft was 
very similar to a constitution, and provoked uproar in the Italian media. 
There were accusations of pan-Tyrolean separatism, and the Italian govern-
ment took legal steps and initiated an investigation into subversive separa-
tist activity, during the course of which documents were seized in Bozen/
Bolzano and Trient/Trento. The government in Rome of ficially challenged 
the idea that Trient/Trento and Bozen/Bolzano had the right to pursue 
such policies or draft documents such as the Toniatti Proposal.
In the face of this political pressure, the Toniatti Bill was withdrawn 
by the politicians in Bozen/Bolzano and Trient/Trento. Instead of an 
institutional anchoring of the European region in May 1998 the three local 
parliaments agreed to continue with cross-border activities on the basis 
the ‘round table’ of 1996.
In spite of this settlement a new row emerged at EXPO 2000 in 
Hanover, when the ‘Europaregion Tirol-Südtirol/Alto Adige-Trentino’ 
pitched its own stall alongside the other exhibitors – all nation states. 
The state-like appearance of the Europaregion caused an argument 
between Rome and Innsbruck and Bozen/Bolzano. The Italian prime 
minister Luigi Scalfaro rejected this kind of regionalization outright, but 
Wendelin Weingartner, Landeshauptmann of North Tyrol, defended the 
Europaregion against accusations of separatism, arguing that it was an 
example of European federalism in accordance with the Madrid Treaty of 
1980. This new closeness between North and South Tyrol signalled two 
important developments: first, a process had begun that would result in 
the establishment of a regional entity called Tyrol which, due to its geo-
graphical location (situated between Rome and Vienna) would touch on 
the integrity of both national governments. Secondly, the Region Trentino-
Südtirol and its function appeared to be de facto obsolete.
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In January 2001, the Italian state of ficially recognized these develop-
ments and an altered constitutional law, which amended the 1972 Statute 
of Autonomy accordingly. These amendments were so far-reaching that 
some analysts have claimed that they created a ‘third statute of autonomy 
for South Tyrol.’15 The former region ceded its dominant role to the two 
autonomous provinces of Bozen and Trento. Since then South Tyrol has had 
only limited authority over foreign issues, but other than that the province 
governs essential aspects of everyday life in the region. This is particularly 
apparent in financial control, for example. Ninety per cent of taxes raised 
in the province are kept in the province. In return, it has taken responsi-
bility for areas of administration that were previously within the Italian 
state’s remit, such as the maintenance of the road network. By contrast, 
all administrative competencies that were previously the responsibility of 
the former region are now under the remit of the domain of the province. 
As Pernthaler has pointed out, however: ‘these new competencies are not 
irreversible as they do not originate in the Italian constitutional system, 
but are granted by the state’s agreed self-limitation.’16
In January 2001, with the signing of ‘Alpendeklaration’ [Alpine decla-
ration] by the various first ministers of the areas of South Tyrol, Trentino 
and Tyrol,17 the ‘Projekt Europaregion’ [European Regional Project] was 
given a further boost. The practical ef fects of this declaration have been 
the organization of joint exhibitions, collective representations in Europe 
and close cooperation in the areas of economy, environment, energy, 
traf fic, education and research, culture and tourism. While the pragmatic 
‘Alpendeklaration’ may not be comparable to Toniatti’s constitutional draft 
in terms of its political vision for the region, the importance of practical 
cooperation should not be understated as it will draw all sections of the 
Europearegion closer together.
It is evident that the regional project is having a magnetic ef fect 
on surrounding areas with other regions seeking inclusion. Many local 
15 Pernthaler, Identität Tirols, 222.
16 Pernthaler, Identität Tirols, 200.
17 Luis Durnwalder, Lorenzo Dellai and Wendelin Weingartner.
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communities on the fringes of the new region, impressed by the economic 
success of the autonomous provinces, have petitioned for inclusion into the 
successful provinces. There is, for example, the commune of Lamon near 
Feltre in Venetia whose 3,800 inhabitants announced in July 2005 the desire 
to join the Province of Bozen/Bolzano. Landeshauptmann Durnwalder 
received them cordially, and despite the rejection of their application by a 
special committee of the South Tyrolean local parliament, other communes 
have followed suit. A ninety-five per cent majority of the community of 
Sovramonte voted to change regions and a further eight communities in 
Belluno also voted overwhelmingly in favour of a change. These develop-
ments have caused grave concern among the governments of those regions. 
Veneto’s first minister Giancarlo Galan defended his region from what he 
regarded as ‘cheap and vulgar politics’ promising that the Veneto would 
not have ‘parts sold of f.’18 Galan has campaigned vigorously for the aboli-
tion of South Tyrol’s autonomy. A war of words has developed between 
Galan and Durnwalder on the issue, which underscores the significance of 
financial power within the regional context. Galan has accused Durnwalder 
of ‘baiting’ the people of Cortina d’Ampezzo with South Tyrol’s wealth, 
while Durnwalder has mocked Galan for his province’s lack of financial 
clout.19 Durnwalder’s counterpart in Belluno, however, has adopted a very 
dif ferent strategy, hoping that through cooperation with South Tyrol 
he can persuade Rome to accord greater adminstrative autonomy to his 
region also. South Tyrol has undoubtedly been the driving force behind 
European political restructuring and regionalization and a showcase for its 
successful implementation. The success of the European region Tyrol has, 
however, the potential to lead to the destabilization of the existing order 
in the alpine region of northern Italy and Austria.
18 <http://www.stol.it>, accessed 10 October 2006.
19 <http://www.stol.it>, accessed 10 October 2006.
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Regional statehood in South Tyrol
Ironically, the failure to institutionalize the Europearegion through the 
Toniatti Proposal and the increasing popularity of the region amongst its 
neigbouring provinces has led to an emergence of state-like characteristics 
in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano. The Durnwalder era, which began in 
1989, heralded the state-like development of the ‘Regional State of South 
Tyrol’. Durnwalder worked to equip the province with all the paraphernalia 
of a sovereign European state. Thus South Tyrol has its own parliament, 
f lag, and anthems (the ‘Südtiroler Heimatlied’, and more recently the song 
‘Dem Land Tirol die Treue’, which is regarded as an expression of a new 
patriotism).20 Perhaps even more significant is the fact that the region has 
its own diplomatic representation such as the Deutsches Generalkonsulat 
(German consulate) in the Dr. Streiter Gasse in Bozen/Bolzano. In March 
2008 South Tyrol granted itself a ‘Südtiroler Orden’ [the South Tyrol 
medal] which the Province of Bozen/Bolzano has conferred several times 
on distinguished contemporaries.21
Bozen/Bolzano is not only the administrative centre of the Province, 
it has also acquired the aura of a capital. It boasts respectable museums, 
well-stocked libraries, a theatre, shopping facilities and restaurants well 
beyond what could be expected from a town of its size. The city is elegant 
and cosmopolitan, friendly, and intimate, and also has its own intellectual 
life. Bozen/Bolzano is traditional and tourist friendly in areas such as the 
open air fruitmarket but also extremely modern and avant garde as exem-
plified by the new museum of modern art, the Museion. The European 
Academy (EURAC) which of fers excellent research facilities for scholars 
and the new Free University of Bozen/Bolzano not only contribute to the 
cosmopolitan atmosphere, but raise Bozen/Bolzano’s status from that of 
an Alpine town.
20 Neue Südtiroler Tageszeitung (9/10 February 2008).
21 <http://www.stol.it>, accessed 3 March 2008.
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In fact, the development of the University of Bozen/Bolzano is indica-
tive of this move towards a region state. Since the division of North and 
South Tyrol, Innsbruck University has served as the alma mater for students 
from South Tyrol. However, Luis Durnwalder, after decades of opposi-
tion to the idea, changed his mind on the establishment of a university in 
Bozen/Bolzano.22 South Tyrol is looking no further than Bozen/Bolzano 
and Brixen/Bressanone for tertiary level education.
The regional desire for emancipation from Austria was all too evident 
in the case of Ötzi. In 1993, the ice mummy was found at the foot of a gla-
cier, and South Tyrol fought vigorously to acquire it, even though there 
was considerable doubt as to whether Ötzi was actually found on South 
or North Tyrolean territory. Bozen/Bolzano won, and Ötzi now resides in 
Bozen/Bolzano’s museum where he is a source of great interest and pride. 
The Ötzi controversy revealed that South Tyrol was slowly attempting to 
separate from its erstwhile homeland Tyrol by stressing its emancipation 
whenever the opportunity arose.
South Tyrol is well aware of its strengths and steers an equally eman-
cipatory course in relation to Rome. The province is willing to take over 
further state responsibilities such as the police system and the postal serv-
ices in exchange for greater independence. In fact, Bozen/Bolzano has 
repeatedly responded to Rome’s threats to decrease the fiscal privileges of 
the autonomous provinces by of fering to take over more of Rome’s duties 
in South Tyrol. During the election campaign of October 2008, the then 
SVP party leader Elmar Pichler-Rolle even went so far as to announce his 
goal of a tax autonomy, which was decisive in the attempt to gain more 
political self-determination. In the summer of 2007 Bozen/Bolzano finally 
secured the rights to its hydroelectric power making it one of the strongest 
European regions. Given the political realities in Rome during the long 
Berlusconi era – with a prime minister who had little time for the autono-
mous provinces – South Tyrol can nevertheless be proud of what is has 
22 Michael Gehler, Tirol im 20. Jahrhundert: Vom Kronland zur Europaregion (Innsbruck 
and Vienna: Tyrolia and Bozen: Athesia, 2008), 435.
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achieved. The German-speaking minority in particular has fared well and 
has successfully established its collective identity within Italy.
Constitutional analyst Peter Pernthaler maintains that South Tyrol has 
developed a specifically South Tyrolean identity which dif fers from a pan-
Tyrolean identity and often contradicts it. Pernthaler describes it as volun-
taristic, an ‘identity based on a desire’23 – the desire to be South Tyrolean 
rather than displaying a geographical or ethnic claim to the identity. He 
is critical of the political chauvinism of South Tyrolean representatives, 
whom he accuses of seeking to prioritize South Tyrol at the expense of the 
other partners in the Europaregion.24 He argues that the Europaregion 
Tyrol could be an even stronger political tool for the interests of all three 
participating partners if South Tyrol were willing to invest in the creation 
of a pan-Tyrolean identity. Pernthaler’s analysis ignores the fact that South 
Tyrol is more than just a severed part of the historic Tyrol, it has also been 
part of Italy for ninety years and the self-definition of the South Tyroleans 
has been fundamentally af fected as a result.
South Tyrolean collective identity is firmly established within the 
framework of the Italian state and no longer needs the ethnic definition 
that was so vital and prominent in the past. It can stress its function as a 
link between North and South in a relaxed manner. South Tyrol presents 
itself confidently as a success story, even within the framework of its politi-
cal allies. In June 2008, at Bozen/Bolzano’s Kornmarkt the SVP chairman 
summed up this sense of confidence, pride and achievement: ‘In almost 
every aspect we are at the top of European league tables, whether it be 
in economic growth, employment rate or the production of alternative 
energy. We are clearly the masters of Europe’s regions, even ahead of Tyrol 
and Trentino.’25
23 Pernthaler, Identität Tirols, 266.
24 Pernthaler, Identität Tirols, 263.
25 <http://www.stol.it>, accessed 25 May 2008.
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The SVP and politics in South Tyrol
It is understandable that the chairman of the SVP should take pride in such 
achievements, as it was after all the SVP who fought so hard to achieve 
political power for the region and played such a significant role in secur-
ing economic and political success for South Tyrol after 1945. Ironically, 
however, this very success is threatening to undermine the SVP’s position in 
South Tyrol, as the region, no longer under threat, has become less predict-
able in its voting behaviour and more demanding of its political elite. The 
SVP’s raison d’être was, for so long, the struggle for self-determination and 
a comprehensive autonomy for South Tyrol and protection for the identity 
of the German-speaking population. This has largely been achieved, and 
now the SVP runs the risk of becoming a victim of its own success. When 
considered from a practical perspective, the party has achieved all of the 
political goals it set out in 1945 when it was founded. One could argue that 
the original definition of self-determination looks little dif ferent from what 
South Tyrol obtained in 2011, but in a fast-changing world the concept of 
self-determination has also changed. A key to Silvius Magnago’s success in 
the late 1950s was his ability to see (and convince others) that autonomy 
could mean self-determination within Italy and not merely separation from 
Italy. This foresight was crucial in guiding the SVP through the tumultu-
ous years of the 1960s.
It is dif ficult to imagine any other political constellation in which 
South Tyrol would be more advantaged than it is now, associated loosely 
with Italy and with considerable inf luence in domestic and foreign policy. 
Luis Durnwalder, Magnago’s successor in 1989, managed to transform the 
autonomy into an interregional dialogue with other regions within Europe, 
which has strengthened South Tyrol’s role in Italy even further. If Magnago 
was the visionary who brought about the autonomy, then Durnwalder 
quickly became its manager. He succeeded in turning political spaces into 
economic advantages and used the international stage pragmatically to 
promote South Tyrol.
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Despite these positive aspects, the threat of a political crisis looms over 
the region, as the parliamentary elections of April 2008 clearly showed. 
The electorate in South Tyrol denied the SVP their usual solid support 
and created a crisis within the party which was unsure how to combat this 
lack of support. The SVP had never experienced this before. What had 
happened? The SVP had been the all-powerful ethnic regionalist party 
representing the German speaking populace, and they had governed domes-
tic policy since 1945, but in the political world they had created critical 
voices multiplied. Democratic deficits in the political life of South Tyrol 
and the SVP were bemoaned; critics claimed there was a lack of transpar-
ency in the decision-making processes and began to question the purpose 
of the entire party. Pernthaler places the SVP’s troubles in the context of 
the waning ‘ethnic conf lict’ and the subsequent loss of cultural cohesion: 
‘As the ethnic conf lict with Italy dissolved, so the SVP and its mantra that 
the Germans have to stick together, lost the support of their followers’.26 
In fact, the purpose of an ethnic political party in general now began to 
be questioned in a globalizing world. The real divisions in the SVP run 
along dif ferent lines than the ethnic ones. In terms of its origins, the SVP 
is a relatively conservative party catering for the middle section of society. 
Even though the party also boasts a ‘workers’ wing’, many workers in South 
Tyrol, including German-speaking ones, do not feel adequately represented 
by the SVP. At the same time, if the SVP were to shed its ‘ethnic label’, the 
party might very possibly experience support from the Italian population. 
There have been a few attempts at this reorientation in the past. The ‘col-
lective ethnic party’ faces considerable criticism from the young and the 
educated South Tyroleans. This new generation is not adverse to combining 
the advantages of their Italian and German worlds. Life is multicultural, 
multilingual and young educated South Tyroleans look increasingly to 
global role models – where in this world is there room for an SVP that 
holds on tightly to old ideals which appear so out of step with the world 
it has helped to create?
26 Pernthaler, Identität Tirols, 267.
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Admittedly, disenchantement and general disengagement from politics 
and politicians is widespread all over Europe. While this younger generation 
have enjoyed the benefits of a democratic system, they have not excelled 
in taking responsibility for maintaining that system. This reluctance on 
the part of the younger generation to engage in the political system in 
South Tyrol may partly be because the SVP dominates that system to such 
a degree that in many respects it is the system. There are few changes and 
alterations in the political landscape, and despite his permanent media 
presence and his early morning public of fice hours in the Palais Widmann, 
the Landeshauptmann Durnwalder remains generally detached from real 
life in South Tyrol.
In response to these frustrations new parties have sprung up within the 
German-speaking camp to challenge the SVP, such as the Greens, the South 
Tyrol Freedom Party and the Union of South Tyrol. While these parties 
are still quite weak they represent a fracturing of the political hegemony 
that has characterized the German-speaking political arena. A political 
party spectrum in the classical sense, that is, a system with competing 
parties which are able to form coalitions, is as yet absent in South Tyrol. 
However, the first cracks indicating a split in the SVP were visible in the 
summer of 2008. Moreover, after future elections circumstances may arise 
in which the SVP might be forced to seek a coalition with the Italian par-
ties in South Tyrol. The SVP is facing major challenges which will change 
the party fundamentally.
The timing of this crisis is anything but desirable. It was the historical 
strength of the SVP and its deep rooting in the German-speaking elector-
ate that, throughout South Tyrol’s post-war history, led to the success of 
the present. Part of the reason for South Tyrol’s success in carving out its 
autonomy was the ability to express itself forcefully with one political voice 
to Rome. Aspects of South Tyrol’s autonomy have been threatened repeat-
edly during Silvio Berlusconi’s second period of of fice between 2008 and 
2011. He has never made a secret of his dislike of South Tyrol’s autonomy. 
The weakening of the SVP and the arrival of other political voices inside 
South Tyrol therefore threaten South Tyrol’s unified stance in the parlia-
ment in Rome, which was so important in securing and maintaining the 
autonomy.
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Furthermore, South Tyrol’s leading circles have failed to transmit 
the history of South Tyrol: young people in South Tyrol are often poorly 
informed about their past and therefore are not in a position to fully appre-
ciate the benefits and protection the autonomy of 1972 af fords the region. 
History has lost its resonance and with that its power to inform the current 
political reality. This seems surprising in a country where historical arte-
facts are so omnipresent and where history is so basic to an understanding 
of the present. It may well be that the organized teaching of history was 
shied away from because contemporaries were wary of old wounds and 
divisions resurfacing. The ‘Option’, the ‘Rückoption’ (option to return after 
World War II), the emigration of the 1950s and the polarizing bombing 
campaigns, however, have left deep impressions on the collective identity 
of the South Tyroleans that need to be confronted, placed in context and, 
most importantly, explained to a new generation of South Tyroleans. In this 
case ignorance is not bliss, it is merely ignorance and deprives the current 
generation of the ability to create an informed political future.
The teaching of history, particularly in the context of ethnic and cul-
tural tension, is always challenging and should take place in an environ-
ment free from political manipulation. However, a knowledge of history 
is vital if one wishes to create an informed political process. The accept-
ance of South Tyrol as a success story has eased the relationship between 
history and historiography. Even the most controversial issues such as the 
bombing campaign of the early 1960s can be discussed in an informed, 
objective and analytical fashion as, for example, in the 2005 radio pro-
gramme ‘Bombenjahre’ (RAI Bozen, Italian state radio and television 
organization, Bozen/Bolzano section) with Christoph Franceschini and 
Helmut Lechthaler.
Despite various attempts by the regional papers, by local historians and 
by the SVP themselves to keep the history alive there has been a remarkable 
lack of institutional and systematic historical research. It was not until 2008 
that a lecturer was employed to teach South Tyrolean history at the Freie 
Universität Bozen. Only in spring 2011 did the government announce the 
creation of a Regional Historical Institute to be located at the university, 
which would work in cooperation with local archives in its attempts to 
research, document and publish local and regional history.
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Even though there have been other institutions involved in histori-
cal research before now, namely the Südtiroler Landesarchiv and the 
Europäische Akademie, these institutes focused solely on research instead 
of adopting an integrated approach of research-led teaching. The new 
Institute for Regional History will presumably seek to take up this chal-
lenge. It will be a delicate undertaking. There are a number of histories in 
the Province that need to be taught: German South Tyrolean, Italian and 
Ladin. In view of the intimate connection between history and identity, 
the teaching of these histories must be sensitive and imaginative. All these 
histories are almost mutually exclusive as the Ladin people feel reppressed by 
both Italy and by the German South Tyroleans, and the Italian population, 
which has as yet not formed a collective identity, agrees only in their shared 
conviction that their founding myth coincides with the fascist regime in 
Italy, when Mussolini brought many Southern Italians to Bozen in order 
to Italianize the province’s population. This very era, however, is anathema 
to the German South Tyroleans who experienced their harshest period of 
suppression between 1922 and 1943. The relics of the fascist past which are 
apparent in Bozen/Bolzano and elsewhere, are being hailed as memorials of 
a founding period (Gründerzeit) by the Italians, while the German South 
Tyroleans view them as memorials of suppression and forced integration. 
The Ladin population, divided and dispersed over three provinces in the 
region, are simultaneously discovering their common bond and are thus 
contributing to a mixture of understandings of history which are contro-
versial, contradictory and polarizing.

Chapter 12
Writing the Past and Establishing a South Tyrolean 
Collective Memory
History is political in South Tyrol, or more accurately: historical events are 
more present in today’s political discourses than in many other European 
regions. Not only are they more present, there are also more of them as all 
three linguistic groups in South Tyrol, the German speakers, the Italians 
and the Ladins, have dif ferent interpretations of that history. Historical 
interpretations compete with each other and often appear mutually exclu-
sive. The discourse of memory and reinterpretation of the past is highly 
dynamic in South Tyrol and subject to rapid change. An analysis of this 
process of reinterpretation reveals a good deal about the ways in which 
South Tyrolean history has contributed to the area’s current self-image.
The bombing campaign of 1961 and South Tyrolean autonomy
Sandro Canestrini, the solicitor acting for the South Tyrolean defendants 
during the 1963 Milan trails, shocked the judge and court-room audience 
when he opened his defence by declaring: ‘I Turchi oggi hanno occupato 
Firenze!’1 [‘The Turks have occupied Florence today!’] Brief ly relishing 
the stunned silence, he went on to explain that this was a joke, but that 
the scenario was nevertheless extremely similar to the one the German 
1 Interview with Sandro Canestrini, in Bilder aus Südtirol, broadcast by 3sat on 6 
October 2006. Report by Josef Ebner, ORF Tirol 2006.
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South Tyroleans experienced after both World War I and World War II, 
when they had to accept that they were ruled by Italy. Canestrini’s open-
ing remarks were intended to have a resonance for the Italian public and 
press. His strategy was to evoke some kind of empathy amongst the Italians 
for the South Tyroleans, a people the majority of Italians knew precious 
little about. It was only as a result of the violence of 1961 that many Italians 
became aware that all was not well in the northern border region of their 
country. Even then the attacks were not in any way contextualized and 
regarded merely as instances of mindless terrorism. Canestrini sought to 
educate the Italian population about the German-speaking South Tyroleans’ 
experience at the hands of the Italian state. In their attempt to Italianize 
the German-speaking majority in the province, the Italians had created a 
dualism in society that was hard for the native German South Tyroleans 
to tolerate. In the decades following the bombings of the early 1960s there 
was no public discussion in South Tyrol about their social or political 
significance. Historians dealt with the issue in passing, while the political 
situation for the German South Tyroleans remained unclear.2 It was only 
in 1992, after Italy’s full implementation of the Paket of 1969 and the sub-
sequent Austro-Italian UN declaration that the dispute over South Tyrol 
was over, that it became possible to have a public discussion of the violence 
of that period and its wider historical meaning.
Elisabeth Baumgartner, Hans Mayr and Gerhard Mumelter were 
the first to address the issue comprehensively with the publication of 
Feuernacht. Südtirols Bombenjahre. Ein zeitgeschichtliches Lesebuch [Night 
of Fire: South Tyrol’s Years of Bombings. A Contemporary Reader]. The 
editors’ expressed intention was to start a ‘public discussion’, the introduc-
tion declared that: ‘After three decades of silence it is time for the public to 
deal with this issue, it is time that questions are answered and that positions 
2 See Felix Ermacora, Südtirol und das Vaterland Österreich (Vienna: Amalthea, 1984), 
Claus Gatterer, Im Kampf gegen Rom (1968), Robert Drechsler, ed., Sepp Kerschbaumer: 
Ein Leben für Südtirol (Vienna: Drechsler, 1965), Viktoria Stadlmayr, ‘Italienische 
Argumente’, in Franz Huter, Südtirol. Eine Frage des europäischen Gewissens (1965) 
and Friedl Volgger, Mit Südtirol am Scheideweg (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1984).
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are taken.’3 As the first real engagement with this controversial period at 
a politically sensitive time, it was careful in its editorial style providing 
many pictures and statements from both sides of the linguistic divide, in 
a conscious ef fort to incorporate all views in the narrative.
The Austrian writer Felix Mitterer followed up on this intiative 
with a four-part docudrama Verkaufte Heimat [Lost Homeland]. Part 3, 
Bombenjahre, dealt specifically with the bombing campaign. Mitterer’s 
TV production reached a wide audience in Germany, Austria and South 
Tyrol. He depicted the protagonists of the early 1960s and their struggle 
in a way that was symptomatic of the treatment of the Bombenjahre in 
1994: his heroes are riddled with self-doubt, troubled by what they felt 
they must do to save their Heimat. This docudrama ref lected the Zeitgeist 
in South Tyrol in the same way that more recent publications document 
the change in perception. More recently, in 2005, RAI Bolzano broadcast a 
six-part documentary on the bomb attacks of 1961. Through Bombenjahre 
the authors Helmut Lechthaler and Christoph Franceschini managed to 
reopen a public discussion about the ef fect of these violent attacks on the 
political process.
The new national library
The academic debate about the ef fect of violence has often been charac-
terized by wishful thinking and idealistic approaches, while the public 
discourse is characterized by a rehabilitation of the ‘men and women’ of 
1961. This rehabilitation resembles historical phenomena of the early twen-
tieth century – that is, those phases of nation-building in the evolution of 
small states that, after achieving national independence, resort to writing 
their own history in the light of what has been achieved. Yet modern-day 
South Tyrol is not a newly founded nation state, but a strong autonomous 
3 Baumgartner, Mayr and Mumelter, Feuernacht, preface.
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province within the ‘host state’ of Italy. However, an analysis of publications 
since the 1990s reveals that the bombers of the early 1960s are portrayed 
as icons. This myth-making is the foundation for the new South Tyrolean 
‘national library’ – a corpus of printed histories of the South Tyrolean 
struggle. Interest in the Bombenjahre has been suf ficient to result in a 
number of publications, both academic, such as Rolf Steininger’s 1999 
three-volume publication Südtirol zwischen Diplomatie und Terror [South 
Tyrol between Diplomacy and Terrorism],4 and non-academic and mainly 
biographical and highly subjective studies. Most of these publications are 
more than just memorial accounts of the past in that they place the activ-
ists and their individual destinies in the violent period of the 1960s in the 
wider context of South Tyrolean history in the twentieth century. Close 
scrutiny of this new literature reveals a strong regional self-confidence, 
based on the far-reaching constitutional autonomy of the Autonomous 
Province of Bozen/Bolzano.
As the leader of the SVP (1957–1989) and Landeshauptmann of South 
Tyrol (1961–1989), Silvius Magnago is considered the founding father of 
South Tyrolean autonomy. It is generally accepted that he inf luenced the 
transition of South Tyrol from an underprivileged and impoverished back-
water to the wealthiest and most politically independent region of modern 
Italy. Gottfried Solderer’s publication Silvius Magnago. Eine Biographie 
Südtirols [Silvius Magnago: A Biography of South Tyrol, 1996] is a literary 
tribute to a man who has become synonymous with the success story of 
South Tyrol. In this impressive study Solderer draws a very human portrait 
of Magnago, often as a larger-than-life personality shrouded in the mist 
of cool professional political distance, an image widely accepted by the 
South Tyrolean public.
Since 2000 a wave of published biographies and oral histories have 
sought to, and largely succeeded in, creating a place for the more controver-
sial activists of 1961 in the canon of South Tyrolean history. The (mainly) 
men portrayed in these biographies generally come from a dif ferent back-
ground to Magnago’s educated and intellectual one; they were farmers, 
4 ‘… a publication so extensive that is thus accessible only to experts’, Lill, Südtirol, 8.
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shopkeepers, students and, above all, family men. Indeed, it is the role of 
the families and the women behind the activists that have been stressed in 
recent publications. This approach has facilitated a process whereby the 
protagonists are humanized and their choices are given moral legitimacy. 
A more detailed consideration of the most significant of these publica-
tions reveals modern South Tyrol’s changed perception of the events and 
activists of 1961.
In 2000, Josef Fontana and Hans Mayr published a biography of Sepp 
Kerschbaumer, Sepp Kerschbaumer: Eine Biographie [A Biography]. Fontana 
and Mayr were fellow-activists of Kerschbaumer’s, who along with Luis 
Amplatz and Georg Klotz, is considered the main figure of the ‘liberation 
movement’. As leading members of the BAS all three of these men were 
arrested and interned by the Italian police in 1961, thus they are not merely 
narrators but also witnesses and protagonists of the violent struggle. This 
makes for an intimate, well-informed, but also subjective interpretation 
of Kerschbaumer and the struggle he represented. His struggle was their 
struggle, and thus an account of his actions is also a justification of their 
involvement in the violent activities. This proximity to Kerschbaumer makes 
for a problematic publication and a curious interpretation of his character. 
Mayr and Fontana do not spend much time on Kerschbaumer’s formative 
background. His journey from shopowner and family man to political activ-
ist/terrorist is not considered, instead they explore him through the prism 
of his role as a BAS-activist and sentenced prison inmate. This is essentially 
a hagiography and Kerschbaumer is not portrayed in the context of the 
Zeitgeist of his time, but rather from the perspective of 2000. This makes 
for a regrettably superficial and two-dimensional characterization.5
5 A case in point is the historical introduction, which focuses on Kerschbaumer’s 
emergence as an activist: Kerschbaumer joined the SVP in 1946 and stepped down 
from his post as Ortsobmann (party chairman) of Frangart/Frangarto in 1958. This 
very significant phase in his life is summarized in one short paragraph which con-
cludes: ‘The SVP remained his political home’, Josef Fontana and Hans Mayr, Sepp 
Kerschbaumer: Eine Biographie (Bozen: Raetia, 2000), 21. This is factually inac-
curate – Kerschbaumer left his post because of the massive divergence in strategy 
with the SVP leadership – and stylistically most regrettable, because Fontana and 
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Numerous passages in the biography indicate that the authors were pri-
marily interested in Kerschbaumer’s legacy and there are constant attempts 
to stress his importance for contemporary South Tyrol. When describing his 
altruism,6 his philanthropy,7 and his extraordinary tolerance,8 the authors 
note that his qualities are exceptional even ‘in the context of today’. This 
comparison to the present, which serves no purpose in a historical interpre-
tation of Kerschbaumer, reveals the authors’ strong personal involvement in 
the subject. They belong to the generation of South Tyroleans who accepted 
significant personal risks for their participation in the armed struggle and 
who paid the price and served time in Italian jails. This generation tends 
to evaluate the achievements in the living standards in South Tyrol since 
the 1980s more critically: they equate the current wealth with materialism, 
complacency and political lethargy. Kerschbaumer symbolizes the opposite: 
he is passionate in supporting fellow-citizens,9 he demonstrates ‘exemplary 
civic courage,’10 he declared his sole responsibility for the attacks of 1961 
in the Milan bomb trials in order to protect his fellow-accused,11 and he 
looked after his fellow inmates in Verona prison ‘like a father’.12
Mayr rob themselves of the unique opportunity to draw an analytical picture of 
Kerschbaumer’s character in the period 1946–1958, which forms the basis of  his later 
actions. Similarly regrettable in its superficiality is the chapter Kerschbaumer and 
the Italians, where the authors write: ‘He nourished a holy rage towards the of ficial 
Italy. At the same he helped Italian immigrants when they needed help. He sharply 
distinguished between people and politics. Everybody who knew him, emphasized 
this fact.’ Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 25. This comment is superf luous; it is a 
shortcut in interpreting Kerschbaumer which originates not in his time, but in the 
present. A few pages on, Kerschbaumer as leader of the BAS is being described as 
follows: ‘This [i.e. Kerschbaumer’s] tolerance in the home of the South Tyrolean 
separatist movement was unusual in contemporary South Tyrol and would still be 
exemplary today.’ Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 27.
6 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 28.
7 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 25.
8 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 27.
9 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 84.
10 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 101.
11 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 145, 147.
12 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 207.
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Fontana and Mayr repeatedly stress Kerschbaumer’s strong Catholic 
beliefs and his exceptional concern for other human beings,13 however, 
they fail to give plausible and specific reasons for his turning to violence. 
Instead they present a general picture of post-World War II South Tyrol, 
they describe in great detail the injustices of the First Autonomy Status 
of 1947, and emphasize the threat posed by Italian immigration to South 
Tyrol and the Italian government’s fifty-one per cent majorization policy. 
Their reading confirms the general historical understanding of the period 
of the 1950s as one of increasing tension in South Tyrol as epitomized 
by Gamper’s 1953 Dolomiten article. It is widely accepted that Gamper’s 
characterization of the policy of majorization as a ‘the death march of the 
South Tyroleans’ prompted Sepp Kerschbaumer to press the SVP leadership 
into a more decisive stance against the Italian government. Consequently, 
he strongly supported the new style of leadership under Silvius Magnago 
after the internal party revolution in the SVP in 1957. However, Magnago’s 
speech at the Sigmundskron mass gathering disappointed Kerschbaumer, 
he considered it too moderate and designed to quell public outrage rather 
than to harness it to bring about real change. Kerschbaumer then took indi-
vidual action and wrote leaf lets in order to mobilize the South Tyroleans 
politically by encouraging them to take action against Italian oppression. 
These pamphlets were signed Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol BAS (Liberation 
Committee of South Tyrol) and widely disseminated. He also displayed 
great personal courage when in February 1957 he f lew the Tyrolean f lag 
from the church steeple in Frangart/Frangarto, for which he was arrested 
and served ten days in prison. Actions such as these mobilized the public to 
a degree, and in the following weeks Tyrolean f lags appeared in inaccessible 
yet very visible places throughout the area. Moreover, civil disobedience 
now had a name and a symbolic figure in Sepp Kerschbaumer. His political 
struggle continued when he stepped down from his post as an SVP local 
chairperson, an act Fontana and Mayr claim was motivated by a desire to 
‘protect the party’.14 In response to the sentencing of the Pfunderer Buam 
13 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 28.
14 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 75.
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he began a fifteen-day hunger strike, to highlight what he, and many others, 
considered was an unjust trial.15 His letters of protest from prison to the 
Italian prime minister Amintore Fanfani, president Giovanni Gronchi, and 
minister of justice Guido Gonella were ignored. Fontana and Mayr regard 
this series of events as pivotal in Kerschbaumer’s disenchantment with the 
political process and ultimate conclusion that ‘we need dynamite’.16
At this juncture in their political biography, Fontana and Mayr, portray 
Kerschbaumer as emerging from being a very Catholic, courageous, and 
disappointed South Tyrolean citizen who was driven by political events 
to become an activist. However, they are careful to stress that he remained 
faithful to his Christian beliefs even though he employed violent means to 
improve the future of his fellow-citizens. The biographers fail to investi-
gate the political alternative represented by Silvius Magnago. They present 
Kerschbaumer as someone who was forced to become a ‘dinamitardo’, the 
Italian term for the South Tyrolean activists. From then on things moved 
swiftly: Kerschbaumer created an active organization, linked up with North 
Tyrolean sympathizers who would become instrumental in procuring 
dynamite, and fell out with its leaders, especially Wolfgang Pfaundler, the 
North Tyrolean journalist. The groups dif fered significantly in their stra-
tegic considerations which, according to the authors, derived from their 
diverse individual mentalities.17 Pfaundler and Kerschbaumer’s diverging 
views relate to the question of whether the violent struggle should be lim-
ited to attacks against objects representing Italian supremacy, or whether 
it should be extended to guerilla warfare and focus on human targets, i.e. 
carabinieri, soldiers, and Italian political representatives.
Kerschbaumer favoured the fight against the Italian infrastructure, and 
the authors of his biography support his view strongly. This is a crucial point 
for the moral legitimacy of their telling of this history, but also of their 
role in it. A struggle against the symbols of oppression is easier to justify to 
15 See chapter 8.
16 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 101.
17 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 117.
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today’s readership than attacks on human targets.18 Josef Fontana and Hans 
Mayr created an image of Sepp Kerschbaumer that was easy to contextu-
alize in a peaceful society at the turn of the millennium. Kerschbaumer’s 
ethics, his courage, and his initially peaceful struggle conform to current 
political ethics, and he is thus transformed into a modern unifying figure 
representing South Tyrol’s struggle for cultural independence from Italy. 
Few in South Tyrol disagree with his moderate anti-Italianism – directed 
against Italian policies but never against individual Italians. Furthermore, 
Fontana and Mayr use the opportunity to ascribe anti-Germanism to Italian 
policies and Italian demonstrations in Bozen/Bolzano, even though several 
historians have argued that at the root of the controversial Italian policies 
against South Tyrol lay the fear of fragmentation of the Italian state.19
Kerschbaumer, however, remains an icon: his letters from prison are 
described as the ‘poetry of a virtuous heart’, his altruism is praised and he 
is compared to an unknown Italian saint.20 His funeral in 1964 is recast as 
a religious pilgrimage – a third Sigmundskron.21 Fontana and Mayr recall 
a protagonist who was opposed to division and disintegration, worked for 
peace and justice, for unity and cohesion in the pursuit of South Tyrolean 
freedom.22 The Sepp Kerschbaumer that they create is designed as a role 
model for the reader of the twenty-first century. Their biography is less 
true to the historical Kerschbaumer than to an idea of his legacy, which, in 
turn, includes them as members of Kerschbaumer’s group. The chief aim 
18 Nevertheless, they are careful not to come down too hard on the other group and its 
most prominent members, Wolfgang Pfaundler, Georg Klotz, and Luis Amplatz, as 
they describe the relationship between the two groups as a ‘Nebeneinander, nicht 
Miteinander’ (a parallel struggle, not a concerted one), yet at the same time it is not a 
‘Gegeneinander’ (fight against each other) either. Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 
103.
19 At the same time the Trient Carabinieri trials of 1963 would lend themselves to anti-
Italian polemics, but here Fontana and Mayr remain moderate in their criticism of 
events which are clearly in the past and which have, thanks to the dynamics of the 
autonomy process of the 1970s and 80s, become history.
20 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 169.
21 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 216.
22 Fontana and Mayr, Kerschbaumer, 223.
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of the biography is to ensure Kerschbaumer’s legacy is understood as mor-
ally legitimate and therefore one that can be owned by the entire German 
South Tyrolean population.
In 2000, Sepp Mitterhofer and Günther Obwegs published a mono-
graph with an unambiguous programmatic title: ‘… Es blieb kein anderer 
Weg …’ Zeitzeugenberichte und Dokumente aus dem Südtiroler Freiheitskampf 
[There was no other way … Eyewitness Reports and Documents from the 
South Tyrolean Struggle for Freedom]. The title asserts from the outset 
that the violence of 1961 was not only inevitable but also morally unavoid-
able. The preface articulates the two main functions of the book: first, 
to record and explain the events of the past to the younger generation; 
secondly, to claim a monopoly on the truth or more emotively to end the 
‘litany of lies which has shrouded the 1960s struggle for freedom’ and 
‘instead tell[s] the truth’.23 Thus the book is aimed at the new generation 
of South Tyroleans, the post-bombing autonomy generation. Crucially, it 
also claims a monopoly on the truth, implying that there is but one truth. 
The narrative of South Tyrol’s struggle as ref lected in all these essays24 is 
set in stone as one of ‘necessary self-defence’.25
In his essay Hans Stieler, leader of the so-called Stieler Group, which 
became famous at the end of the 1950s, sets the context for a reading of 
the bombing period as self-defence. He describes in detail the political 
situation of post-World War II South Tyrol: Italy remains fascist, the SVP 
betrays ‘our homes’,26 German-speaking South Tyroleans are dispossessed 
of property and forced to emigrate, while Italian workers f lood the area.27 
According to Stieler this context was vital to the formation of the Stieler 
Group in 1955. Its members were gravely concerned for the future of their 
23 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 13.
24 The contributors are well-known activists such as Hans Stieler, Sepp Mitterhofer, 
Luis Steinegger and Luis Gutmann, but there are also contributions by some of the 
women of the resistance movement, such as Maria Mitterhofer, Rosa Klotz, and 
Midl von Sölder.
25 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 45.
26 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 26.
27 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 27.
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Heimatland and, in order to highlight the plight of the people, created 
home-made bombs to warn ‘our politicians to become harder in their 
negotiations’ for independence from Italy. In his contribution Stieler argues 
there was a strong connection between the Italian negotiation strategy 
of obfuscation and delaying tactics and the subsequent violence. Stieler’s 
rationale is that injustice creates resistance, and resistance is another form 
of negotiation between the oppressors and the oppressed.28
All the contributors to Mitterhofer and Obwegs’s collection address 
the issue of Italian suppression after the bomb attacks and the torture of 
those arrested. This focus shifts the critical attention away from bombs 
and the violent deeds of the activists and on to the brutality of the Italian 
regime. The activists’ violence is only mentioned in one short subordinate 
clause, while the acts of torture that the carabinieri inf lict on those arrested 
is moved centre stage. In other words, the acts of violence are seen as the 
context for Italian torture. Mitterhofer, for example, repeatedly stresses 
that it was the isolation of the South Tyroleans that forced innocent citi-
zens into using violence as a means of protest. He portrays these citizens 
as compelled to action in the face of genocide.29 Furthermore, they were 
Catholic – albeit disappointed by their church and their bishop – and 
consequently anti-Communist.30 This presents Mitterhofer and Obwegs’s 
freedom fighters as individuals who were embedded in the societal consen-
sus of past and present-day South Tyrol and whose deeds in the 1960s are 
therefore deemed acceptable even by modern standards. They also delib-
erately attach these fighters to Sepp Kerschbaumer and his more benign 
militancy of violence against objects rather than people. Mitterhofer and 
Obwegs cite Rosa Klotz, wife of Georg Klotz, the most notorious gue-
rilla fighter of the period, who claims that Klotz and Kerschbaumer had 
solemnly declared that they would devote themselves to liberating South 
Tyrol.31 By associating these activists with Kerschbaumer the authors seek 
28 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 34.
29 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 45.
30 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 78, 46.
31 This was in ‘1959 or 1960’ and they had done this in the presence of ‘an embroidered 
pillow featuring the Tyrolean eagle’, Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 
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to rehabilitate them and redeem their reputation in the light of the general 
social approval for Kerschbaumer and his ideals and methods. Mitterhofer 
and Obwegs’s book seeks to reconstruct the history of South Tyrol’s struggle 
for autonomy as a moral one in which all members of the German-speaking 
population were united.
Luis Amplatz is consequently portrayed as a man of great political 
wisdom and vision, as one of the first to recognize the significance of Italian 
plans to marginalize the German population.32 South Tyrolean resistance is 
conceptualized as a ‘self-defence against an unjust regime’33 and thus similar 
to contemporary colonial struggles, where rules and laws were violated in 
pursuit of just liberation. Luis Gutmann summarizes the situation thus: 
‘We violated Italian law but we obtained moral justice.’34 The struggle for 
South Tyrolean liberation is thus portrayed as one that transcends legal 
justice because it is a moral fight.
If the reader accepts this interpretation, he/she will see the protago-
nists as heroes of an ethnic and national struggle. Obviously, this reading 
is not necessarily historically accurate, but motivated by a political agenda. 
Crucially, Mitterhofer and Obwegs use their book to strongly criticize 
contemporary ef forts by the SVP to harmonize the relationship between 
the Italian and German people in South Tyrol.35 They vehemently disa-
gree with any attempt to find compromises: for example, they label the 
recognition of Italian road signs as ‘rape’. In similarly trenchant vein mixed 
marriages between Italians and Germans in South Tyrol are regarded as 
having a negative impact on South Tyrolean culture, which reveals that 
the authors remain attached to the liberation movement’s principle of 
cultural ‘apartheid’. Fortunately, this ethnic chauvinism has little relevance 
in twenty-first-century South Tyrol.
Mitterhofer and Obwegs’s attempts to justify morally the actions of 
guerilla fighters Amplatz and Klotz paved the way for Eva Klotz to publish 
32 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 102.
33 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 270.
34 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 110.
35 Mitterhofer and Obwegs, Kein anderer Weg, 346.
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the biography of her father, Georg Klotz. Freiheitskämpfer für die Einheit 
Tirols [Georg Klotz: Freedom Fighter for the Unity of Tyrol] in 2002. Klotz 
tells the story of the freedom fighter partly from her own perspective as a 
daughter, partly from a third-person narrator’s point of view. Her perspec-
tive changes often and abruptly, which makes the book quite dif ficult to 
read, but she also provides the reader with insights into the family life of 
a freedom fighter. While the book is in the genre of memory literature, it 
is also overtly political in its message.
Eva Klotz paints a picture of her father as a tragic hero: he is a freedom 
fighter who pursues his path of violent activism even though this creates 
immense hardship for him and his family of six. As a hero he suf fers perse-
cution and betrayal which drives him into the mountains of South Tyrol; 
he is forced to emigrate to Austria where he suf fers acute home sickness 
and repeatedly returns to South Tyrol illegally to see his farmstead and 
his family. Ultimately, he is a tragic hero because his ideal of armed resist-
ance to liberate South Tyrol becomes anachronistic and outdated after 
the Paket of 1969. He remains an outcast, outliving his old comrades Sepp 
Kerschbaumer, Kurt Welser and Luis Amplatz. In the latter years of his 
life he experiences real loneliness as he feels the Tyrolean people no longer 
support him and his fight.36 Though he survives an assassination attack, he 
finally dies from smoking-related disease, and his slow death is attributed 
by his daughter to his bitterness about Austria.37
Eva sets out to rehabilitate her father’s reputation and present him in 
a heroic light. While he remains throughout the book the lone wolf who 
adheres to nothing but his own strong principles, his daughter seeks to 
humanize him and thereby diminish the impression of his remoteness. 
She describes him as a military strategist,38 calls him the symbol of Italian 
defeat,39 a knightly and valiant warrior,40 but at the same time compassion-
36 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 308.
37 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 314.
38 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 73.
39 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 152.
40 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 123, 104.
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ate, caring and full of sympathy.41 In Eva’s hands he is not an adventurer, 
but a liberation fighter who devotes his service entirely to his country in 
order to achieve South Tyrolean self-determination.
Central to Rosa’s (Eva’s mother’s) portrayal of her husband in the same 
publication is the image of him as a family man, in this way she personalizes 
his story: his story becomes a family’s story and, by implication, a society’s 
story. Eva calls South Tyrolean society to book: her father, her family car-
ried out South Tyrol’s struggle often without their society’s support. Eva 
describes how her mother, Rosa, attempted to meet her husband and was 
unable to even trust her neighbours.42 She portrays the SVP as negligent, 
claiming that even they failed to support the freedom fighters when they 
were exposed to systematic police torture.43 In fact, she regards the SVP as 
traitors who condemned the attacks and welcomed the exile of Amplatz and 
Klotz.44 Klotz had to endure lasting separation from his family, loneliness, 
and home-sickness.45 His personal fight for South Tyrolean freedom only 
ended with the SVP’s – with the Paket. However, even when he sought 
reconciliation with the Italian authorities he was rejected. He was forced 
to live his life away from his beloved South Tyrol making a modest living as 
a forest worker in Northern Tyrol living in a small mountain hut. His final 
‘hut’ existence in many senses symbolized his literal, moral and political 
isolation from his Heimat.46 Eva Klotz’s portrayal of her father bears many 
characteristics of the hero in a Greek tragedy. He is larger-than-life, a hero 
who can only be brought down through conspiracy and intrigue.47
In 2003 the journalist Astrid Kof ler published Zersprengtes Leben. 
Frauen in den Südtiroler Bombenjahren [Scattered Lives: Women in the 
South Tyrolean Years of Bombing], which of fered a very dif ferent per-
spective on the years of violence. Kof ler employs a mixture of social his-
41 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 78.
42 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 147–149.
43 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 103.
44 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 179.
45 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 308.
46 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 327.
47 Klotz, Georg Klotz, 177, 181, 248.
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tory, politics and psychology as she presents various dif ferent women and 
their recollections of the period. The women are from ‘scattered’ back-
grounds including various walks of life and diverse political perspectives 
who recount their experiences of the bombing era. None of the women 
interviewed – Rosa Klotz, Anna Amplatz, Pia Widmann, Maya Mayr and 
Rosa Gutmann, to name but a few – raise the question of guilt, justice, or 
injustice. As victims of the political circumstances they present a forum of 
experiences and background information. All of them have their (political) 
views, but these come second to recollections of a more personal nature. 
They state ‘our family lives were “blown up to pieces” because our fate was 
determined by our husbands.’48
While Kof ler’s interviewees do touch on the reasons why their 
husbands turned to violence in the early 1960s, which include: cultural 
suppression,49 financial discrimination,50 and political repression,51 the 
emphasis is on surviving the struggle. Every day life takes centre stage in 
these narratives which personalize the struggle and its consequences on 
family life. As Midl von Sölder recalls: ‘Everyday life did not leave us women 
any time for despair.’52 Their children suf fered ostracization in school,53 and 
they were abandoned by the SVP.54 These women’s story is one of isolation 
and betrayal within and beyond the family framework,55 despite occasional 
moments of solidarity.56
The women’s narratives are peppered with tales of personal courage. 
Midl von Sölder challenges the prison priest in the confessional,57 Maya 
Mayr swallows explosive capsules in order to get them past the Italian border 
48 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 80.
49 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 219.
50 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 34, 117.
51 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 248.
52 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 82.
53 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 89.
54 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 77.
55 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 242.
56 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 186, 290.
57 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 32.
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control,58 and Rosa Klotz becomes the ‘Mother Courage’ of the South 
Tyrolean liberation struggle,59 sustaining the fighters with moral support, 
providing shelter and looking after their abandoned families. This book 
seeks to explain a complex historical period through the prism of family 
life, exposing the degree of private suf fering and the deep social wounds 
inf licted at the time. As Christl Kerschbaumer noted, when commenting 
on the publication, ‘history was not and still is not amusing – it left traces 
in all families.’60 Astrid Kof ler refrains from passing political judgment 
on the 1960s, instead she gives those contemporaries who had not been 
heard before a public voice and thus contributes substantially to a better 
understanding of the period of the Bombenjahre. This approach also facili-
tates a personalizing of this history. It is in some senses depoliticized and 
reconceptualized through the lived experiences of ‘ordinary people’. The 
implication is that this could be anyone’s story, anyone’s history.
Günter Obwegs’s 2004 biography of Luis Amplatz, Ein Leben für 
Tirol [A Life for Tyrol] serves a similar purpose and adopts a similar 
approach to Mitterhofer and Obwegs’s Es blieb kein anderer Weg. Alongside 
Kerschbaumer and Klotz, Amplatz was the third in the triumvirate of icons 
of the 1960s South Tyrolean struggle. Amplatz has generally been portrayed 
as a man who embraced life and remained an idealist until the day of his 
assassination in 1964. He was killed by the Italian agent Christian Kerbler 
in the Brunner Mahder, high above the Passeiertal/Val Passiria. Amplatz is 
an ideal subject for any biographer: full of life, a family man who embraced 
tradition and folklore and who had a great sense of humour. Nonetheless, 
because Obwegs uses the biography to express his anti-Italianism, Amplatz 
is stripped of his dynamism and appears lifeless and two-dimensional. 
Obwegs’s study is superficial and serves to obscure his subject. Amplatz is 
presented as a man who, compelled by the Zeitgeist of his time – which 
the author is at pains to stress – exceeded the imagination of modern-
day contemporaries: ‘Today’s people, who are wealthy, may struggle to 
58 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 254.
59 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 216.
60 Kof ler, Zersprengtes Leben, 212.
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understand, but what was done then was done because of desperation 
which was visible and tangible everywhere.’61 However, in his anxiety to 
elucidate that period, Obwegs presents an oversimplified narrative in which 
the fascist Italian state is full of sadistic Italian policemen62 and noble South 
Tyrolean freedom fighters. In this context his hero, Amplatz, is forced to 
conclude that ‘politics and talk alone will not change this state’.63 In using 
Amplatz as a vehicle to express his own political views, Obwegs obscures 
the historical person.
In 2005, Hans-Karl Peterlini with his survey book Südtiroler Bomben-
jahre. Von Blut und Tränen zum Happy End? [South Tyrolean Years of 
Bombings: From Blood and Tears towards a Happy End?] sought to track 
this historical revision of the period. Peterlini’s title reveals the central vein 
of this revisionism: the move to re-imagine the blood and tears as part of, 
if not responsible for, the happy ending of autonomy. Peterlini retells the 
story of the Bombenjahre and presents them in the context of the mil-
lennium, but does not, in essence, revolutionize the view of the period, 
rather he contextualizes the roles of the main protagonists for a post-1960s 
generation. This is a considerable challenge as his audience, particularly 
South Tyrol’s younger generation, have no real concept of material poverty 
and political repression, the two things that define the narrative of the 
time. He reinterprets the violence of the 1960s from the perspective of a 
modern South Tyrolean by taking into account the successfully achieved 
South Tyrolean autonomy.
These twenty-first-century accounts of the violent struggle of the 1960s 
quite deliberately personalize the history of South Tyrol and the fight for 
autonomy. In so doing, they place that history at the heart of South Tyrolean 
society, normalizing the protagonists rather than exceptionalizing them: 
these are ordinary heroes with families. This emphasis on the personal is 
underscored by an attempt to retell history as ‘lived experience’; hence the 
61 Günther Obwegs, Freund, der du die Sonne noch schaust … Luis Amplatz: Ein Leben 
für Tirol (Bozen: Athesia, 2004), 27.
62 Obwegs, Leben für Tirol, 96.
63 Obwegs, Leben für Tirol, 31.
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decisions made to use violence are recontextualized and thereby recon-
ceptualized as human choices in the absence of hindsight. The bombing 
years explained in the light of human choices by real people has made the 
task of inserting these men and women into the history of South Tyrolean 
autonomy a more morally acceptable undertaking.
Chapter 13
Commemoration and Collective Memory
Establishing the South Tyrolean autonomy, politically and economically, 
has also led to the development of a South Tyrolean collective identity, 
which remembers the past in a dif ferent way to previous generations. The 
following analysis of selected crucial events in the Province’s history reveals 
the changes in the way South Tyrol interprets its past.
Remembering the Paris agreement
The year 2006 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Paris Treaty, a treaty 
negotiated by the then foreign ministers of Italy and Austria, Alcide deGa-
speri and Karl Gruber. The treaty’s core point was an agreement regarding 
the return of the 75,000 ‘Optanten’ and a significant degree of autonomy 
for South Tyrol. As has been discussed in a previous chapter, the status of 
this treaty, which was not actually a treaty, caused considerable anxiety in 
the German South Tyroleans. In view of this controversy and ambiguity it 
is revealing to see how the so-called treaty has entered the realm of public 
memory in South Tyrol as this agreement has proved dif ficult for modern 
South Tyrol to evaluate and interpret.
Immediately after the treaty political commentators in both North 
Tyrol and in Vienna were extremely critical of Gruber. Innsbruck, in par-
ticular, was very vociferous in its disappointment that the division of Tyrol 
had been reaf firmed and, in ef fect, signed and sealed by this agreement. It 
believed that a reunification of North and South Tyrol was rendered even 
less likely by Gruber’s Paris agreement. It was dif ficult afterwards to develop 
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any vision of a united Tyrol.1 The view of the South Tyrolean political 
elite was somewhat more positive, for example, the SVP paper Volksbote 
regarded the agreement as progress because at least Italy had acknowledged 
the political existence of the South Tyrolean people.2
The Innsbruck based Tiroler Tageszeitung hailed the agreement as a 
compromise between law and power,3 but the Dolomiten complained that 
South Tyrol had once again become a victim of greater interests.4 However, 
there was general relief in South Tyrol that the ‘Optanten’ issue had now 
been resolved and that the fellow South Tyroleans, who still remained 
abroad, would now be allowed to return home. This relief was tempered 
by uneasiness regarding the geographical size of the region which was to 
receive a degree of autonomy from Italy under this agreement. These res-
ervations were entirely justified as the emergence of the new amalgamated 
region Trentino-Alto Adige in 1948 was to demonstrate. A decade later 
the Paris agreement was all but forgotten as South Tyrol entered a period 
of increased tensions, a period marked by people’s frustration about the 
political realities of the Region and by the first instances of radical violence. 
The political slogans of this time were ‘Los von Rom!’ and ‘Los von Trient!’, 
and the SVP managed to capitalize on the meeting at Sigmundskron.
The twentieth anniversary, 1966, was no time to ref lect on the Gruber 
deGasperi agreement. South Tyrol was reeling from the ef fects of bomb 
attacks and tough political negotiations. In 1976, the diplomatic relation-
ship between Italy and Austria was worse than ever before, however, thirty 
years after the agreement, the conf lict had largely passed. The Paket had 
been approved and autonomy for South Tyrol had been granted by Rome. 
With these secure political foundations public commemoration of 1946 
was an option.
In 1976 in an article in Europa Ethnica Viktoria Stadlmayer, long-
serving and legendary head of the ‘Referat S’, the South Tyrol department in 
1 Jennifer Hegarty-Owens, ‘Gedenken an das Gruber-deGasperi Abkommen: 1946 
bis 2006’ (Unpublished MA Thesis: University College Dublin, 2007), 25.
2 Volksbote (12 September 1946).
3 Tiroler Tageszeitung (7 September 1946).
4 Dolomiten (9 September 1946).
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the Tyrolean government in Innsbruck, criticized the Italian state’s approach 
to the ‘Pariser Vertrag’ arguing that it regarded it as a ‘one-of f payment’ 
which allowed the state to cast the issue aside.5 This she contrasts with the 
Austrians who considered it as a temporary platform for the existence of the 
South Tyroleans, which would be developed through further negotiations. 
For the South Tyroleans the agreement was negative, because they endured 
worse political and economic hardship than before World War I. Many in 
South Tyrol had hoped the agreement would be a ‘Magna Carta’, but only 
after 1972 and the ratification of the Second Statute of Autonomy, was 
there any noticeable progress in the area. South Tyrol was well on course 
to becoming a regional state; however its development was overshadowed 
by many dif ficulties and dangers which created an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty. As Stadlmayer noted: ‘South Tyrol today is even more at risk than 
twenty or thirty years ago. It is currently on dry land, while beside it there 
is political, social and moral marshland. If the waves roll over it tomorrow, 
will Austria be able to help again?’6
The magazine Südtirol in Wort und Bild commemorated the thirtieth 
anniversary with a reprint of an radio interview that Gruber had given the 
Österreichischer Rundfunk Tirol (ORF).7 This piece ref lected the con-
temporary criticism of Gruber as inexperienced, particularly when faced 
with deGasperi. This inexperience, it was claimed, allowed deGasperi to 
gain significant ground in negotiations. In 1976, Gruber rejected this allega-
tion, while apologizing for the shortcomings of what he referred to as the 
‘Gentlemen’s agreement’. However, in mitigation he cited the extremely 
tight time frame in which the agreement had to be drawn up and the 
dif ficulties posed by the many dif ferent languages employed during the 
conference and the fact that German was not one of them. He argued that 
he had been driven by the desire to achieve something for South Tyrol and 
to define it internationally. Stadlmayer, representing the North Tyrolean 
5 Viktoria Stadlmayer, ‘30 Jahre Pariser Vertrag’, in Europa Ethnica. Vierteljahresschrift 
für Nationalitätenfragen Jahrgang 33 (1976), 104f.
6 Stadlmayer, ‘30 Jahre Pariser Vertrag’, 105.
7 Südtirol in Wort und Bild, November 1976, 2–5.
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view, waded into the debate by stressing this Austrian weakness referring to 
South Tyrol as little more than ‘small change in the international market’, to 
quote Stadlmayer’s famous phrase.8 The historian Rolf Steininger entered 
the debate in 1987 by supporting Gruber’s argument and also pointing out 
that he had been further hampered by the international climate in which 
Austria was weak and anti-German sentiment was widespread. In fact, 
Steininger argued that South Tyrol had been the first victim of international 
Cold War diplomacy.9 However, providing academic legitimacy to Gruber’s 
view of his own historical role, the historian described the agreement as 
a major contributing factor in Austria’s decision to bring the South Tyrol 
question before the United Nations in 1960.
The fact that Gruber felt it necessary in 1976 to defend himself and 
his role in the brokering of the 1946 agreement, reveals that the agree-
ment and its legacy had new political relevance and potency in 1976 South 
Tyrol. During this period, South Tyrol was only beginning to define itself 
as an autonomous region following the granting of autonomy status in 
1972. Thus 30-year commemorations revealed an attempt to analyse the 
Gruber deGasperi agreement in the light of the new autonomy. Gruber as 
protagonist, Stadlmayer as the voice of diplomatic Tyrol, and Steininger as 
historian, all played a role in this crucial phase of the agreement’s histori-
cization in the 1970s and 1980s. These debates marked the beginnings of 
the conceptualization of the Gruber deGasperi agreement as one of the 
foundation stones of the future autonomy.
By 2006 the idea of the Gruber deGasperi agreement as central to 
the history of the autonomy of South Tyrol was firmly established. In the 
commemorations of that year the chairman of the SVP, Elmar Pichler 
Rolle, hailed the agreement as crucial to the achievement of South Tyrol’s 
far-reaching independence from Italy. However, there was an awareness 
that this interpretation could alienate Italians in the region. Therefore, 
8 See Viktoria Stadlmayer, Kein Kleingeld im Länderschacher: Südtirol, Triest und 
Alcide deGasperi 1945–1946 (Innsbruck: Wagner, 2002).
9 Rolf Steininger, Autonomie oder Selbstbestimmung? Die Südtirolfrage 1945/1946 und 
das Gruber – De-Gasperi-Abkommen (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006), preface.
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the SVP’s of ficial website urged South Tyroleans to ‘commemorate’ rather 
than ‘celebrate’ the significance of the agreement. This distinction implied 
that the SVP regarded the process of commemoration as somehow more 
sensitive and respectful of competing traditions in the area. This was not 
celebratory in a chauvinistic fashion, rather commemorative in a histori-
cal sense.
The South Tyrolean Press Of fice designed a website dedicated to com-
memorating the agreement. Significantly, the webpage was presented in an 
educational format containing historical detail, documents and eyewitness 
accounts. The webpage characterized the agreement as an ‘international 
contract’, which stressed its potential role as a model for other minority 
conf licts. It asked, for example: ‘Does the solution of the South Tyrol 
problem provide a key to the Tibet issue?’10 This reading of the agreement 
was echoed by South Tyrol’s print media, which by and large praised the 
agreement as a foundation for South Tyrolean autonomy.11 The significance 
of the 2006 commemorations lies in the fact that South Tyrol appeared 
confident enough in its autonomous status to be conciliatory, to be con-
cerned about how its commemoration of that process might be regarded 
by its Italian fellow citizens.
Commemorating Sigmundskron
November 2007 saw the fiftieth anniversary of the Sigmundskron mass rally. 
At this rally the young and charismatic new chairman of the SVP, Silvius 
Magnago, coined the phrase ‘Los von Trient!’ to spearhead the political 
struggle for a ‘real’ autonomy for South Tyrol. This was a critical juncture 
in South Tyrolean history as Magnago simultaneously confronted those 
10 <http://www.provinz.bz.it/pariservertrag/autonomie/tibetfrage.asp>, accessed 25 
October 2011.
11 Hegarty-Owens, ‘Gruber deGasperi’, 41–45.
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demanding separation from Italy or ‘Los von Rom!’ and harnessed the col-
lective anger for the more moderate (and achievable aim) of meaningful 
autonomy. Ef fectively, at Sigmundskron, Magnago managed to secure a 
mandate for his more moderate political demand which went hand in hand 
with a rejection of radical violence in the political arena. This cemented his 
role as the main political voice of the South Tyrolean people until 1989.
The commemoration of Sigmundskron has been considerably less 
problematic than the Gruber deGasperi agreement or the bombing cam-
paigns of the 1950s and 60s. Sigmundskron has been celebrated as a crucial 
turning point and the beginning of a very successful development which 
was crowned by the Paket in 1969. A testament to the unproblematic nature 
of this event in South Tyrolean’s collective memory is Margareth Lun and 
Hans Veneri’s 2007 illustrated cof fee-table book of the event. In this book 
the events of 17 November 1957 are aestheticized with beautiful photos 
that attempted to capture the solidarity of the day. Eyewitness accounts 
stress the atmosphere and the sense of a collective turning point.12 The 
Dolomiten also joined the public commemoration of Sigmundskron and 
published an extra photo supplement entitled: ‘November 17 – a day that 
changed South Tyrol forever’. The SVP took the opportunity to ‘thank’ 
Magnago and thereby reassert its connection to him and the successful 
autonomy. The party also explicitly reaf firmed its position the people’s 
party by also thanking the:
many thousand South Tyroleans who, 50 years ago to the day, followed the call of 
the South Tyroleans People’s party and voiced their support for the party’s slogan 
‘Los von Trient!’ Led by Silvius Magnago, their courage and political wisdom turned 
the event into another landmark on the path of history towards the success of the 
South Tyrolean autonomy.13
In the same commemorative period, writing in the FF magazine, the his-
torian Gerald Steinacher of fered academic confirmation of Sigmundskron 
12 Margareth Lun and Hans Veneri, Der Tag von Sigmundskron: Eine Kundgebung 
macht Geschichte, 17. November 1957 (Bozen: Südtiroler Schützenbund, 2007).
13 Dolomiten (17/18 November 2007), 48.
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as a landmark. Interestingly, Steinacher regarded the commemorations 
as a process of ‘small nation building’,14 whereby South Tyrol was estab-
lishing foundation myths and symbols. He compared this region’s foun-
dation myths to the role played by the myths of well-established nation 
states, for example, Switzerland’s Rütli oath, the United States of America’s 
Declaration of Independence, the Austrian’s Staatsvertrag of 195515 and the 
Germans’ Hambach festival of 1832. In comparing South Tyrol’s commemo-
rations as foundation myths akin to those created by other nation states, 
Steinacher used the commemorative process to underscore South Tyrol’s 
nation-like qualities. However, he also of fered a contemporary warning that 
foundation myths could foster complacency and/or a culture of alienation. 
Thus he urged South Tyrol to build an inclusive commemorative process 
that represented, or at least did not alienate, its Ladin and Italian people. In 
the same issue, the historian and politician Hans Heiss echoed Steinacher’s 
warning by reminding the South Tyroleans that those who had supported 
Magnago had, nevertheless, failed to support those political activists who 
were tortured and incarcerated following the events of 1961.16
These debates contribute to keeping these institutionalized days of 
‘regional’ memory from becoming complacent days of self-congratulation. 
They are also a reminder that commemoration is never neutral, that it is 
itself a dynamic process that not only ref lects current preoccupations, 
but can also impact and alter the future. It is, therefore, crucial that every 
generation re-engages with these commemorations and the history they 
represent, in order to ensure history does not become a pretext for chau-
vinistic exclusion of any social or political grouping. In 2007, Steinacher by 
cautioning against commemoration becoming a means to exclude Ladins or 
Italians, was attempting to draw attention to the danger of cementing the 
ethnic divisions in the region. Thus commemorations do not just provide 
an opportunity for historical ref lection, they also of fer society a chance 
to ref lect on the future it wants to create.
14 FF, Steinacher, ‘15. November 2007’, 38–45.
15 FF, Steinacher, 43.
16 FF, Heiss, ‘Basar der Erinnerung’, 50f.
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The victory monument, the Pascoli School and the  
Italian-German relationship in South Tyrol
While the German-speaking minority in Italy is now enjoying its special 
status as a minority, the Italian minority in South Tyrol is being forced to 
redefine itself as a minority in South Tyrol. This process has been painful 
and very slow because political coteries in all three linguistic groups have 
been forgetful of the fact that the autonomy protects all three groups and 
not just the German-speaking one. Steininger has pointed out that there 
is no real cooperation between these groups in South Tyrol, but instead a 
very orderly coexistence of two or three parallel societies.17 His conviction 
is supported when one examines the two biggest newspapers in the region, 
the German-speaking Dolomiten and the Italian Alto Adige. On a daily basis 
both papers ref lect two very dif ferent realities and perspectives usually 
covering dif ferent stories and almost always of fering very dif ferent views 
on society. Even their subtitles, Tagblatt der Südtiroler and the Corriere 
delle Alpi, suggest that each is taking a dif ferent view on South Tyrol. 
The papers’ weather forecast sections also hint at dif ferent perspectives: 
the Dolomiten predict the weather for the entire geographical region of 
the historical Tyrol, from the Austrian town of Kufstein in the North to 
Rovereto in the South, while Alto Adige confines its forecast to the area of 
South Tyrol and Trentino.
Two parallel societies are nonetheless better than two opposing ones, 
especially when one takes into account the painful history of the past ninety 
years. There can be no doubt, however, that South Tyroleans (of all three 
linguistic/ethnic groups) need to work on improving this interrelationship 
in order to ensure that the autonomy works in the long run. To this end, 
history, or rather its use, has not facilitated closer relations or greater under-
standing among the three groups. First of all, each has its own historical 
narrative with which to explain the past and which informs three diverging 
public memories of the twentieth century in South Tyrol. A communal 
17 Steininger, Südtirol vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart, 116.
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history, one which integrates and balances these narratives is extremely 
hard to imagine at present. The process of ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ 
[coming to terms with the past], has been so fundamentally dif ferent for 
each group. For the German-speaking group history has been a key to turn-
ing suppression into political success. The Ladins are gradually beginning 
to look to their specific historical narrative, the Italian population has 
not in any real way embraced its historical roots in the region. Especially 
the period of Fascism, which is most prominent and has left the deepest 
scars on South Tyrol, has become an issue where both major groups are 
diametrically opposed in their interpretation. To the German-speaking 
South Tyroleans, Italian Fascism symbolizes suppression and injustice, 
while the Italians in South Tyrol see the era of Mussolini as the period in 
which they came in large numbers to South Tyrol to work and live in the 
country. The Italian annexation is, as Lucio Giudiceandrea points out, at 
the root of both the German South Tyrolean and the Italian definition 
of themselves as a collective identity. While the German South Tyroleans 
suf fered under Mussolini’s attempts to Italianize them, the Italians fol-
lowed the fascist myth that they had to bring civilization to South Tyrol. 
However, Giudiceandrea’s historical analysis indicates that the Italians in 
South Tyrol could also justifiably be considered as victims of Fascism:
The superior Roman-Fascist Italian was to bring the barbarians culture and was to 
teach them. During Fascism and unfortunately even later this became the mission 
given to tens of thousands of families who left their regions and moved to South 
Tyrol. Following developments, however, revealed that they, just like the German and 
Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans, had in fact become victims of the state’s national-
ist policy.18
The dif ferences in interpretation of South Tyrolean history is particularly 
apparent in the way both groups deal with the artefacts of the fascist past. 
The numerous controversies about these lieux de mémoires have always 
18 Lucio Giudicenandrea, ‘SüdtirolerIn als Identität: Die schwierige Ausbildung von 
Identitätsmodellen in Südtirol’, in Georg Grote and Barbara Siller, eds, Südtirolismen: 
Erinnerungskulturen, Gegenwartsref lexionen, Zukunftsvisionen (Innsbruck: Wagner, 
2011), 281–292, 282.
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come to a head at the Siegesdenkmal [victory monument] by the river 
Talfer, the sheer existence of which divides the South Tyrolean population 
deeply, while, at the same time, it suggests to the visitor a very ‘relaxed’ way 
of dealing with the fascist past. Many scars of the fascist past have healed 
and many symbols of German South Tyrol have returned to their old places 
in Bozen/Bolzano. The monument of Walther von der Vogelweide was 
returned to its square in 1981, the Laurinbrunnen, which had been dam-
aged in 1933, was restored in 1993 and is now situated in front of the South 
Tyrolean regional parliament, and even the Bozen/Bolzano Museum was 
given back its traditional tower.
Nevertheless, Benito Mussolini’s face is still staring down from the tax 
of fice and opposite that there is the Amba-Alagi Street commemorating 
the military success of the fascists in Abyssinia in 1935/36. Just up the road 
is the ‘Siegesdenkmal’ bearing its chauvinist message. The ‘Siegesdenkmal’ 
is surrounded by a low fence, which, however, is not enough to musealize 
the monument. Thomas Pardatscher provides a detailed analysis of the 
political conf licts of the 1980s and 90s surrounding the monument, which 
led to deep rifts among the two national groups in South Tyrol.19 It has 
not been possible so far to depoliticize the monument as both sides have 
used its very existence for their political ends.
In 2002 the Bozen/Bolzano local council decided to rename the square 
on which the monument stands as the Peace Square rather than Victory 
Square. Street signs were changed accordingly. The neofascist Alleanza 
Nazionale (AN) reacted immediately afterwards and conducted a survey 
of the citizens of Bozen/Bolzano, the vast majority of whom are Italian, 
which revealed that sixty-two per cent favoured ‘victory’ rather than ‘peace’. 
The square had to be re-renamed and is still called Siegesplatz to this day. 
The result of this survey should not, however, lead to the conclusion that 
all Italian-speaking citizens of Bozen/Bolzano are fascists, but it reveals a 
deep-seated insecurity among the Italian population and a sentiment of not 
feeling properly at home in South Tyrol. The vast majority of Italians living 
in South Tyrol are descendants of immigrants from the South during the 
19 See Pardatscher, Siegesdenkmal, 182f.
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fascist era and have lived in South Tyrol for two or even three generations. 
As the autonomy developed so quickly after 1972 and the German-speaking 
group became the driving force in the area, many estranged Italians have 
simply held on to all things Italian regardless of the political and histori-
cal connotations insisting on the integrity of artifacts that remind them 
of their forefathers’ immigration to South Tyrol.
Another striking example which demonstrates this defensive attitude 
to history is the 2006 controversy over the redesignation of the Pascoli 
School house. The school, which was built during the fascist era, was lying 
empty and the local council decided to refurbish it as the city’s main library. 
This scheme would have allowed the centralization in one library of the 
material scattered throughout smaller libraries all over Bozen/Bolzano. 
There was a massive protest from the Italian population, whose representa-
tives argued that the school represented Italian art and was thus a part of 
their understanding of what the German language describes as ‘Heimat’.
Irrespective of, or perhaps increasingly because of, South Tyrol’s suc-
cessful autonomy, the historical ownership of the province’s monuments, 
landmarks and events remains contested. It is in the commemoration of 
historical events that these tensions become particularly obvious. In fact, 
contemporary tensions are often articulated and played out in the various 
commemorations. With each recurrence of commemoration of the events 
like the Gruber deGasperi agreement and the Sigmundskron mass rally, the 
South Tyroleans repeatedly work out the contemporary relevance of their 
past. However, these commemorations have, by their very nature, objectified 
and excluded the Italian population. As the South Tyroleans have gradu-
ally outgrown the notion of themselves as victims, sections of the Italian 
population have begun to regard themselves as the new victims. In fact, 
representatives of this group, such as the journalist Lucio Giudiceandrea, 
have argued that the Italians could also be considered victims of Fascism. 
This reading of the past could of fer a bridge between the ‘parallel commu-
nities’ in South Tyrol, as in this reading Fascism becomes the central force 
of oppression. However, this has not occurred as yet because a significant 
section of the Italian population regard Fascism and its monuments as sites 
of their identity and history in South Tyrol.
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The case of South Tyrol thus exemplifies the complexity of cultural 
identity formation over time in an area of Europe that is both unique in its 
historical, social, linguistic and ethnic composition, but at the same time 
is typical of the issues which arise from the problematic interface between 
politics and culture for minority communities worldwide.
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